000179093 001__ 179093
000179093 005__ 20210122074049.0
000179093 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.22004/ag.econ.179093
000179093 037__ $$a1434-2016-118845
000179093 041__ $$aeng
000179093 245__ $$aInvestment Treaty Arbitration and Developing Countries: A Re-Appraisal
000179093 260__ $$c2011-05
000179093 269__ $$a2011-05
000179093 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000179093 490__ $$aGDAE Working Papers Series
000179093 490__ $$a11-01
000179093 520__ $$aThere is an ongoing debate about bilateral investment treaties (BITs) – and investor-state arbitration, in particular – between those who maintain that BITs encourage investment in developing countries by providing enforceable rights and protections for investors, and those who suspect that these new rights and protections have a chilling effect on regulation for public and environmental welfare and actually hinder development. For years, both ?camps? have drawn heavily upon anecdotal evidence and observations to support their view, as no systematic, comprehensive study of empirical data on investment arbitrations had been undertaken. To fill this void, legal scholar Susan Franck has evaluated the criticisms of investment arbitration based on empirical studies of published or known disputes (Franck 2009; Franck 2007). These efforts produced helpful data and initiated a productive discussion of these issues. However, the results and conclusions that can be drawn from Franck’s work are more limited and warrant more nuance than Franck and others so far have taken into account. Franck’s work is now widely used to support the notion that developing countries do not disproportionately ?lose? under the investment arbitration regime. Such a conclusion does not appear to be supported by Franck’s data. This article analyzes Franck’s work to show where differing conclusions emerge. We show that: 1) there is a lack of adequate sample composition and size to conduct rigorous empirical work from which an analyst could draw such bold lessons; 2) discounting the fact that developing countries are subject to a disproportionate number of claims is not to be overlooked, especially when looking at claims by the United States; and 3) relative to government budgets and in per capita terms developing countries pay significantly more in damages than developed nations do.
000179093 650__ $$aInternational Development
000179093 6531_ $$aInvestment
000179093 6531_ $$aInternational Development
000179093 6531_ $$aBilateral Investment Treaties
000179093 700__ $$aGallagher, Kevin P.
000179093 700__ $$aShrestha, Elen
000179093 8564_ $$91a367c37-b2dd-45da-858e-9e0b1e77a34e$$s399837$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/179093/files/11-01TreatyArbitrationReappraisal.pdf
000179093 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/179093
000179093 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:179093$$pGLOBAL_SET
000179093 912__ $$nSubmitted by Mukhtar Amin (gdae@tufts.edu) on 2014-07-17T16:26:35Z
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  Previous issue date: 2011-05
000179093 913__ $$aLicense granted by Mukhtar Amin (gdae@tufts.edu) on 2014-07-17T16:23:49Z (GMT):

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000179093 982__ $$gTufts University>Global Development and Environment Institute>Working Papers