000019888 001__ 19888
000019888 005__ 20180122201615.0
000019888 037__ $$a375-2016-19891
000019888 041__ $$aen
000019888 245__ $$aDO U.S. MARKETING ORDERS HAVE MUCH MARKET POWER?  AN EXAMINATION OF THE ALMOND BOARD OF CALIFORNIA
000019888 260__ $$c2002
000019888 269__ $$a2002
000019888 270__ $$mjcrespi@agecon.ksu.edu$$pCrespi,   John M.
000019888 270__ $$machacon@agecon.ksu.edu$$pChacon,   Adriana
000019888 300__ $$a27
000019888 336__ $$aConference Paper/ Presentation
000019888 446__ $$aEnglish
000019888 490__ $$aSelected Paper
000019888 520__ $$aThis paper tests the conventional wisdom that U.S. marketing orders act as profit-maximizing cartels.  The paper analyzes the marketing order for U.S. almonds in both the domestic and export markets.  Such a case study is relevant to all U.S. marketing orders because the size and scope of the U.S. almond industry on the world market, and the legal authority of the almond marketing order makes it a likely prospect for exhibiting true cartel behavior.  The authors find that the market power exerted by the Almond Board of California's reserve setting is significantly less than would be expected from a profit-maximizing cartel.
000019888 650__ $$aMarketing
000019888 700__ $$aCrespi, John M.
000019888 700__ $$aChacon-Cascante, Adriana
000019888 8564_ $$s72620$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19888/files/sp02cr01.pdf
000019888 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/19888
000019888 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:19888$$pGLOBAL_SET
000019888 912__ $$nMade available in DSpace on 2007-03-07T22:41:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
sp02cr01.pdf: 72620 bytes, checksum: 47e3fa366bcf8f6b29ae76266058fff5 (MD5)
  Previous issue date: 2002
000019888 982__ $$gAmerican Agricultural Economics Association>2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA
000019888 980__ $$a375