SPATIAL COMPETITION IN OVERLAPPING SEASONAL FISHERIES: A BIOECONOMIC MODEL OF FISHERMEN AND REGULATORS

This paper develops a single-season dynamic game between fishermen and regulators. Fishermen maximize the NPV of profits by their location choice in a system with congestion, adjustment costs, and adaptive, quota-driven, site closures. Simulation results reveal feedbacks between site-choice and closure decisions and suggest the usefulness of spatial policy instruments in reducing congestion externalities and costly congestion-averting expenditures.


Issue Date:
2004
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/20383
Total Pages:
17
Series Statement:
Selected Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

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