A MODEL OF PRODUCER INCENTIVES FOR LIVESTOCK DISEASE MANAGEMENT

We examine the management of livestock diseases from the producers' perspective, incorporating information and incentive asymmetries between producers and regulators. Using a dynamic model, we examine responses to different policy options including indemnity payments, subsidies to report at-risk animals, monitoring, and regulatory approaches to decreasing infection risks when perverse incentives and multiple policies interact. This conceptual analysis illustrates the importance of designing efficient combinations of regulatory and incentive-based policies.


Issue Date:
2004
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20146
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/20146
Total Pages:
32
Note:
Replaced with revised version of paper 07/13/04.
Series Statement:
Selected Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-09-26

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