Reducing Deer Overabundance by Distinguishing High-productivity Hunters: Revealed-Preference, Incentive-Compatible Licensing Mechanisms

This paper models the current problem of overabundance (and under-harvesting) of white-tailed deer as a Principal-Agent problem, with adverse selection and moral hazard. Using econometric analysis of data available from hunter behaviors studies in Pennsylvania, overall welfare gains are estimated from increased hunter satisfaction and license revenue. Results indicate that significant gains in economic surplus result when licensing schemes are unrestricted by current quota systems.


Issue Date:
2005
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/19281
Total Pages:
24
Series Statement:
Selected Paper 135580




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

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