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THE SOCIAL SETTING OF LAND TENURE SYSTEMS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

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How can research be useful in appraising, planning, and carrying out land reform? Included in this question are two other questions, How can social scientists help the government agencies responsible for agrarian reform? How can graduate training be improved to prepare American and foreign research workers to deal with land tenure and agrarian reform?

I shall attempt to deal with these issues by first considering some differences between the tenure system in this country and systems in some underdeveloped countries. The crucial difference is the fact that in many countries, relations between tenure classes are manifestations of differentiation in the underlying social structure. By contrast, in the U.S.A. there is little social distance or social difference between owners and tenants.

The close relation between tenure and the social system makes it important to study the historical background and the social setting of tenure arrangements. Attention to these phenomena is important in studies designed to describe how the tenure system works, and in studies whose purpose is to aid in planning reforms. I shall try to illustrate this point with examples from India and Japan.

Background of tenancy in U.S.A.--Tenancy in the U.S.A. is due primarily to two phenomena: the economic independence of young adults and investment by nonfarmers in farm real estate.

Much American tenancy arises in the process of one generation of farmers taking over the assets of the preceding generations. Younger farmers become tenants and borrowers rather soon after they assume adult workloads. On the other hand, farmers of the older generation continue as landlords and creditors after they have ceased to operate their farms. These tenure and credit relations are sometimes between relatives and sometimes among unrelated individuals. But even in family arrangements, the relation has a formal and legal status, indicative of economic independence of young operators and recognition of separate legal identity and legal rights of the two generations.

This kind of tenancy simply does not arise in most countries because land is controlled by the extended family. In an extended or joint family, three or more generations continue to operate a joint household and a joint family business. It is taken for granted that as young people grow up, they take up their share of physical labor; conversely those who are too old to work, share in the family food supply and family wealth. The change in the roles of the maturing and aging family members is not accompanied by any transfer of rights in land. Ownership is only transferred after the death of the father or even later, if adult brothers continue joint operations and joint households. Or to put it another way: the cohesion of the extended family obviates the necessity for an agricultural ladder in the American meaning of that concept.

Partly associated with the above is a lack of social differentiation between tenants and owners. Since many landlords in the U.S. are retired farmers, they do not constitute a separate social class from the tenants of the younger generation. Nor are nonfarm landlords a single distinct social class. They are a heterogeneous group of people who do not usually depend upon rents as their major source of income.

Within the U.S.A., the only areas with tenure situations resembling those of the underdeveloped countries are the South, with its plantation agriculture, and possibly the areas of Spanish-speaking farmers. It is characteristic of such situations that landlords and tenants also differ greatly in their wealth and social status and that individuals rarely cross from one class to another.

Within this setting of the American tenure system, it is easier to center tenure research on "purely" economic problems: efficiency implications of leasing versus buying a farm, or
effect of tenure arrangements on resource allocation. The development of our national land policy and the effect of economic development in reducing agriculture to a small sector of the economy provide an important background for understanding our tenure situation. But it is both easy and legitimate to take this background for granted and concentrate research on other issues.

In a country like India, the first research question (leasing versus buying) has almost no relevance. The second research problem (tenure arrangements and resource allocation) does of course have some relevance but the achievement of agricultural efficiency depends much more on speeding up the rate of development of the whole economy and on success in developing a research and extension service and credit and marketing cooperatives.

Also, in India, problems of tenure and tenure reform are a part of the problem of economic development and widespread demands for social change. A research worker who wants to understand Indian tenure and reform problems soon feels a need to understand the historical and social background of Indian tenure. In part, this conclusion rests on the difficulties I experienced in understanding Indian problems because of lack of background knowledge about India. But independently of that, it seems to me that the nature of tenure problems in underdeveloped countries lead us much more directly to the above areas which need not concern us quite so much in studying American tenure.

Background of tenancy in India.--India provides a good example of the effect of history and the social structure on the tenure system. A catalog of the forces responsible for the present situation would include the following:

1. The unique development of the Indian relation between the state, the intermediary and the cultivator, as it emerged through the turbulent centuries of the decline of Moghul rule, the spread of British rule with its superimposition of western property rights, and as modified by recent legislation dealing with abolition of intermediaries (approximately the period 1700 to present, described in 1, 2, 11, 12). 1/

2. The mutual customary relations between upper and lower castes within the village and their expression through the tenure rights accorded to different castes (3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15).

3. Passing of landownership to money-lenders and traders (often the same person) following the emergence of markets for products, and enforcement of debts by foreclosure under the British (5).

4. The emergence of contractual (rather than customary) relations between landowners on one hand and tenants and hired workers on the other.

Present Indian tenure relations are a complex result of the interaction of these developments. These interactions have resulted in the development of many more tenure categories than those with which we are familiar in this country and have also created great regional diversities in tenure systems within India.

Brief history of Indian tenure. 2/ --The peculiar institution of intermediaries arose out of the attempt of the state, through much of Indian history, to capture approximately half of the gross produce of land for various purposes of the state and the sovereign. The theory was that peasants were entitled to their means of subsistence, while all of the "economic rent" belonged to the state and was collected as land revenue.

Land revenue was collected by two methods. Usually, both methods were used simultaneously, with one method used in some districts and the other in remaining ones. It could be collected by the administrative hierarchy of the state, accumulated in the state treasury, and then disbursed to carry on activities of the state and the court. Or the right to collect land

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1/ Numbers in parentheses refer to Literature Cited.
2/ Descriptions of Indian tenure have interested and baffled me for a long time, particularly statements about land revenue and intermediaries. During my second year in India, Moreland's book and some lectures by Professor Neale helped me to see some order in the tenure system of India. The description that follows is a statement of the situation as I now understand it. It is oversimplified, and I'm afraid that it might be incorrect in important details.
revenue could be given to various individuals for a variety of reasons. Such individuals might be: 1) assignees: officials, army leaders, and warriors who were given right to collect land revenue from designated areas; the proceeds constituted their salary and provided funds for carrying out their duties, 2) grantees given right to collect land revenue in recognition of service or merit: deserving officials, poets, musicians, court favorites, 3) conquered vassal kings (rajas) who retained administrative controls over their territories in return for accepting suzerainty of a superior ruler and paid part of their land revenue collection as tribute, and 4) tax farmers who assumed obligation for collection of land revenue, and kept a share of the collection as a reward for their services. The above functionaries, collecting a share of land revenue, were intermediaries. In addition, the state and the above intermediaries usually dealt with a village headman rather than directly with each cultivator. Village headmen also received a share of land revenue for their services, and thus also became intermediaries.

The above division of rights is a division of the streams of income from land, but rights differed from western conception of property in that duration of right was uncertain, and shares in income were indefinite. All intermediary rights were theoretically at the pleasure of the court, and in times of strong rulers were actually so. Intermediaries attempted to increase their share at the cost of the peasants subject to limitations of peasant cunning, control of strong rulers over intermediaries, or abandonment of cultivation by peasants who escaped to areas where exactions were smaller or administration not well established. Strong rulers attempted to dispense with intermediaries, and increase their share at the cost of vassal kings. In times of strong rulers, there was no inheritance of intermediary rights.

A state of anarchy prevailed in India in the XVIII and the first half of the XIX century following the decline of Moghul rule. A number of independent principalities emerged. Intermediaries and other persons who had a base of local power either emerged as independent rulers or as intermediaries who collected land revenue from peasants and passed a share of it to a superior ruler. An unstable situation emerged in which the prerequisite for being an intermediary was sufficient power vis-a-vis the peasants, potential usurpers of the intermediary estate, and superior rulers. An intermediary needed power not only to exact land revenue from peasants but also to protect himself and the peasants from forcible seizure of the estate by another. On the one hand, the intermediary’s local power was needed by the superior ruler so that he could get some land revenue. On the other hand, local power protected the intermediary so that the superior ruler could not get along without him. Thus in this period of anarchy, all intermediaries tended to become a combination of vassal, tax farmer, and local official of a superior ruler.

With the sovereignty over India, the British East India Company and then the British Empire (after 1857) acquired the right to collection of land revenue. The British attempted to define landowners among the various claimants to the produce of the land, to give them rights possessed by British landowners, and in some areas to subject such right holders to a specific unvarying land revenue (so-called “permanent settlement”). They were motivated by the hope that such landlords, given security of tenure and right to all additional income following from improvements, would follow the example of British landlords in increasing production of the land. However, no progressive landlord class ever emerged from that attempt.

The Western structure of property rights which the British were trying to impose did not fit relations between intermediaries and peasants. Intermediaries were interested in the largest possible exaction from peasants, but they had no interest in such landlord prerogatives as choice of tenant or choice of techniques of cultivation. Peasants were as secure in possession of the land as the turbulent times would allow, but they were at the mercy of the will or whim of the intermediary. Since a land market did not exist, the question of who was entitled to sale proceeds of the land did not arise.

The process of attempting to vest sole rights of ownership in one of a number of right holders in land, none of whom possessed rights defined in a Western sense, caused considerable injustice. Eventually, the British adjusted to the situation by giving limited rights to both the intermediaries and the peasants, and also by introducing distinction between some land in which the intermediary had greater right and other land in which he had smaller right. A very complex structure of rights of various people in various kinds of land emerged with such tenure terms as absolute occupancy tenant, occupancy tenant, subtenant, and distinctions between "self-cultivated" land of the intermediary in which he had the greatest right as against the actual cultivator, and various types of other land on which his rights were more limited. The above description holds for areas characterized by the intermediary tenures, the so-called zamindari tenures. The historical development of land tenure is different in the remaining, or raiyatwari, areas.
Throughout India, there is a further division of rights in land related to the caste system. Each village would typically have a dominant caste of cultivators. Members of the cultivator caste would either be landowners or would hold a superior tenancy right. Below them there would be a number of members of service castes: goldsmiths, smiths and carpenters, barbers, tailors, oil pressers, washermen, leather workers, sweeper. Each service family would be tied to a specific cultivator (upper-caste) family in a heritable patron-client relation (the jajman-kamin relation). The upper caste family would receive the services of the lower caste in return for shares of produce of the land and sometimes in return for use of a small parcel of land. Members of service castes helped their patrons at harvest times. But also the patron would traditionally abstain from some agricultural activity, such as plowing, and this would be done for him by a member of the service caste. Clients who were not fully employed in the traditional service occupation would often become tenants or farmworkers of their patron.

The passing of ownership from peasants to moneylenders followed in the wake of commercialization of agriculture, emergence of a land market, and court enforcement of foreclosures to satisfy debts. This is a process that has been experienced by every peasant community exposed to a market economy. In India, this relation is aggravated by need for large expenditures for certain ceremonial occasions, particularly marriage.

Commercialization of agriculture and some breakdown of traditional ties between castes have given rise to contractual tenancy and employer-hired worker relations outside the traditional patron-client relation. Richer peasants have become landlords and moneylenders.

Social differentiation of tenure classes in Japan.

Excerpts from Dore's book about Japan (16) are used below to describe 1) some effects of the rural social structure on the tenure system and 2) the manner in which the social structure influenced the enforcement of land reforms. In Japan, it made a difference whether the landlord came from a traditional landlord family of high social status or whether his landownership resulted from recent accumulation of wealth. Where the rural social structure was largely unimpaired, it could act to protect the rights of landlords and other privileged groups from criticism and defiance, and it could modify the enforcement of national legislation to local standards of fairness.

Dore points out that in hamlets dominated by several successive generations of a single landlord family, such a family would tend to monopolize the administrative structure and the informal councils of the hamlet. At the opposite pole were hamlets in which there was a broad stratum of owner-operators and small landlords, and: "Differences of economic power did not necessarily entail relations of economic dependency. Tenancy relations, where they existed, tended to be contractual and were not overlaid with personal relations of patronage and service, requiring respectful behavior from the inferior" (16, p. 366).

The newer process of becoming landlord by acquisition of wealth does not achieve the same position in social status. The contrast is vividly described in the following passage:

"A recent study of a village in Tokushima on the island of Shikoku shows how, at the beginning of the Meiji period, a single landlord family held all the marks of high hereditary status, received careful deference, and exercised dominant authority in the hamlet. Its fortunes rapidly declined, however, and in a little over a generation the special respect terms of address ceased to be used. Another family rapidly accumulated wealth during this same period, and by the turn of the century was in as dominant an economic position as the old 'masters' of the hamlet had been. But the old respect terms of address were never revived for its benefit, and it never acquired the same high prestige status, and never achieved the same unquestioned control over hamlet affairs as the old 'masters' had had. By contrast, the Otakis' relations with the rest of their hamlet were almost as 'feudal' in 1945 as in 1870.

"In other words, the egalitarian tendencies of Japanese society over the last hundred years, even if they have not been strong enough--and particularly in northern areas--to destroy active and continuing status relations between families when they were both supported by tradition and by continuing economic dependence, have been strong enough to prevent newly developed
economic inequalities and relations of economic dependence from taking on all the implications of traditional status differences and extra-economic dominance.

"At the same time, where relations of economic dependence have disappeared the traditional status structure has crumbled away. The importance of the land reform lies in the fact that it has largely destroyed the most common and overt form of economic dependence--tenancy relations--and done so, moreover, at a time when the influence of ideological egalitarianism on the villages was greater than it has ever been" (16, pp. 366-367). 3/

One of the greatest difficulties in enforcing Japanese land-reform laws was caused by the attempts of many landlords to resume cultivation of rented land. It was at this point that rural standards of fairness modified the intent of national legislation.

The provisions of the 1946 Japanese Land Reform Act limited the total amount of land that could be cultivated by the owner and the amount of land that could be rented. All land of absentee landlords was expropriated, while landlords resident in a village were allowed to keep up to about 2.5 acres of rented-out land and up to 7.5 acres total of both cultivated and rented-out land. Also, rent on the rented-out land was to be controlled far below prewar levels.

The provisions of the law created great temptation for landlords to take into self-cultivation some of the rented-out land. A landlord who owned 30 acres and rented all of the land out would lose ownership of 27.5 acres and be left with only nominal rent from the remainder. But if he could persuade some of his tenants to give up some of their land and resume cultivation of 7.5 acres, he would have an above-average holding and above-average income, even though his income would be reduced from prereform levels (16, pp. 150-51).

These attempts of landlords to repossess tenanted land were the chief source of evasion of the land-reform law. In some cases, landlords could repossess such land because of their dominance of local Land Committees. In other cases, the local Committee prevented such landlord exactions. But evidently in many cases, disputes between landlords and tenants over repossession were turned over to mediators from the hamlet, with the following results: "In most cases the object of their mediation was to restore harmony to the hamlet rather than to see that justice was done as defined by the provisions of the law. The most common solution was to split the difference" (16, p. 162). Another motive at work is described by the following passages:

"'What is the world coming to if a landlord can't use his own land when he needs it?' was an argument for which only the most hesitant of 'Yes, but's' could be found in answer. Then, too, the traditional hierarchy of families within the hamlet or village seemed too much a hallowed part of the order of nature. It was accepted that there could be some leveling up, but a complete reversal of roles was difficult to contemplate. 'If X / a tenant/ had been allowed to take that land too, he would have been better off than the landlord' was an argument used to me in justification of a Land Committee decision by a former tenant representative in the same Yamanashi village" (16, p. 161).

I have cited these examples to show how permeated is the tenure situation in many countries with "personal relations of patronage and service" and other aspects of the social structure. If we want to study land tenure and land reform in such situations, we need to include in our analysis the social setting of the tenure system.

Demand for land reform is a demand for social justice in situations in which the criteria of social justice are changing. These criteria are relative. They seem to accompany the spread of ideas that life can be better than it is, they follow contact with cities and import of ideas and ideologies from the West.

There are degrees in the thoroughness of the reforms that are demanded, related probably to degrees of breakdown of the traditional social structure in rural areas. In Japan, land reform was not only an act imposed by the occupation. Dore indicates widespread activity in the 1920's and the 1930's of tenant unions, and many landlord-tenant disputes in which these unions

3/ For an excellent description of the way the social structure permeated landlord-tenant relations in Japan, see(16, chapters 2 and 15).
were bargaining agents; the first such organizations can be traced to the beginning of the century (16, pp. 65-80). Land reform was preceded by half a century of discussion, and the demand for it had become familiar in the villages through the tenant unions and their actions. These developments are a manifestation of breakdown in the traditional social structure. But it was a limited breakdown. It did not go so far as to make land reform a class issue of landlords versus tenants. As shown above, leaders of hamlets, mediated disputes of landlords and tenants over landlord repossession by criteria of preserving hamlet solidarity, rather than by strict provisions of the law.

Social and economic consequences of land reforms.

Recent economic discussion on land reform has usually been formulated around the issue of reform as a means of removing obstacles to economic development. The above discussion of the social setting of land tenure points to another connection between economic development and land reform. Economic development can affect the rural social structure, either by creating new non-agricultural opportunities for depressed classes in rural society, or by undermining the traditional relations in agriculture by the example of contrasting social relations which grow up in urban sectors of a developing economy. Three contrasting situations described below illustrate some of the possible interrelations.

Rapid economic development, greatly increasing employment opportunities outside agriculture, can decrease the number and increase the bargaining power, income, and status of classes at the bottom of the rural social and tenure structure. The rapid increase in new types of jobs and immobility, enabling new people to achieve higher status in the growing nonagricultural sectors, can outflank the exclusive prerogatives and high social status of landowners. Decrease in the status and economic power of the landowner can then occur without a frontal attack on his tenure rights.

Land reform is not likely to be a policy issue in societies in which economic development has produced the situation described above. In these circumstances, the demands for social justice are likely to take the form of attempts to create the welfare state: social security, policy of providing public minima in education, medicine and housing, collective bargaining legislation, and so forth.

By contrast, the demand for land reforms which limit landownership or rights of landlords is likely to arise when ideas of social justice change more rapidly than the rate at which economic development creates opportunities for advance in income and in social status outside agriculture. This may happen even in the presence of rapid economic growth, if population growth prevents a decline in the absolute number of the agricultural population. In the case of Japan, Dore mentions strains in the 1920's and the 1930's resulting from the coexistence of a continuing superior-inferior status relation between landlords and tenants on the one hand and of compulsory education and universal conscription on the other (16, p. 54). It is significant in this connection that the absolute size of the agricultural population in Japan did not decline in the course of rapid development of the economy.

Yet another situation may exist in countries in which economic development is slow or is only getting underway. If change in the rural structure has not yet resulted in attitudes of widespread opposition to traditional ideas of the relative roles of various social groups, then it is possible to concentrate on increasing the rate of economic development without the need for wholesale land reforms (reforms which drastically change the distribution of ownership or the distribution of rural income). With this strategy of development, rural welfare could at first be attained primarily by indirect measures of increasing income and employment outside agriculture, and increasing the bargaining power of the lowest income and tenure groups in agriculture.

Thus land tenure and economic development may be related in several ways. Professor M. L. Dantwala has recently spoken on this theme in his 1960 presidential address to the All India Agricultural Economics Conference. His concluding remarks were: "In the ultimate analysis, the problem of the removal of the defects in the agrarian structure cannot be separated from the problem of economic development as a whole. To say that the former constitutes an obstacle to the latter is but a partial statement of the phenomenon, because it can be said with equal validity that absence of economic development constitutes an obstacle to the removal of defects in the agrarian structure " (4, p. 25).
There is some danger in making the desirability of land reform depend entirely on the issue of land tenure as an obstacle to development. The danger is that on the one hand we lose both sympathy and understanding of demands for land reform which arise out of social and political grievances (but which promise little economic benefit for the economy as a whole), and that on the other hand we might prescribe land reform as a solution in situations in which little political pressure exists for reform and in which agricultural development may well proceed in the near future without tenure changes. Japanese experience illustrates the point made above in three ways: 1) increase in agricultural production and improvement in techniques accompanied economic development and preceded land reform, 2) land reform was preceded by a period of discussion, agitation, and landlord-tenant bargaining which created some base of political support for reform, 3) even so, it took defeat in war and the fiat of the occupation to carry out land reforms against landlord opposition.

Doreen Warriner, in a book about Egypt, Syria, and Iraq (based on conditions in 1955), states the need for political support of land reforms as follows:

"Land reform in its initial and crucial stage is emphatically not a question for experts; it cannot be advised into existence, but must be based on an impetus arising within the country. Once that impetus is there, and recognized in a decision to legislate, experts can help in overcoming technical difficulties. The choice of the type of group farming appropriate for the country as will be seen, is not a simple matter, and the experience of administrators who have themselves carried out reforms can be a useful guide. At this stage the integrated approach is relevant, though it is valid only when the economic sails are filled by a political wind. If there is no real drive for reform, experts can produce expensive little demonstration projects, but they will not be able to achieve any general and genuine improvement in the position of the cultivators (18, p. 9).

Warriner in the same book also describes an example of agricultural development without aid of a favorable tenure situation (and without other governmental assistance). The development described is the rapid spread of mechanized wheat farming introduced by private enterprise in northern Syria. These developments took place in a few years preceding 1955:

"The expansion in agriculture, judged by the inertia prevailing ten years ago, is surprising. It completely confutes some current doctrines. It is now fashionable to believe that the economic development of underdeveloped countries needs foreign capital, foreign experts, good public services, long-term planning, agrarian reform, plus, for good measure, a revolution. But Syria has done none of these things, and in the north, where progress has been so fast, every one of these conditions is lacking. Transport is expensive, roads are bad, labor is scarce, credit dear, and land tenure confused and insecure. Revolutions of course Syria has had, but they have been self-destroying seizures of power without much effect on economic policy, and none on social structure.

"Syrian governments have done almost nothing to promote agricultural development " (18, p. 74).

Long in his recent article (9, p. 114) poses the issues in terms of two objectives in land reforms: providing incentives for a more rapid increase in agricultural production, and creating "a sense of security (and participation) among the peasantry as a basis for needed political stability." He then goes on to point out the dangers to stability from either acting (attempting to institute land reforms) too early or from postponing reforms even after great pressures have built up in their favor (Doving in his paper in the present seminar poses somewhat the same issue in his section on the Pace of change).

The argument about economic consequences of tenure systems consists largely of three parts: 1) in underdeveloped countries, small farms employing family labor, either owner or tenant-operated, achieve more production per acre (than larger family farms and farms employing hired labor), and thus economize on scarce resources (9 and Doving's paper in this seminar), 2) ownership and security of tenure promote many forms of investment which result from direct application of labor, (such as buildings, terraces, livestock herds, etc. (19)); these investments occur within the traditional agricultural technology, and 3) insecurity of tenure and share tenancy may be among the reasons that inhibit adoption of new output-increasing
techniques, such as use of fertilizers, insecticides, new varieties, better feeding of livestock, artificial insemination, and so forth (19).

It seems to me that the third effect has the least necessary relation to the tenure system and yet is probably the most important factor for potential increases in agricultural production in underdeveloped areas (here again, Japanese experience is relevant). This raised the policy question, whether effort in extension, probably associated with effort to build up public or cooperative credit and marketing agencies can produce significant results without land reforms, or whether the success of such effort must depend upon prior completion of reforms.

I think the answer is that it is possible to use the extension and service agency approach without land reform, at least in some situations. Such policies might well be applicable to agricultural economies characterized by the coexistence of farms of different sizes, and operated under different tenures, all, however, using approximately the same technology. This is a situation in which large ownership units are usually operated in small tenant cultivating units, though occasional farms employ a few hired workers; it is a situation typical of most of Asia, except for areas of plantation agriculture. Such areas are to be distinguished from areas where large ownership units are usually also large operating units employing many hired workers and using a different technology than the small units which exist by their side.

The beneficial economic consequences from improvements in tenure may not result if attempts to institute land reforms increase instability. This may readily occur if there is not sufficient political support for reforms; in such circumstances, reforms may not be undertaken, or they may be legislated but only feebly enforced. It is in such circumstances that the above policy alternatives might be particularly relevant.

The intent of the above discussion is to suggest a framework of ideas which may be useful for the study of tenure and land reform. Possibly, the only valid point is that situations differ a great deal, and that we need to be careful in ascribing one-to-one relationships between tenure systems and certain economic consequences.

Some other problems for tenure research.—Almost all of the above discussion has dealt with the implications of social differentiation of tenure classes. I would like to add just a few comments about some other problem areas on which tenure research is needed.

In many underdeveloped countries, owners of existing small farms or of new small units created by land reform need help from credit and marketing cooperatives and from an extension service. The basic purpose of such remedies is to adjust peasants to opportunities of a market economy, keep them out of the clutches of moneylenders, prevent recurrence of loss of ownership, and increase incomes and production.

There is general recognition of the need, and many attempts have been made but without significant success. In India, attempts to introduce cooperative credit date to the beginning of the century, and extension was introduced shortly before independence. Neither movement has yet taken root.

The nature of the difficulties facing extension and cooperative credit (in India) are known, at least in a general way. The difficulties are caused partly by social divisions in the villages, partly by peasant distrust of outsiders and particularly of officials, and partly by the unsuitability of bureaucratic attitudes developed in administration of law and order and in revenue collection. However, if one reads government reports, one gets an impression of rapid growth and popular enthusiasm which simply isn't there. There is need for considerable additional research to indicate what is really happening, and to help formulate more useful methods of developing these service agencies.

Useful research can also be done in describing more precisely how the rights and duties of different tenure holders are exercised in practice (law-in-action type of research). This is probably more important in underdeveloped countries because of the greater variety and complexity of tenure rights which exist in these countries. Rights of different kinds of tenants in India seem to require considerable administrative supervision. For example, an occupancy tenant in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh (before abolition of intermediaries) could have his rent raised 1) if it was below rates paid by other occupancy tenants on similar land, 2) if prices had risen since rent was fixed, and 3) if there had been an increase in cultivated area within
his holding. It would be useful to know how much recourse is had to the administrative hierarchy, and what kind of decisions the administrators have actually been making.

Implications for graduate training.—A number of difficulties face us in providing better graduate training in tenure research to students from our own country and from abroad. I think Phil Raup (in the paper contributed to this seminar) has made an excellent statement of the difficulties facing a foreign student: 1) language problems of the foreign student and the resulting tendency to emphasize the most mathematical and abstract areas in economics, 2) lack of interest and knowledge of the history of his own country, 3) an ideological rather than an analytical approach to tenure problems, and 4) a tendency to describe tenure problems of underdeveloped countries in terms of concepts relevant to developed regions.

A few observations can be added to the above. I have been stating the case for tenure research, which would include recognition of the historical development of tenure institutions and recognition of how tenure functions within the structure of rural society. Agricultural economists in this country, in India, and probably in most underdeveloped countries have not been doing this kind of research. The only major recent works by American agricultural economists that come to mind are Marshall Harris' Origin of the Land Tenure System in the United States, and Hewes' Japan--Land and Men.

A few comments about possible modifications in training of foreign graduate students follow. These comments can be grouped under three headings: learning to understand better the tenure system of their own countries and to use this broader understanding in tenure research, developing an analytical approach to tenure problems, and applying theoretical ideas of production economics to understand problems of farm people in their own countries.

The effort to understand tenure calls for wider reading, much of it outside agricultural economics literature. The application to research calls for some attempts to classify various tenure holders by all appropriate tenure categories, (rather than just into landlords, owner-operators, tenants, and hired workers), attention to processes by which tenure rights are obtained, attempts to differentiate customary from contractual relations in tenure arrangements, description of the extent to which people in any one tenure category control the credit and marketing alternatives of those in other tenure categories, and attention to appearance of new patterns of behavior.

Developing an analytical approach to tenure calls for developing habits of appraising by research ideological and emotional solutions to tenure problems. There is a great danger that we ourselves equate analytical approaches with our own ideologies; Raup warns that: "We must first abandon the notion that we fail if we do not turn out research workers convinced of the overriding merit of systems of private ownership and individual tenure." But to avoid this danger, we must not draw back from analysis of solutions commonly proposed in many underdeveloped countries simply because they happen to be popular with students from those countries.

Finally, we might help students from underdeveloped countries, who are interested in tenure, to learn how to apply concepts of production economics to the peasant farms of their own countries. Many foreign students think of agricultural problems entirely in aggregate terms: relation of agriculture to rest of economy in course of economic development, problem of marketing surplus in a peasant economy, and so forth. It would be very desirable if students had some data about resources available on typical farms in their own country, combinations of enterprises, present production practices, and some research findings about new practices. Students should be helped to learn from such data what alternatives the peasants have, the implications for farm organization of scarce land and abundant labor, the possibilities of improved practices (seed, fertilizer, better rotations), and the relative opportunities for using such new practices versus the more glamorous introduction of tractors.

This in any case is what we can do best in agricultural colleges. In relation to tenure, the most immediate contribution should be a clearer understanding of issues in economies of scale, relevance of mechanization, and so forth. I would also hope that we can make a contribution to tenure problems by putting together some of the techniques of production economics with the insights of economic historians, sociologists, and anthropologists.

4/ From an unpublished paper by a research scholar in Punjab University, M. L. Patel, Malguzari Abolition in Madhya Pradesh.
LITERATURE CITED

Publications on India

1. Baden-Powell, B. H. The Land Systems of British India. 3 volumes, 1892.

Publications on Japan


Other


* Works marked with * have recently been republished in India and are probably currently available.
Personnel in Attendance

A. Aandahl
Joseph Ackerman
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Raleigh Barlowe
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University of Nebraska
Farm Foundation
Purdue University
Michigan State University
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BLM, Department of Interior
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University of Illinois
South Dakota State College
American Bar Foundation
CSESS, U.S. Department of Agriculture
ERS, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Iowa)
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ERS, U.S. Department of Agriculture
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University of Nebraska
University of Illinois
BLM, Department of Interior
North Dakota State University
University of Missouri
University of Missouri
Agricultural Missions, Inc.
Council on Economic and Cultural Affairs
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Kansas State University
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Iowa State University
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