Does Transparency Reduce Corruption?

Does a better monitoring (transparency) of officials lowers the incidence of corruption ? Using a common agency game with imperfect information, we show that the answer depends on the measure of corruption that one uses. More transparency lowers the prevalence of corruption but it may raise the average bribe as it motivates the corruptor to bid more aggressively for the agent’s favour. We show that transparency affects the prevalence of corruption at the margin through a competitive effect and an efficiency effect.


Subject(s):
Issue Date:
2013-10
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/158368
Total Pages:
23
JEL Codes:
D73; D80
Series Statement:
CREATE Working Paper
2013-5




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-27

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