000170571 001__ 170571
000170571 005__ 20180122232841.0
000170571 037__ $$a329-2016-12751
000170571 041__ $$aen_US
000170571 084__ $$aD03
000170571 084__ $$aO12
000170571 084__ $$aC93
000170571 245__ $$aThe perils of peer punishment: evidence from a common pool resource framed field experiment
000170571 260__ $$c2014
000170571 269__ $$a2014
000170571 270__ $$mgioiademelo@iecon.ccee.edu.uy$$pde Melo,   Gioia
000170571 270__ $$mmpiaggio@iecon.ccee.edu.uy$$pPiaggio,   Matías
000170571 300__ $$a31
000170571 336__ $$aConference Paper/ Presentation
000170571 490__ $$aPaper
000170571 490__ $$a5119
000170571 520__ $$aWe provide experimental evidence on the effects of non-monetary punishment by peers among communities of Uruguayan fishers exploiting a common pool resource (CPR). We combined this treatment with an in-group (groups from a single community) / mixed group (groups composed of fishers from different communities) treatment. Our aim is to compare the effects of non-monetary sanctions in a context in which individuals exploiting a CPR belong to different communities relative to the case in which only individuals from the same community are allowed to exploit the resource. We find that mixed groups—unlike in-groups—reduce their exploitation of the resource in response to the threat of punishment. We do not find any differences in behavior between in-groups and mixed groups when the possibility of being punished is not available. The effectiveness of non-monetary punishment is reduced because cooperation was not perceived as the unique social norm. In such cases there is substantial antisocial punishment, which leads to increased extraction of the CPR by those who are unfairly punished. These findings indicate that effective peer punishment requires coordination to prevent antisocial targeting and to clarify the social signal conveyed by punishment.
000170571 542__ $$fLicense granted by Gioia de Melo (gioiademelo@gmail.com) on 2014-05-28T21:34:27Z (GMT):

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000170571 650__ $$aCommunity/Rural/Urban Development
000170571 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000170571 650__ $$aInstitutional and Behavioral Economics
000170571 6531_ $$anon-monetary punishment
000170571 6531_ $$ain-group bias
000170571 6531_ $$aframed field experimen
000170571 6531_ $$asocial preferences
000170571 6531_ $$acommmon pool resource
000170571 700__ $$ade Melo, Gioia
000170571 700__ $$aPiaggio, Matías
000170571 773__ $$d2014
000170571 8564_ $$s913626$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/170571/files/The%20perils%20of%20peer%20punishment_evidence%20from%20a%20common%20pool%20resource%20framed%20field%20experiment.pdf
000170571 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/170571
000170571 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:170571$$pGLOBAL_SET
000170571 912__ $$nSubmitted by Gioia de Melo (gioiademelo@gmail.com) on 2014-05-28T21:52:33Z
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  Previous issue date: 2014
000170571 982__ $$gAgricultural and Applied Economics Association>2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota
000170571 980__ $$a329