Managerial Incentives, Moral Hazard, and Structural Change in Agricultural Cooperatives

The federated business structure exists in many sectors of the economy, but we know little about its comparative advantage. This paper explores theoretically and empirically the current dynamics of the federated cooperative system. Two hypotheses are tested: growth at the local co-op level has made the structure redundant and managerial incentives create disloyalty. We use a unique data set from a survey of local farm supply and grain marketing cooperatives in the Midwest.


Subject(s):
Issue Date:
2005
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/19226
Total Pages:
26
Series Statement:
Selected Paper 136746




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

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