The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy After EMU

This paper considers the implications for fiscal policy of European Monetary Unification. Following an introduction, Section II describes and critiques the fiscal provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union. Section III considers the case for formal fiscal restraints and presents evidence on their effectiveness. Section IV presents a parallel analysis of the debate over fiscal federalism.


Issue Date:
1992-12
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/233176
Total Pages:
38
JEL Codes:
F33; F36; H87; F4
Series Statement:
Working Paper
C92-004




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-29

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