000211816 001__ 211816
000211816 005__ 20180123002338.0
000211816 037__ $$a1008-2016-80276
000211816 041__ $$aen_US
000211816 245__ $$aOptimal Tariffs with Smuggling: A Spatial Analysis of Nigerian Rice Policy Options
000211816 260__ $$c2015
000211816 269__ $$a2015
000211816 270__ $$pJohnson,   Michael
000211816 300__ $$a31
000211816 336__ $$aConference Paper/ Presentation
000211816 520__ $$aThis paper assesses the difficulties inherent with raising the rice import tariff in Nigeria given the
problem of smuggling, and under such conditions, whether there is an optimal tariff rate that the
Nigerian government can consider, especially when the effects are likely to vary by location.
Using a spatial multi-market model for rice, results show that an optimal tariff rate of 37 percent
does exist if smuggling cannot be controlled. The effects of higher tariffs can have different
effects on price changes, trade flows, and ultimately, household welfare in different parts of the
country. Most notably but not surprising, consumers in the south could face much higher welfare
losses, especially in urban areas as prices increase more when imports flow in from the north. On
the other hand, smuggled imports in the north actually help dampen the effect of the tariff on
prices in this region and in the central region.
000211816 542__ $$fLicense granted by Allison Hasslen (hassl020@umn.edu) on 2015-11-05T15:29:47Z (GMT):

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000211816 650__ $$aAgricultural and Food Policy
000211816 650__ $$aInternational Relations/Trade
000211816 6531_ $$aOptimal tariff
000211816 6531_ $$asmuggling
000211816 6531_ $$aspatial market equilibrium model
000211816 6531_ $$arice
000211816 6531_ $$aNigeria
000211816 700__ $$aJohnson, Michael
000211816 700__ $$aDorosh, Paul
000211816 773__ $$d2015
000211816 8564_ $$s492536$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/211816/files/Johnson-Optimal%20Tariffs%20with%20Smuggling-1150.pdf
000211816 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/211816
000211816 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:211816$$pGLOBAL_SET
000211816 912__ $$nSubmitted by Allison Hasslen (hassl020@umn.edu) on 2015-11-05T15:34:20Z
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  Previous issue date: 2015
000211816 982__ $$gInternational Association of Agricultural Economists>2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy
000211816 980__ $$a1008