Motives for the International Licensing of Branded Food and Related Products

Given initial empirical observations of international licensing of, food and beer brands, this paper presents a simple game-theoretic model of the motives for licensing. In a situation of complete information, the model suggests that imperfect competition in overseas markets may be an important determinant of a branded product licensing equilibrium, whilst incomplete information about incumbent firms' payoffs and strategies and also repetition of the game may generate a sequence of unsuccessful entry followed by licensing.


Issue Date:
1990-07
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/233054
Total Pages:
31
Series Statement:
OP
15




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-29

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