Markets for Influence

We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence. Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation


Issue Date:
Sep 11 2009
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/151189
Total Pages:
11
JEL Codes:
C7; D72
Series Statement:
Risk and Uncertainty Program
R09/2




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-11-18

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