A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action

The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed, in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real-world cases of voluntary collective action. The model, which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional Cournot theory, predicts a higher level of collective action that that theory. The impacts of income effects and of the price elasticity of demand for the public good are given special emphasis.


Issue Date:
1982-08
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/232605
Total Pages:
33
Series Statement:
Working Paper
8302




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-12-08

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