TAXATION, FINES, AND PRODUCER LIABILITY RULES: EFFICIENCY AND MARKET STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS

This paper addresses the comparative efficiency of liability rules and regulatory policy in competitive equilibria with endogenous product safety. Pigouvian taxation fails to achieve long-run social optimality. A policy involving accident fines and safety subsidization can achieve efficiency, although the optimal policy may involve taxation, not subsidization, of product safety.


Subject(s):
Issue Date:
1998
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/20928
Total Pages:
14
Series Statement:
Selected Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

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