TRANSACTION COSTS, RISK AVERSION, AND CHOICE OF TENURE REVISITED

The related questions of how tenants and landlords choose leasing contracts and how these contracts affect efficient allocation of resources continue to divide economists This article rejects answers suggested by transaction cost models developed by Cheung and by Ip and Stahl and argues that among risk-averse farmers, contract choice is determined by the relative intensities of tenant and landlord aversion to risk The risk model examined here suggested that all contract forms - whether fixed rent, fixed wage, or crop share - can generally achieve the same allocative efficiency


Issue Date:
1980-04
Publication Type:
Journal Article
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/148631
Published in:
Agricultural Economics Research, Volume 32, Number 2
Page range:
26-35
Total Pages:
10




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-27

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