000232718 001__ 232718
000232718 005__ 20180123003612.0
000232718 037__ $$a843-2016-55943
000232718 041__ $$aen_US
000232718 084__ $$aH23
000232718 084__ $$aQ5
000232718 245__ $$aA Note on Pollution Regulation With Asymmetric Information
000232718 260__ $$c2016-03-10
000232718 269__ $$a2016-03-10
000232718 270__ $$malberto.pench@unipi.it$$pPench,   Alberto
000232718 300__ $$a10
000232718 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000232718 490__ $$aET
000232718 490__ $$a20.2016
000232718 520__ $$aThe paper addresses the problem of information asymmetry between a regulator and the polluting firms and proposes a very simple mechanism where the regulator is free to choose, without communicating in advance to the firms, between two instruments: an effluent fee or a standard: as a result in a real world setting this uncertainty might induce firms to a truthful revelation. Moreover, under the assumption of linear marginal abatement or marginal social damage functions, in many cases the resulting optimal behaviour might be an under reporting for some firms and an over reporting for others so that the resulting marginal aggregate benefit function might be not so far from the true one and the aggregate pollution level attained by the mechanism not so far from optimal.
000232718 542__ $$fLicense granted by Emanuela Ragnolini (emanuela.ragnolini@feem.it) on 2016-03-10T11:12:47Z (GMT):

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000232718 650__ $$aPublic Economics
000232718 6531_ $$aEffluent Fee
000232718 6531_ $$aStandards
000232718 6531_ $$aAsymmetric Information
000232718 6531_ $$aTruthful Revelation
000232718 700__ $$aPench, Alberto
000232718 8564_ $$s828461$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/232718/files/NDL2016-020.pdf
000232718 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/232718
000232718 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:232718$$pGLOBAL_SET
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  Previous issue date: 2016-03-10
000232718 982__ $$gFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>ET: Economic Theory
000232718 980__ $$a843