000171628 001__ 171628
000171628 005__ 20180122232951.0
000171628 037__ $$a329-2016-13044
000171628 041__ $$aen_US
000171628 084__ $$aQ220
000171628 245__ $$aAre Two Rents Better than None? When Monopoly Harvester Co-ops are Preferred to a Rent Dissipated Resource Sector
000171628 260__ $$c2014
000171628 269__ $$a2014
000171628 270__ $$mDale.Manning@colostate.edu$$pManning, Dale T.
000171628 270__ $$muchida@uri.edu$$pUchida, Hirotsugu
000171628 300__ $$a18
000171628 336__ $$aConference Paper/ Presentation
000171628 490__ $$aPaper
000171628 490__ $$a5179
000171628 520__ $$aThis paper evaluates the conditions under which a fish-harvester cooperative (co-op) with monopoly power represents a preferable outcome when compared to a rent dissipated fishery. Currently, United States anti-trust law prevents harvesters from coordinating to restrict output. In a fishery, this coordination can represent an improvement, despite the creation of market power because a monopolist builds the resource stock. We show, analytically, how a monopolist harvester co-op generates both resource and monopoly rent. While the monopolist generates monopoly rent by restricting production to generate higher prices, it also manages the fish stock to lower stock dependent harvesting costs. We demonstrate the conditions under which a monopoly is likely to be favored over rent dissipation. Given that a monopoly can be efficiency-improving in a common property resource sector, policymakers should consider both the costs and benefits of co-op formation in the case of a rent dissipated fishery.
000171628 542__ $$fLicense granted by Hirotsugu Uchida (uchida@uri.edu) on 2014-06-03T17:49:07Z (GMT):
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000171628 650__ $$aResource /Energy Economics and Policy
000171628 6531_ $$aResource rent
000171628 6531_ $$acooperatives
000171628 6531_ $$afishery
000171628 6531_ $$aantitrust law
000171628 6531_ $$amonopoly rent
000171628 700__ $$aManning, Dale T.
000171628 700__ $$aUchida, Hirotsugu
000171628 773__ $$d2014
000171628 8564_ $$s222577$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/171628/files/Manning_Uchida%20AAEA%202014.pdf
000171628 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/171628
000171628 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:171628$$pGLOBAL_SET
000171628 912__ $$nSubmitted by Hirotsugu Uchida (uchida@uri.edu) on 2014-06-03T18:05:37Z
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000171628 912__ $$nMade available in DSpace on 2014-06-03T18:05:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
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Previous issue date: 2014
000171628 982__ $$gAgricultural and Applied Economics Association>2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota
000171628 980__ $$a329
