COURTS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT IN AGRICULTURAL TRANSITION - THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM POLAND

The paper investigates theoretically and empirically the role of courts for contract enforcement in transition agriculture. We develop a theoretical model, based on the costs and benefits of court enforcement that captures the boundary between contracts to be judged as court "enforceable" and "not-enforceable" and, simultaneously, identifies the threshold of taking legal action. The empirical analysis based on a survey of 306 Polish hog farmer conducted in 1999 strongly supports our model.


Subject(s):
Issue Date:
2003
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/22213
Total Pages:
22
Series Statement:
Selected Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

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