000148927 001__ 148927
000148927 005__ 20180122225108.0
000148927 037__ $$a824-2016-54784
000148927 041__ $$aen_US
000148927 084__ $$aC73
000148927 084__ $$aD62
000148927 084__ $$aD64
000148927 084__ $$aQ20
000148927 245__ $$aContagious Cooperation, Temptation, and Ecosystem Collapse
000148927 260__ $$c2013-04
000148927 269__ $$a2013-04
000148927 270__ $$ma.p.richter@ibv.uio.no$$pRichter,   Andries
000148927 300__ $$a51
000148927 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000148927 490__ $$aCCSD
000148927 490__ $$a36.2013
000148927 520__ $$aReal world observations suggest that social norms of cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a common pool resource – but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse. We show that these patterns of erosion and collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the temptation to overexploit the resource, while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations. We analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters (including the size of the community, and the rate of technological progress) trigger catastrophic transitions from relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation – causing the social-ecological system to collapse.
000148927 542__ $$fLicense granted by Nancy Elera (nancy.elera@feem.it) on 2013-05-10T10:29:07Z (GMT):

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000148927 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000148927 6531_ $$aSocial Norms
000148927 6531_ $$aCommon Pool Resource
000148927 6531_ $$aCo-Evolution
000148927 6531_ $$aResilience
000148927 6531_ $$aAlternative Stable States
000148927 700__ $$aRichter, Andries
000148927 700__ $$aSoest, Daan van
000148927 700__ $$aGrasman, Johan
000148927 8564_ $$s1350156$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/148927/files/NDL2013-036.pdf
000148927 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/148927
000148927 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:148927$$pGLOBAL_SET
000148927 912__ $$nSubmitted by Nancy Elera (nancy.elera@feem.it) on 2013-05-10T10:36:16Z
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000148927 912__ $$nMade available in DSpace on 2013-05-10T10:36:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
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  Previous issue date: 2013-04
000148927 982__ $$gFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Climate Change and Sustainable Development
000148927 980__ $$a824