TOURNAMENTS, RISK PERCEPTIONS, AND FAIRNESS

This paper reports the results of an economic experiment investigating human subjects’' preferences for two types of contracts – tournaments and fixed performance standard contracts. Willingness to pay data was elicited through an auction and results suggest that subjects prefer fixed performance standard contracts to tournaments. Primary drivers of this result appear to be subjects’' perceptions that tournaments are more risky and less fair than fixed performance standard contracts. Surprisingly, measures of the relative profitability of the contracts did not correlate with willingness to pay. Our results can shed light on why agricultural producers express frustration over tournaments and can provide insights on contract and policy design.


Issue Date:
2004
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20154
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/20154
Total Pages:
38
Series Statement:
Selected Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)