A Model of Producer Incentives for Livestock Disease Management

We examine the management of livestock diseases from the producers' perspective, incorporating information and incentive asymmetries between producers and regulators. Using a dynamic model, we examine responses to different policy options including indemnity payments, subsidies to report at-risk animals, monitoring, and regulatory approaches to decreasing infection risks when perverse incentives and multiple policies interact. This conceptual analysis illustrates the importance of designing efficient combinations of regulatory and incentive-based policies.


Issue Date:
2004
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/15653
Total Pages:
34
JEL Codes:
C61; D82; Q12; Q18; Q28
Series Statement:
Working Paper WPTC 04-07




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-23

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)