COMMON-PROPERTY RESOURCE USE AND OUTSIDE OPTIONS: COOPERATION ACROSS GENERATIONS IN A DYNAMIC GAME

This paper presents a noncooperative dynamic game with overlapping generations of players using a common-property natural resource, and identifies conditions under which cooperation is supported as an equilibrium of the game. It explores how heterogeneity among the resource users and access to outside markets or microcredit affect local resource use in developing countries.


Issue Date:
2004
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/20029
Total Pages:
28
Series Statement:
Selected Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

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