000024522 001__ 24522
000024522 005__ 20180122202748.0
000024522 037__ $$a724-2016-49113
000024522 041__ $$aen
000024522 084__ $$aQ13
000024522 245__ $$aCompeting Screening Rules
000024522 260__ $$c2005
000024522 269__ $$a2005
000024522 270__ $$mghendrikse@fbk.eur.nl$$pHendrikse,   George
000024522 270__ $$myhu@rsm.nl$$pHu,   Yamei
000024522 300__ $$a20
000024522 336__ $$aConference Paper/ Presentation
000024522 446__ $$aEnglish
000024522 490__ $$aContributed Paper
000024522 520__ $$aVarious studies show that agricultural cooperatives behave differently than their investor-owned counterparts. One explanation may be that the internal decision making process differs in these two governance structures. A model is developed to explore how endogenous screening rules affect efficient organizational choices and industrial structures. It is shown that screening level choice may outweigh architecture choice and that screening rules are strategic substitutes. Conditions are derived under which cooperatives are efficient organizational forms. It is also shown that competition may increase the attractiveness of investor-owned firms and circumstances are determined in which cooperatives and investor owned firms coexist in equilibrium.
000024522 650__ $$aAgribusiness
000024522 6531_ $$aarchitecture
000024522 6531_ $$ascreening
000024522 6531_ $$acooperatives
000024522 6531_ $$aduopoly
000024522 700__ $$aHendrikse, George W.J.
000024522 700__ $$aHu, Yamei
000024522 8564_ $$s383837$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/24522/files/cp05he04.pdf
000024522 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/24522
000024522 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:24522$$pGLOBAL_SET
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  Previous issue date: 2005
000024522 982__ $$gEuropean Association of Agricultural Economists>2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark
000024522 980__ $$a724