000014431 001__ 14431
000014431 005__ 20180122195436.0
000014431 037__ $$a1687-2016-137172
000014431 041__ $$aen
000014431 245__ $$aINTERTEMPORAL PERMIT TRADING FOR STOCK POLLUTANTS WITH UNCERTAINTY
000014431 260__ $$c2002
000014431 269__ $$a2002
000014431 270__ $$mtarui001@umn.edu$$pTarui,   Nori
000014431 300__ $$a18
000014431 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000014431 446__ $$aEnglish
000014431 490__ $$aWorking Paper WP02-1
000014431 520__ $$aThis paper explores the efficiency of tradable permit markets for stock pollutants.  With uncertainty about the future stock level or damages, a market with banking and borrowing is inferior, in terms of efficiency, compared to a market without banking and borrowing if the regulator commits to an initial allocation of permits.  This result occurs because, with banking and borrowing and commitment, the regulator needs to specify the total allowable amount of emission over time at the initial time period before the uncertainty with the pollution stock is resolved.  An alternative banking and borrowing scheme is proposed, where the regulator can update the allocation of permits to firms over time and achieve the efficient pollution accumulation.
000014431 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000014431 700__ $$aTarui, Nori
000014431 8564_ $$s118303$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14431/files/wp02-01.pdf
000014431 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/14431
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  Previous issue date: 2002
000014431 982__ $$gUniversity of Minnesota>Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy>Working Papers
000014431 980__ $$a1687