Games without Rules

We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.


Keywords:
Issue Date:
Jul 09 2004
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/151166
Total Pages:
27
JEL Codes:
C71
Series Statement:
Risk and Uncertainty Program
7/R04




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-27

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)