000165792 001__ 165792
000165792 005__ 20180122232257.0
000165792 037__ $$a829-2016-55199
000165792 041__ $$aen_US
000165792 084__ $$aJ31
000165792 084__ $$aJ41
000165792 084__ $$aJ63
000165792 245__ $$aWage Incentive Profiles in Dual Labor Markets
000165792 260__ $$c2014-03
000165792 269__ $$a2014-03
000165792 270__ $$memanuele.grassi@unisalento.it$$pGrassi,   Emanuele
000165792 300__ $$a28
000165792 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000165792 490__ $$aES
000165792 490__ $$a22.2014
000165792 520__ $$aThis paper formalizes the use of flexible labor contracts in an efficiency wage framework and derives market dualism as an endogenous outcome. By allowing temporary contracts to be either renewed or converted into permanent contracts, new theoretical insights emerge both on the equilibrium wage structure and the incentive problem faced by workers and firms. Since temporary workers weigh the outside option of entering the labor market through permanent positions, the rate at which fixed-term contracts are converted into open-ended contracts is itself an incentive device which acts as a substitute for the wage. It follows that, even if temporary workers face a higher job loss risk, firms pay a wage differential in favor of permanent workers. The model also predicts that in equilibrium firms hire exclusively under flexible contracts, then half of them is converted into stable contracts while the remaining contracts are left to expire. Thus, in steady state, firms let permanent positions to survive in order to sustain the wage incentive structure.
000165792 542__ $$fLicense granted by Nancy Elera (nancy.elera@feem.it) on 2014-04-07T09:34:05Z (GMT):

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000165792 650__ $$aLabor and Human Capital
000165792 6531_ $$aDual Labor Market
000165792 6531_ $$aEfficiency Wages
000165792 6531_ $$aWage Differentials
000165792 6531_ $$aFlexible Contracts
000165792 700__ $$aDi Cintio, Marco
000165792 700__ $$aGrassi, Emanuele
000165792 8564_ $$s1068537$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/165792/files/NDL2014-022.pdf
000165792 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/165792
000165792 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:165792$$pGLOBAL_SET
000165792 912__ $$nSubmitted by Nancy Elera (nancy.elera@feem.it) on 2014-04-07T09:50:48Z
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  Previous issue date: 2014-03
000165792 982__ $$gFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Economy and Society
000165792 980__ $$a829