Strategic issues in global climate change policy

An analysis of prospects for deriving self-enforcing, global, greenhouse gas emission mitigation agreements is provided. Policy spillovers and carbon leakages are accounted for. Situations where mitigation effort should be concentrated in particular countries and where efficient outcomes can be fostered by international trade in emissions permits are discussed. The use of auxiliary policies to transform intractable Prisoner’s Dilemma incentive problems to more tractable problems, the role of policy commitments and the strategic implications of ‘no regret’ and ‘adaptation’ policies are analysed. Dynamic and repeated game formulations are outlined.


Issue Date:
2010
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/162001
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/162001
Published in:
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Volume 54, Issue 2
Page range:
165-184
Total Pages:
20




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

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