Cross and Buccola (2004) established that if the lenders of cooperatives are not in position to assess the “right” price to be paid for the raw-material delivered by cooperative members, these latter may push for a cash transfer which may deteriorate the financial position of the cooperative. This form of liquidation can be an exit way for cooperatives which, at the turning point of maturity, do not seek strategic alliances to increase their market power, or do not shift to a new model, according to the lifecycle approach of Cook (1995). In this research, we test this hypothesis for cooperatives of the Bordeaux wine industry. We run two regression which aim at characterizing the relationship between leverage and cash transfer to cooperative members according to the downstream strategy of cooperatives. Our results confirm our main hypothesis. The cooperatives which stay in the traditional form are prone to liquidation: the cash transfer to producers implies a higher leverage which implies a financial distress. The financial behavior of cooperatives forming union and of those which have opted for vertical integration is radically different.