ADVERSE SELECTION, MORAL HAZARD, AND GROWER COMPLIANCE WITH BT CORN REFUGE

This paper develops a principal-agent model of farmer compliance with Bt corn refuge requirements intended to manage the evolution of resistance to the Bt toxin by insect pests. The model endogenizes the price of the technology, the audit rate, and the fine imposed on non-complying farmers when farmer willingness to pay for Bt corn and compliance effort is private information.


Issue Date:
2004
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20123
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/20123
Total Pages:
19
Series Statement:
Selected Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

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