Community-Based Land Tenure and Government Land Policy in Sarawak:
A Study in Institutional Dissonance

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INTRODUCTION

Discussions of rural land policy in the underdeveloped world are frequently based on what Bromley (1985) terms the "myth of management." This is the often mistaken notion that decisions made at the policy level (that is, within parliaments and planning agencies) and translated into rules and procedures at the organizational level (for example, by proclaiming land laws and setting up agencies for land administration and development) necessarily have the desired or intended effects at the operational level (where farm households, villages, plantation companies, and so on, make actual land-use decisions). [2] In reality, the formal institutional environment created by the state may be incongruent with the often informal institutions (rules and customs) which define and guide the behaviour operating units; or, even if congruent, they may be imperfectly applied or enforced. The effect is often to induce perverse behavioural responses to land policy initiatives and to reduce the social efficiency of land-use management. [3]

This "layering" of incongruent institutional structures, with its concomitant inducement to socially inefficient behaviour, Bromley (1985) refers to as "institutional dissonance." Such dissonance may arise because of differences between operating units and the state and its agencies concerning the goals of land use, because of different perceptions of the appropriate institutional means for achieving land-use goals, or some combination of the two. For example, in discussing contemporary resource management problems in Asian agriculture, Bromley and Verma point to "the tension that results from a divergence between what is necessary or desired from the perspective of the national government and what is necessary or desired from the perspective of the individual economic agent" (1983:258). Bromley and Cnapagair also argue in relation to the problem of deforestation in Nepal that "to ignore the tensions between the village and the center is to miss the essence of natural resource policy in many parts of the world ... The sort of tensions we have in mind show up in terms of different priorities in resource use, different objectives regarding that use, and certainly different means for addressing conflicts among users at the local level—or between local and non-local users" (1984:868). [4]

Divergent goals may arise because the state perceives (correctly or not) that it must intervene to modify land-use decisions in the public interest, for example, by remedying land-use externalities. Action to control shifting cultivation is frequently justified in these terms, though the nature and extent of the supposed externalities in this case remains a matter for debate (Cramb 1988b). Taking a more cynical view, goals may diverge because the state "as a hidden agenda involving the redistribution of benefits to a favored elite (e.g., Dove 1986). Such intentional redistributive policies, however, are invariably rationalized in terms of promoting "... public interest. For example, the state may encourage plantation agriculture for export because this gives it access to increased revenue and foreign exchange needed to satisfy the consumption requirements of an urban elite (Dos Santos 1970), yet the case will be argued in terms of promoting "development" for the nation as a whole, a goal which, in itself, few would criticize.
Even with agreement on the goals of land use, institutional dissonance may arise because of different notions of the appropriate means of administering land use. This may be simply due to cultural biases at the policy level, reinforced by limited understanding of the nature and function of traditional local-level rules and conventions. For example, widespread attempts during the colonial period to transplant western, economic institutions, particularly western systems of land tenure, have been notoriously disruptive of traditional social organization (e.g., Steinberg et al., 1971:196-210; Pluvier 1974:56-69). Ironically, as Commons (1924) long ago demonstrated, the very institutions imported from the west and imposed on local populations were themselves in many cases derived in an evolutionary way out of the unwritten customs and conventions of European farmers, villagers, guildsmen, and others. The English common-law courts in particular were the means by which the law of landlord and tenant, of creditor and debtor, and of employer and employee were progressively formalized. Parsons, noting these origins of economic institutions in the Anglo-American tradition, argues that in the developing countries, too, "ways must be found to build upon and modernize traditional practices and not merely attempt to replace these practices by imported procedures" (1962:175).

It is true that, at times, attempts to reinforce or formalize indigenous institutions have been equally misconceived. Crocombe (1971) points out how mistaken views of indigenous land tenure led colonial authorities in many Pacific island countries to impose inappropriate structures of collective ownership, resulting in what he terms "institutionalized misunderstanding". Feldman (1974) argues that, in over-reaction to the individualization of land tenure during the colonial period, the Tanzanian government has attempted to revert to an equally inappropriate communal stereotype.

Yet such mistakes merely reinforce Parsons's call for careful research into indigenous institutions:

To the extent that the experience of the people of the area is taken as the source of insights to be expanded and generalized in an economy newly developing from traditional forms, the research problem evidently centers on a selective analysis of social practices, or customs, of the people with a view to finding social practices which can be built upon. The development of laws out of customs, by the common-law method, represents the essence of this approach (1962:174).

However, he laments that "this searching of the customs or social practices of a people for elementary rules which can be extended and strengthened is somewhat alien to the habits of thought of much of contemporary economic analysis," influenced as it is by the widely-held view that traditional economic institutions are inherently obstructive of technological change and economic progress (1962:174).

More recently, Bromley and Verma have also argued that local-level perceptions should be given greater prominence in planning technical and institutional change.

[T]he development process as it relates to natural resource use should be designed in such a manner that the resource problems as defined by those at the village level carry significant influence vis-à-vis the problems as defined by national or foreign participants. The process must be such that the needs of the local participants are met and it must be consonant with the larger part...
Recognizing, however, that institutional dissonance may be due to the intentional redistributive policies of the state, they note that the changes they envisage require a willingness to "confront those who possess political power" (1983:263). This is partly what Dorner has in view when he remarks that "changes in tenure systems emerge out of conflict among contending groups... Tenure systems, as hammered out by experience and conflict, are adaptations to prevailing circumstances and the dominant ideas and political philosophy" (1972:37). The current debate and experimentation within many developing countries concerning the appropriate institutional structure for rural land development exemplifies this process.

This paper considers the extent to which past and present governments in the Malaysian state of Sarawak have built on the strengths of the traditional, community-based tenure system (as Parsons, Bromley and others advocate) or have undermined its effectiveness and endeavoured to replace it with alternative institutional forms. In doing so it examines the degree of dissonance between local-level institutions and those imposed by the state and the extent to which such dissonance leads to socially inefficient outcomes. The hypothesis is that successful institutional innovations at the policy level are consonant with perceptions and procedures at the local community level.

The paper focuses on the land tenure system of the largest indigenous group in Sarawak—the Iban. The following section describes the characteristics of traditional Iban land tenure. Since the middle of the 19th century, however, Iban institutions have been progressively incorporated within and subordinated to the wider institutional structure of the Sarawak state (Pringle 1970; Leigh 1974; Reece 1982; Searle 1983). From 1841 to 1941 Sarawak was the private colony of an English family, the Brookes. After being occupied by the Japanese during the Pacific war, Sarawak was ceded by Vyner Brooke to Britain in 1946. It was thus a crown colony until 1963 when it became part of Malaysia. Succeeding sections examine the impact of land policy in the Brooke period and the postwar period on the functioning of the traditional tenure system. The paper concludes by assessing the sources and consequences of institutional dissonance and suggesting future directions for institutional innovation at the policy level.

A study of this kind inevitably involves value judgements. The position taken in this paper is that Iban values and preferences should be given priority in determining or evaluating the policies affecting the use of Iban land, except where there are demonstrable spillover effects associated with Iban land use (such as forest degradation or excessive soil erosion and runoff) which need to be dealt with at a higher level. As argued elsewhere (Cramb 1988b), despite repeated assertions to the contrary, there is no convincing evidence of the importance of such effects in established areas of Iban settlement. Consequently, government land policy toward the Iban can be assessed according to how well it reinforces and builds on the institutional arrangements which the Iban themselves have devised to meet their goals.

TRADITIONAL IBAN LAND TENURE

The Iban are a vigorous, egalitarian society of longhouse-dwellers who practice shifting cultivation of hill rice (Freeman 1955). They are often mistakenly assumed to be engaged predominantly in a "linear-shift" system of land use, continually abandoning cultivated land to move into primary forest
In traditional Iban land tenure the household is the basic right-holding unit and the longhouse community, comprising from 5 to 50 households and occupying a distinct territory, is the basic unit of land administration (Cramb 1987). Hence the system is "community-based" (property rights are assigned and enforced by the local community) but not strictly "communal" (most property rights are held by individual households and only some are held in common). An individual household's rights to land are gained in the first instance by virtue of its membership in the longhouse community. This membership bestows a general right of access to the longhouse territory, held in common with all other member households. The right of access is in fact a bundle of rights. The most important, of course, is the right to clear the forest for the cultivation of hill rice and other food crops in order to meet the household's subsistence requirements. During the cropping period a household has exclusive rights to the plot it has cleared and it retains the right to recultivate the plot in subsequent years, so long as it remains a member of the community. A household also has the right to claim individual forest trees (such as fruit trees or bee-bearing trees) which it is the first to harvest or utilize as well as any trees which it plants. Apart from these exclusive rights, member households have common access to the longhouse site itself, to the landing place at the river's edge adjacent to the longhouse, to the community graveyard and to forest reserves maintained by the community as a source of timber, cane and other produce. Common access also extends to hunting and gathering within the longhouse territory, including cropland currently under forest-fallow, and to fishing in the stretch of river running through the territory. All these rights are held to the exclusion of non-members of the community.

Elsewhere it has been argued that Iban land tenure institutions have been largely successful in providing orderly access to land resources for the members of the longhouse community with minimal expenditure of resources on defining and enforcing rights to land (Cramb 1987). Close personal interaction over a long period, reinforced by the influence of a shared morality, serves to facilitate the negotiation of rights to land, to communicate information about rights, and to monitor the exercise of those rights. A key element in the success of traditional Iban land tenure has been that free-rider tendencies (the propensity of individuals to act in a purely self-interested fashion to the detriment of the collective interest, for example, by flouting tenure rules) have been voluntarily curtailed due to a shared concern for the survival of the community. The continued viability of the longhouse mode of land administration depends on preserving this sense of community and community territory by which the necessary degree of cooperative behaviour is sustained.

The infrequency of disputes over land within longhouse communities, despite the lack in most cases of any formal registration of title, indicates the effectiveness with which Iban land tenure institutions have maintained orderly access to community land resources. Disputes between communities, however, have been more common. Traditionally, competing territorial claims were settled by regional leaders. Disputes which could not be settled by negotiation were resolved by various forms of ritualized contest, such as fighting with clubs or the diving ordeal, though these procedures did not
necessarily lead to a permanent resolution of the dispute and, particularly in the case of fighting with clubs, carried the risk of promoting further conflict (Happell 1976, 1987). As discussed below, this was the principal area in which the Sarawak state had the potential to improve upon the traditional system—by providing a third party with the capacity to record and enforce territorial rights—though, as will be seen, government activity in this respect has been inconsistent.

It has been further argued that the order created by traditional Iban land tenure satisfies Iban notions both of efficiency and of equity (Cram 1987). The Iban system neatly combines features of both smallholder and collective or group farming which are conducive to productive efficiency. The right of an individual household to cultivate all land which it was the first to clear encourages the intensive application of family labour and permits the use of individual knowledge and managerial judgement in making farming decisions. It also provides the incentive for maintaining the productivity of land in the long term, both through adequate forest-fallowing and the planting of perennials, including cash crops such as rubber. Nevertheless, the Iban recognize that uncoordinated use of individual household plots can entail significant loss of efficiency. In the case of hill rice farming, grouping plots together in a large block and coordinating activities within the block creates economies in burning off, constructing temporary paths and fences, controlling pests and exchanging labour at peak work times. In the case of cash crops, block planting arrangements enable the realization of similar economies and, incidentally, may also encourage less progressive households to participate. Under conditions of growing population pressure, coordinating the farming activities of individual households can facilitate efficient land-use decisions at the community level, by regulating both the area of hill rice and the area allocated for cash crops in relation to the overall availability of land within the longhouse territory.

Iban land tenure has also permitted an equitable distribution of access to land. A pioneer Iban community began as a voluntary association of households sharing equal rights of access to a tract of virgin land. As noted above, through felling primary forest each household was able to acquire cultivation rights to specific plots in order to grow its subsistence requirements, while retaining common rights of access to the longhouse territory for hunting, fishing and collecting forest produce. Yet as generations passed, and particularly as newcomers arrived, the distribution of cultivation rights within the community became more unequal and some households found themselves with rights to insufficient land. Equitable access has been maintained, however, by the temporary transfer of cultivation rights between households (with or without the payment of a token rent) and, in some cases, by the pooling of cultivation rights such that the longhouse meeting allocates individual hill rice plots each year on the basis of household needs. Where common farming land has been used for commercial crops (particularly rubber), principles of equity have required, firstly, that all households be involved and, secondly, that household shares be of roughly equal size.

Thus Iban land tenure institutions have created a culturally acceptable order which provides the basis for a culturally acceptable trade-off between efficiency and equity in the use of land. This order has proved adaptable to the growing pressure of population on the land and the spread of commercial agriculture. The acceptability and adaptability of these institutions have ensured that individuals cooperate to maintain them in force and that free-rider behaviour is rare. As Field suggests, "the cultural or historical conditions that may make it possible to sustain [cooperative] behaviour with
relatively low real expenditures on enforcement can be thought of as invested 'capital' associated with the existing institutional arrangements" (1984:701). Recognition of the "institutional capital" tied up in the Iban system of community-based land tenure suggests that the role of the community in managing access to land within its territory should be buttressed in government legislation and, where appropriate, harnessed in land development policy. Dissenting this community structure of rules in the interests of "rationalizing" the land tenure system will involve the erosion of institutional capital which a purely state enforced system could find very difficult and costly to replace.

LAND POLICY IN THE BROOKE PERIOD

Though the Brookes endeavoured to promote a measure of economic development (Reece 1988), economic motives in themselves were of secondary importance in their dealings with the Iban. Rather, as Pringle concludes, "the mainspring of Brooke rule was the soul-filling satisfaction which the first two Rajahs, but above all the Second, derived from ruling" (1970:347). The Brookes were primarily concerned to establish and maintain control over the Iban and other indigenous groups, with minimal expenditure of resources on the machinery of government, rather than to utilize Iban land for commercial development (for which they turned primarily to immigrant Chinese and to "unoccupied and waste lands" [5]). It was therefore in their interests to preserve traditional land tenure arrangements as far as possible, while subordinating them to an implied claim of ultimate state proprietorship in land. The notion of state proprietorship did not convey any intention of actually expropriating the Iban but was used to justify administrative control.

The Brooke district courts in particular subordinated traditional Iban authority over land and became the final source of legitimation for both household and community claims to land, particularly the latter. [6] The authority of the courts over Iban land matters was never completely enforced, the extent of effective Iban autonomy increasing with greater distance from the district headquarters. Nevertheless, the courts became an important element in the Iban institutional environment and their impact on land tenure arrangements in long-settled and more accessible areas was considerable.

Once the inevitability of continued Brooke rule was accepted by the Iban they focused on the courts as a venue whereby their rights could be established in the eyes of the state. Iban leaders invariably advised the court on the provisions of adat or customary law which were considered relevant to the case in question (Ward 1966; Pringle 1970). The overriding authority of the state meant that traditional principles could be modified or discarded at will, but as already noted, it was in the government's interests to preserve and build on the accepted rules of Iban land tenure and in general the courts did seek to uphold the customary law. The courts thus had the capacity to be a forum for the enunciation and development of Iban land tenure institutions and hence the means by which they could be incorporated in the wider institutional structure of the state, in line with the common-law method advocated by Parsons. As will be seen, however, their potential in this respect remained largely unrealized.

The major business of the Brooke courts insofar as land matters were concerned was the resolution of territorial disputes. To some extent the higher authority of government, as embodied in the court, provided an acceptable way of settling irreconcilable territorial claims which avoided the dangers of the traditional procedures of last resort. The decision of the
court did not necessarily have the supposed finality of an appeal to the
gods, a problem which was exacerbated by the sometimes ambiguous nature of
court decisions and records, and the state's limited powers of monitoring and
enforcement. The court nevertheless carried sufficient authority and its
decisions were sufficiently permanent that many disputes were brought to it
(and continue to be brought) simply as the easiest and most reliable means
for resolving potential conflict and disorder.

On the other hand, by undermining or coopting the authority of
traditional leaders the court unwittingly created a demand for its own
services in that territorial rights no longer had the security conferred by
traditional authority. Given the absence of any legislative provision or
administrative capacity for the registration of community title to land,
government recognition of territorial rights could only be obtained by
asserting them in court. The court was thus effectively used as a land
office where traditional claims to land had to be revalidated or ratified if
they were to be secure. The ad hoc and cumbersome nature of this process of
revalidation through litigation and the limited capacity of the court to
enforce its decisions created both the scope and the incentive for the
opportunistic and expansionary Iban to jockey for a more favourable
allocation of territorial rights. Challenging the territorial authority of a
neighbouring community was very much safer in court, where sharp words took
the place of sharper weapons. The volume of litigation over land in the
Brooke period, and to a lesser degree since the war, is ample testimony to
the popularity of court proceedings as a means of contesting valuable
territory.

The prevalence of such inter-community disputes and the relative absence
of disputes within communities suggests that, from the point of view of
maintaining order, the government's primary role in land administration
should have been to adjudicate and record the territorial claims of longhouse
communities. This came to be recognized towards the end of Brooke rule.
According to Kitto, following the issue of an administrative circular in
1939,

Village Committees were formed and instructed by Government to
"ascertain the extent of the lands over which their communities
claim customary rights." To these lands were added areas of virgin
jungle to allow for future needs and the total areas resulting were
demarcated by rough boundary marks or indicated by topographical
features. These areas were looked upon as fixed native communal
reserves and no doubt the communities concerned must remember the
promises made to them by Government although the reserves have
never been gazetted (1952:91,92).

This, then, was purely an administrative initiative with no backing in law
and hence it failed to provide the needed security of tenure at the community
level.

In general, the translation of traditional principles of land tenure
into the formal land law of the Brooke state was never carried out in any
systematic or lasting way. Occasional government orders dealt specifically
with Iban land tenure, such as the 1868 order banning the convention (tanimah
ulii) whereby mourning restrictions were placed on the use of land and the
1899 order dealing (somewhat ambiguously) with the disposition of an emigrant
household's rights over land and fruit trees, but these were essentially
directives, not always reflecting Iban views, and in any case were
imperfectly enforced. In their fumbling attempts to provide more
The comprehensive land law, from the 1863 Land Regulations through to the 1933 Land Settlement Order (Porter 1967), the Brookes relied on the English concept of individually held leases of state land and gave no recognition to the role of the household as the basic right-holding unit in Iban society nor to the longhouse community as the basic unit of land administration.

The reliance on alien institutional forms was even more apparent with the adoption of commercial agriculture by the Iban. The government insisted that quasi-titles in the form of Permits to Plant, Rubber Garden Registration Certificates, or Occupation Tickets be obtained before planting could be considered legitimate (Porter 1967). Even though such documents were not based on any survey, the courts recognized them as valid title to land, superior to any unregistered traditional claim. Hence it became increasingly necessary for the Iban to go along with the new rules of the game in order to have secure rights to their cash crops in the event of a dispute being taken to court. The security of title conferred by the state was thus simply an artifact of an externally imposed institutional structure and added nothing to the security which Iban households enjoyed in the absence of that structure.

Notwithstanding the increasingly inappropriate institutional structure imposed by the state, it should be realized that even by the end of the Brooke period the bulk of Iban land continued to be administered largely within the context of the traditional community-based system, which functioned satisfactorily (in Iban terms) almost in spite of government land policy.

POSTWAR LAND POLICY

The Brookes, though conservative, were not completely averse to change, provided it was not so rapid or extensive as to possibly disrupt their hold on the population (Reece 1982:12; 1988). Hence the gradual development of smallholder rubber planting was encouraged as a supplement to traditional subsistence farming, though it was never intended to transform the Iban economy in the way that it did in the interwar years. In the postwar period the British colonial government pursued more explicit developmental goals, though still within the smallholder framework. It was concerned to eradicate shifting cultivation and to promote intensive rice farming and smallholder cash cropping, both to make the colony economically viable and to realize its particular vision of rural progress. Many colonial officers saw the break-up of the longhouse and the establishment of independent peasant proprietors on consolidated holdings as a prerequisite to achieving this transformation. In this context, traditional community-based land tenure was seen as an obstacle to development and a solution was sought through government legislation to provide individual title to land.

The independent Sarawak government took over this policy largely unaltered. In addition, since the 1970s the government has been concerned to exploit opportunities for large-scale commercial land development. This is argued to be in the interests of economic development at the state level; that is, land is viewed primarily as a state resource to be utilized for the generation of economic activity and of government revenue, which in principle can then be transferred to the population in the form of improved social infrastructure. From this perspective, further radical changes in land tenure institutions are called for.
Individual Title to Land

The cornerstone of colonial land policy was the 1957 Land Code which, despite efforts in the early 1960s to replace it, has survived largely unaltered to the present (Porter 1967). Hence much of the ensuing discussion applies as much to the contemporary period as to the colonial period itself. The Land Code essentially took over and consolidated the land laws of the later Brooke period in which title to land was a formally registered, individually held, long-term (usually 99 years) lease from the state. It also entrenched a system of land classification with the following categories: (1) Mixed Zone Land, in which there were no restrictions on who could acquire title to land; (2) Native Area Land, in which only legally defined Natives (such as the Iban and Malay, but excluding the Chinese) could hold a title; (3) Native Customary Land, that is, land not held under title but subject to Native Customary Rights; (4) Reserved Land, or land held by the government, principally as forest reserves; and (5) Interior Area Land, a residual category.

The aims of land policy within the framework of the Land Code were, firstly, to protect the rights of the Iban and other indigenous groups to their land through the system of land classification, while systematically excising "surplus" portions of such land for alienation to the more commercially oriented Chinese farmers; and secondly, to progressively convert Native Customary Land (considered to be held by licence from the crown, but effectively administered by autonomous longhouse communities) into titled land (held by individual lease with no reference to traditional community authority or rights). [7] Thus while at least recognizing community-based tenure as an "encumbrance" on crown land, there was no sense in which land law in the colonial period attempted to reinforce or build on the strengths of the traditional system. Rather, the aim was to totally replace it with a peculiarly British system of individual leasehold.

There was not complete agreement within the colonial administration concerning this approach to land policy. Some officers saw a basic conflict between customary principles of land tenure and the official land laws which would not be resolved by simply replacing customary rights with individual titles to land (Noakes 1946, 1947; Kitto 1952; Phillips 1954). Noakes, an experienced land settlement officer, wrote: "We have brought certain European concepts of land tenure to Sarawak and in a modern state land registration is unavoidable, but the great danger is that native adat [custom] will be swamped if we do not act now and translate it into a form of land tenure which will prove an adequate safeguard of those rights we are pledged to maintain." [8] He later observed: "There will always be land disputes, but so many of these disputes are caused, unfortunately, by the premature imposition of our Land Laws before detailed investigation" (1947:165). The anthropologist, Edmund Leach, who was conducting a socio-economic survey of Sarawak at the time, also pointed to what he saw as a "conflict of laws due to inadequate understanding." He remarked: "It seems to me altogether too much to suppose that the enterprising Iban who acquires registered land in a native area suddenly adjusts his legal notions to those of the Land Office." [9]

Kitto, referring to the limited effort made in the immediate pre-war years to delineate territorial boundaries (as noted above), suggested "we have reached the point now where it is vital for economic reasons to once again examine these communal areas." He proposed that land settlement officers should "decide on generous lines the limits of native customary tenure land" and that "native trusts" should be establishe...
"responsible for the administration of the areas under their control in accordance with native customary law as accepted by the communities themselves and not as laid down in our present land laws." Among their prerogatives "these Trusts could, if necessary, lease on yearly rentals portions of the communities' land to non-natives or to other natives," utilizing the revenue for community projects (1952:92).

Some contemporary Iban politicians and lawyers have revived the notion of registering title to land in the name of the longhouse community. One recent discussion paper proposes that land settlement should follow the procedure of first conducting a perimeter survey of the territory (meno) of a particular community, making it possible to issue a "AI menoe title" in the name of the headman, endorsed with the names of each household head. The paper argues that this would prevent boundary disputes, consolidate individual claims within the territory of the community concerned, and facilitate participation in land development schemes. [10] It would also speed up the process of land settlement and thus give community members a more secure hold on their land in the eyes of the law than conferred by their present status as mere "licensees" of the state.

Nevertheless, such arguments have not prevailed. The brief pre-war effort in delineating territorial boundaries and registering territorial claims was not followed up and land policy since the war has been to concentrate land adjudication in more accessible and commercially valuable areas and to alienate land exclusively to individuals.

One argument which has been consistently advanced by many colonial and contemporary officials in support of replacing community-based tenure with a system of individual titles is that this will increase the efficiency of land administration and reduce land disputes. In the vast majority of cases, however, land dealings occur almost entirely between households within the one longhouse community, where local knowledge of property rights and local enforcement procedures keep disputes to a minimum. Hence any improvement in the definition and administration of rights to land brought about by registration of individual title is likely to be relatively insignificant. Yet considerable governmental resources are required to achieve such registration, as evidenced by the slow progress in land settlement proceedings under the Land Code (see below).

Moreover, there can be no doubt that individual title to land issued by the state progressively undermines the authority and hence the viability of the longhouse community. In itself individual title to land is not entirely out of keeping with community-based tenure. The traditional tenure system clearly recognizes the authority of individual households over specific plots of land, particularly those planted with long-term crops such as rubber. A document of title issued in the name of an individual (usually the household head) can still be regarded as the common property of the household, subject to traditional principles of transfer and inheritance within the community (with the added inconvenience, however, of having the document altered at the district office each time a transfer takes place). However, when a conflict of interest occurs between the individual and the community, a state-enforced system of individual titles strengthens the hand of the individual at the expense of the collective interest. For example, the continued control which an emigrant household can exercise over its titled land (usually old rubber gardens) restricts the community's options in managing its territory, requiring the law to be flouted if the traditional reversionary right is to be reasserted (as in a recent case where an emigrant household's rubber land was taken over for a community cocoa project). It can be concluded that the
formal registration of individual title to land is not a priority for most Iban communities (though of course it may be for particular individuals).

A second argument repeatedly advanced for replacing community-based tenure with individual titles is that this is necessary if the landholder is to obtain finance to improve his land; unless he can offer secure title to his land as collateral, credit may not be forthcoming. It is not obvious, however, that Iban investment in Native Customary Land is in fact constrained by the lack of formal individual title; witness the widespread commercialisation of Iban agriculture in this century (Cramb 1988a). In any case, it must be realized that the use of land as collateral implies a fully developed market in land and hence a degree of exposure for Iban landholders which may be considered intolerable. Individual title to land in a fully developed land market can lead to cumulative inequality in landholding and the emergence of an impoverished, landless class, an outcome which Iban land tenure so far has been successful in avoiding. The protection afforded by the Land Code's system of land classification is not an adequate counter to this tendency as wealthy urban-based Iban have been known to accumulate Native Land for speculative purposes. As Parsons observes, "one of the great challenges to development policy, therefore, is to design procedures which enable a group to reorganize their agriculture to approximate the efficiency potential of market-oriented agriculture without thrusting the people into an unendurable degree of liberty-exposure. [11] One clue to strategy in such situations is to explore the potentials of market orientation, which stop short of making land alienable and subject to mortgage" (1974:755).

Despite the emphasis in both colonial and post-colonial land policy on converting landholding to a system of individual titles, by 1986, nearly 30 years after the introduction of the Land Code, the area of land for which titles had actually been issued (including unsurveyed titles such as Occupation Tickets and Rubber Garden Registration Certificates) was 4,655 sq.km, less than 4 per cent of Sarawak's total land area, whereas the area of Native Customary Land was an estimated 30,698 sq.km, or about 25 per cent of the total (Table 1). Within the predominantly Iban Second Division, the area of Native Customary Land was about 7,749 sq.km, 73 per cent of the total area of the Division. This means that, even if a system of individual titles is accepted as a desirable long-term goal, current development policy (if it is to be broadly based) must still consider how to build on the community-based tenure system, which Native Customary Land is administered at the local level. This realisation is one factor behind the institutional innovations described in the next section.

Institutional Arrangements for Land Development

The development of smallholdings in Sarawak, whether independent or community-based, has been largely the province of the Department of Agriculture. In the post-war period the Department has introduced a number of planting schemes to assist smallholders in establishing cash crops, beginning with the Rubber Planting Scheme in 1956. These schemes involve the provision of planting material, fertilizer, equipment, and a cash grant to approved individuals. In the 1980s, however, the Department has shifted its emphasis from dealing with only some individuals in a longhouse to treating the longhouse community itself as the focus of its extension program. This is in recognition that the close interdependence among households within a territorial unit favours coordinated land development.

A good example of this "group farming" approach is found at Sarubah in the Lemanak river where, beginning in 1979, all 29 households have been
assisted to establish about 35 ha of cocoa in two phases. [12] The Sarubah community reached unanimous agreement that a block of common land should be allocated for the project, with each household receiving an equal share. Individual plots were allocated so as to observe the customary restriction on having two kinsmen separated by a non-kinsman. Land preparation, planting, crop maintenance and harvesting have all been done on a coordinated basis. This project has been both technically successful and, given several years of favourable cocoa prices, highly remunerative for the participants. One important reason for the success of the project is that it was conducted within the framework of the traditional tenure system.

Though in the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-90) the in situ development of smallholdings (along the lines promoted by the Department of Agriculture) continues to be emphasized, equal weight is given to the regrouping and resettlement of communities within a newly created structure of commercially managed estates. The government has created three agencies to promote large-scale land development, particularly in areas of Native Customary Land: the Sarawak Land Development Board, the Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority, and the Land Custody and Development Authority.

The Sarawak Land Development Board (SLDB), which was modelled on the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) in Peninsular Malaysia, was established in 1972 under Malaysia's Land Development Ordinance, its purpose being "to promote and assist the investigation, formulation and carrying out of projects for the development and settlement of land in the State of Sarawak." [13] The Board took over the management of seven rubber schemes, with a planted area of about 5,600 ha, in which about 1,175 households had been settled. [14] The land for these schemes was initially state land, including in many cases Native Customary Land which had been surrendered to the government, but following development the settlers (some of whom were the original holders of the customary rights to the land) were to be issued with individual Mixed Zone titles, subject to full repayment of development and housing costs. However, these schemes have encountered serious problems, including culturally inappropriate housing, a limited land base (restricting economic opportunities, particularly for the rising generation), conflict between groups of settlers, the diversion of rubber output to private buyers outside the scheme and a gradual drifting away of the population. Poor economic performance of the schemes has led the the Board to withdraw from its management role, though in most cases settlers have not completed their repayments.

In addition to the rubber schemes which it inherited, the Board proceeded to develop extensive areas in the northern part of Sarawak for oil palm and cocoa. These too were at first intended to be subdivided following crop establishment, with titles being issued to individual settlers. However, in 1974 it was decided to place a freeze on the issuing of titles, partly because of the disproportionate number of Iban among the prospective settlers, and to date the oil palm and cocoa schemes continue to be run on conventional estate lines. [15] Though privatisation of the Board's activities has been mooted, it has been making substantial losses and carries major liabilities, making it unattractive to the private sector. King (1986:86) attributes the Board's financial problems to poor management, inadequate accounting procedures, poor field supervision, frequent breakdowns in machinery and plant, and inadequate infrastructure. The Board itself has identified the shortage and high turnover of local labour as a prime constraint.
In 1976 the Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA) was established, primarily to develop Native-Customary Land for the benefit of the "owners". [16] For purposes of the Land Code, SALCRA is deemed to be a Native of Sarawak, enabling it to deal in Native Land. After taking adequate steps to "ascertain the wishes of the owners," SALCRA can declare a tract of land to be a "development area", thereby giving it powers to carry out any work to improve or develop the land, without however affecting "the legal ownership of that land or any customary rights." SALCRA has initiated projects for oil palm, cocoa, and tea, primarily in the First and Second Divisions, the largest project to date being the Lemanak (Merindun) Oil Palm Scheme which, with the associated Batang Ai (Batu Kayar) Scheme, covers a total area of about 3,600 ha and involves 508 households, all from Iban communities. King comments that "the general concept of in situ development of Native Customary Land put forward by SALCRA is a good one, and acceptable to most natives. It is in implementation that SALCRA activities leave much to be desired" (1986:95). According to King, implementation problems are attributable to the unduly heavy demands being placed on SALCRA's (and Sarawak's) limited managerial and technical expertise.

A significant feature of SALCRA's Lemanak Oil Palm Scheme is that the land for the estate was acquired on a community basis, with each of the 16 participating longhouses arriving at a group decision to contribute a portion (up to a third) of the longhouse territory. Moreover, the estate is pegged out into sectors belonging to individual communities, so that each community adheres to its own land; community members have first right to employment in their own sectors and can organize the way in which work will be distributed. In one case the whole community works on the oil palm together, sharing the wages equally among all the participants; in others, smaller groups carry out the work. In all cases the oil palm is treated as a community resource whose exploitation is subject to institutional regulation by the community. [17]

Without underplaying the many problems with the Lemanak scheme, it remains true that the incorporation of the longhouse community as the basic landholding unit within a larger estate has been a major innovation by SALCRA which has reduced the costs involved both in consolidating the land for planting and in the ongoing management of the estate. This institutional arrangement shows the viability of community-based tenure even in large-scale land development projects. As suggested above, a formal system of community title to land may facilitate such transactions in future, in line with Parsons's suggestion "not to take the pathway toward individualism ... but rather to explore the possibilities of building upon the sense of community or group cohesion as the mode of participation in modernized farm firms" (1974:755).

It is interesting to compare the Lemanak scheme in this respect with the Mukah Oil Palm Scheme, administered by SLDB. In the latter case the land for the scheme was bought from Iban communities by SLDB, leaving a number of communities landless. Though SLDB has no obligation to give former landholders employment on the estate, they account for about 90 per cent of the estate workers. Significant, though they have no legal right to any of the land, they prefer to work on their "own" lots, that is, within their former territories, and the SLDB management, recognizing that the Iban want to be identified with a particular territory, has allowed this in the interests of good worker relations. In other words, though the estate is meant to be run purely on a commercial basis with a "disciplined" workforce, in practice the potential for disruption from the former landholders requires continual negotiation and compromise (including the payout of extra
compensation for the extinguished land rights) if operations are to be carried out smoothly. [18] This seems a clear example of the social inefficiency which can result from institutional dissonance.

The Land Custody and Development Authority (LCDA) was established in 1981 to initiate and coordinate schemes for land development on agricultural, residential, and industrial sites, as well as for "economic and social development," whether in its own capacity or by acting as an intermediary between land-owners and private corporations (in the case of agricultural projects, mainly plantation companies from Peninsular Malaysia). [19] As with SALCRA, LCDA is deemed to be a Native, giving it power to deal in Native Land. LCDA, too, proceeds by declaring land to be a development area. However, the requirement for prior consultation evident in the SALCRA ordinance is weakened, the only condition being that "it appears to the Minister that it would be in the interest of the inhabitants of any area that such area should be developed." Moreover, "where it is not possible to develop any land by arrangement or agreement with the owner, the Authority may, with the approval of the Minister, acquire such land by compulsory acquisition for the purpose of carrying out any of its functions under this Ordinance." Where an agreement to develop the land has been entered into with the owner, he is required to transfer his title or rights to the land to the Authority, which holds them in trust until the development is completed, after which the land is sold, the net proceeds going to the original owner. Alternatively, with the consent of the owner, the title or rights may be reconveyed to him "upon such terms as may be agreed." With regard to Native Area or Native Customary Land, the Authority acts as a purchaser of last resort.

To date, LCDA has concentrated primarily on urban land development, having made little progress in negotiating arrangements for the development of agricultural estates, though this remains a prominent policy objective. [20] According to King, "there has been great resistance on the part of the native population to participation in the schemes because of their unwillingness to surrender land rights, and their suspicion of private commercial plantation companies" (1986:94). A preliminary report for the proposed "Aka-Saribas Integrated Agricultural Development Project contains a similarly critical assessment of the LCDA approach:

In the case of the LCDA model, of the shareholding type, even if it is assumed that there will be no difficulty in convincing the farmers in the study area (mainly Ibans) to hand over their land to the project in exchange for shares and to become paid employees of the joint venture, there are numerous risks involved: ... Misunderstandings with regard to the aims of the project and the reciprocal duties involved; ... Ambivalence in the landowners' position, in so far as they are both decision-makers (in their role as shareholders) and subject to the decisions of the management (as wage labourers); ... Social upheaval caused by the fact that a personal and tangible link between an individual and his land is replaced by an abstract one in the form of shareholding. Several sets of negative consequences may be expected: either there will be passive acceptance, increasing dependence and minimum participation, or else intolerance and refusal, conflicts, absenteeism and out-migration. [21]

In short, the dissonance between the traditional institutions governing community territory and the LCDA form of proportional proprietorship in land
is likely to dramatically increase the social costs involved in the future management of land use.

Iban Perceptions of Land Development Institutions

In addition to considering the actual or projected performance of the alternative institutional arrangements for commercial land development it is crucial to examine the perceptions and opinions of Iban community leaders themselves. To this end, group interviews were conducted in four longhouse communities in the Lemakan region, an area considered to be particularly impoverished and one which has consequently been the focus for a variety of agricultural projects. [22] The communities were chosen to represent different degrees of exposure to government-sponsored land development schemes. Each community was asked to compare four alternative approaches to land development: the Department of Agriculture’s approach, based on planting subsidies and extension advice; SLDB schemes, identified with the Skrang and Malig rubber schemes, and to some extent with the oil palm plantations in northern Sarawak; SALCRA schemes, obviously typified for the respondents by the Lemakan Oil Palm Scheme; and the LCDA approach (still largely hypothetical for most respondents), involving the handing over of rights to land in exchange for shares in a private joint-venture company. Usually several leaders acted as spokesmen for the community, with others throwing in comments from time to time; their collective responses are paraphrased and summarized below.

Bengai, located in the uppermost reaches of the Lemakan, is a remote, conservative community, still felling primary forest, and typical in many ways of Iban communities in the pioneer phase:

We prefer small-scale schemes on our own land, such as the Department of Agriculture’s pepper and cocoa subsidy schemes. We do not want to move to a large-scale scheme such as SALCRA or SLDB; we prefer to have our own land developed here. We would not have enough land if resettled and would lose control over our resources here. We do not want to be told what to do; we want to be our own boss. Our ancestors fought for this land against Bkitans and others and we have continually defended it against outsiders, so we must not give it up or the effort will have been wasted.

Sekandis, located along the Kesit branch of the Lemakan, is a very poor community with insufficient land for hill rice cultivation, no current involvement in any land development scheme, and a high dependence on wage migration for economic survival:

The Department of Agriculture’s approach is helpful. Our problems are from animal pests (the cocoa is damaged by squirrels and monkeys), not from the Department of Agriculture. As for SLDB, as at Malig and Skrang, the government’s arrangements were bad. People there do not have enough to eat. It is difficult mixing strangers together. The area is not big enough for expansion; the land cannot be divided amongst the next generation. Many have left those schemes. Concerning SALCRA, it is good to be able to work on one’s own land. There is no objection to being managed. The wages are not high, but this means the repayments are correspondingly lower. Large-scale schemes arranged and managed by the government are the best alternative. For example, a number of neighbouring longhouses in the same penghulu’s district [23] could agree that
their land be used for oil palm, cocoa and so on. The size of our share in the project would be an important consideration.

Sarubab, in the middle Lemanak, is the prosperous community described above, whose successful group farming project with cocoa has attracted much favourable comment:

With regard to the Department of Agriculture's approach, we are very satisfied with the cocoa project and all the people coming to inspect it. The fertilizer subsidy is very important to us, especially on the hilly land. There is a problem with the quality of locally supplied cocoa seed. Nevertheless, our present arrangement is the preferred one, because no-one controls us. As for SALCRA, we are still willing to join the oil palm scheme; but only if everyone agrees. It has the advantage that we would be all in it together. However, the wages are too low, not providing enough to live on; they would only be attractive to a poor family. Moreover, with SALCRA we would be somewhat trapped—we would not be sure if the land was truly our own and we would have less freedom of action than now, for example with respect to selling our crop. Concerning SLDB schemes, we prefer to control our own farming activities. The experience of those who have worked on SLDB oil palm schemes shows that there is no profit. SLDB schemes are only for very poor families with no land or unsuitable land. With regard to LCDA, we would be interested, provided we have a good agreement, sufficiently clarified in advance, which does not limit us unduly (for example, with regard to the number of workers per household who can gain employment in the scheme) and which indicates what our share in the venture would be. Whatever alternative is chosen, we have to rely on cash crops; rice cultivation will not get us anywhere.

Merindun (Rumah Rambu) is one of the major participants in SALCRA's Lemanak Oil Palm Scheme:

The Department of Agriculture's planting grants would be the best approach if the whole longhouse participated and received assistance at the same time (though not necessarily for the same crops). Otherwise some benefit and others miss out and we are not all pulling together. The SALCRA approach is somewhat beneficial because we work on our own land and can decide whether to accept outsiders. We remain dual meca (territorial elders or leaders) and control our own land. The problem is that the benefits are yet to be seen. With regard to the SLDB approach, there is not enough land here for outsiders and we would not agree to such a scheme on our land. We do not quite understand the LCDA concept, but before agreeing to an LCDA scheme we would insist on being offered a very much better place with assured living conditions, including provision for rice farming and other agricultural activities, and we would want to be compensated for our land.

The recurring theme in these statements is the desire to retain control over traditional community territory, with resettlement a last resort for the very poor. There is a clear desire to improve the productivity of land use and to move away from the traditional emphasis on shifting cultivation to greater involvement in commercial agriculture, but without sacrificing community cohesion. Any arrangement with a government agency must be subject
to a clear and binding agreement, satisfactorily negotiated in advance, and approved by all community members.

CONCLUSION

The progressive incorporation of Iban land tenure institutions within the wider structure of the Sarawak state has given rise to varying degrees of institutional dissonance, where local-level institutions and those of the state, being based on different principles and concepts and serving different ends, do not adequately mesh. The problem of institutional dissonance has not been as great for the Iban as it has in many other Asian societies, where indigenous land tenure institutions have been greatly distorted or completely overridden by colonial and post-colonial authorities. Nevertheless, the divergence between Iban institutional arrangements and the institutional environment created by the government and its agencies is an important problem which needs to be addressed in any consideration of rural development strategy.

In the Brooke period, the basic source of dissonance between Iban land tenure institutions and those imposed by the state was that, from the Iban perspective, the longhouse community itself was an independent state (negri), not subject to higher authority, whereas the the Brookes saw themselves as having a vocation to order the affairs of the indigenous population. Moreover, as a means of ordering access to land, Brooke institutions were increasingly based on inappropriate English models divorced from Iban conceptions. The Iban response to Brooke rule was, firstly, to resist or escape from its influence and then, when resistance became too costly, to exploit whatever advantages it offered while evading wherever possible its more irksome demands. As Pringle observes, "it is fair to say that Brooke rule stimulated attitudes among the Iban which have hampered development ... [They] were conditioned to evade and resist the edicts of Government" (1970:344). The incongruence between Brooke and Iban institutions and the limited ability of the Brooke state to enforce its rules at the community level meant that there was considerable scope and incentive for strategic maneuvering and "rent-seeking" behaviour. The end result was that, instead of community-based land tenure being successfully incorporated in the wider institutional structure of the state, it was distorted and rendered less efficient, the more so as the state extended its control.

This trend continued in the postwar period. The colonial government actively sought to transform community-based tenure into a system of formally registered individual leasehold in order to create a class of independent smallholders who would practise intensive rice farming and cash cropping. This was to achieve its goal of promoting economic progress in the countryside, both to benefit the rural population and to make the colony viable. The post-colonial government has continued to pursue this course, though it has become increasingly obvious that individual title to land tends to undermine the basic Iban social order and leads to a reduction in both the efficiency and equity with which land is managed. Moreover, Iban investment in commercial agriculture has occurred largely in the absence of such a tenure system and the inevitably slow progress in adjudicating and registering individual title to land means that future development must also take place primarily on land which is currently subject to community-based tenure.

This realization, together with a growing policy emphasis on extracting a surplus from land via plantation agriculture, has led the present government to experiment with various institutional arrangements for land
development. Of these, the Sarawak Land Development Board's schemes, including both group smallholdings for rubber and conventional estates for oil palm and cocoa, have been the least successful, both financially and in terms of promoting social welfare. The Iban see such schemes as inconsistent with their customs and inappropriate to their circumstances, except perhaps for households in extreme poverty, though migrant male workers continue to work on the estates for short periods at a time. A major reason for the lack of success has been that the schemes were modelled on the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) schemes, designed for the rather different conditions of Peninsular Malaysia, rather than building on local-level perceptions and institutions. The Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority's approach of in situ development, incorporating the longhouse community as the basic management unit within a larger estate, has met with more acceptance by the Iban, though reservations remain about the centralisation of control and the poor technical performance. The Land Custody and Development Authority's strategy of acquiring control over land in exchange for shares in a plantation company set up to develop the land has met with little acceptance, indicating that it conflicts with Iban notions of land management. Yet this approach remains at the centre of the government's rural development strategy.

The foregoing discussion indicates a continuing and urgent need for land policy to build explicitly on the socially efficient institutional arrangements developed by the Iban through long experience and to give greater weight to Iban values, attitudes and preferences in institutional design. This means reinforcing rather than undermining the longhouse community's control over its territory, enabling the Iban to participate fully as joint managers of their land and not merely as labourers and shareholders. The key to continued social efficiency in the management of Iban land use is to retain the sense of community and territory which together have formed the basis for the Iban economy. This is not to idealise the longhouse community as an inherently superior "moral economy" nor to suggest that the Iban are always capable of appropriate collective action. In the past century, however, Iban institutions have been generally successful in adapting to growing population pressure on the land, the spread of a market economy and a changed institutional environment. Moreover, the community-based system of land tenure provides a low-cost, established, yet flexible framework for the further improvement of land use through such means as medium-scale group farming projects, supported where necessary with technical and material assistance from outside agencies. Such an approach, representing a synthesis between the Department of Agriculture's group-oriented extension program and SALCRA's emphasis on in situ development, seems the most appropriate way forward in terms of Iban perceptions. The registration of community title to land would facilitate this.

To the extent Iban agriculture remains underdeveloped, this is primarily due to the external conditions facing the Iban rather than any inherent deficiencies in their land tenure institutions. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine these external constraints, it can be suggested that some crucial areas of concern are the state of agricultural technology (which provides few locally-adapted alternatives for semi-commercial hill farmers facing a highly uncertain physical and market environment), the state of rural credit services (which offer little more than working capital for a single cropping season), and the state of rural transport and marketing facilities. Hence government policy should perhaps give priority to upgrading agricultural research (particularly on-farm adaptive research (Crab 1983)), expanding the provision of retail outlets
for farm credit (where possible utilizing the principle of group rather than individual liability (Baker 1973; Crab and Dian 1979)), and accelerating the construction of rural feeder roads, rather than replacing a well-adapted local-level institutional structure with one of highly dubious economic and social efficiency, whether based on fully individualized private property in land or on large-scale, commercial estates.

NOTES

1. Paper to be presented to the Thirty-Second Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society, La Trobe University, Melbourne, February 9-11, 1988. The fieldwork on which this paper is based was carried out in 1985 with a travel grant from the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. Thanks are due to Kweebea Anan, Anne-Marie Izac, John Longworth and Grant Winning for comments on an earlier draft.

2. This three-tiered conceptual framework was developed by Cirlay-Wantrup (1967) and modified by Bromley (1985).

3. The social efficiency of a set of institutional arrangements can be defined as the degree to which they meet the goals of a given social group relative to the social resources used.

4. Such tensions obviously also occur in western industrialised countries.

5. This phrase is from the Land Regulations of 1863 (Porter 1967).

6. This discussion of the Brooke district courts is based on an analysis of court records from Simanggang and Betong from 1868 through to 1940.

7. This characterization of the aims of colonial land policy is derived from various issues of the Sarawak Annual Report.


11. The term "liberty-exposure" is derived from Commons. "For a working rule lays down four verbs for the guidance and restraint of individuals in their transactions. It tells what the individuals must or must not do (compulsion or duty), what they may do without interference from other individuals (permission or liberty), what they can do with the aid of the collective power (capacity or right), and what they cannot expect the collective power to do in their behalf (incapacity or exposure). In short, the working rules of associations and governments, when looked at from the private standpoint of the individual, are the source of his rights, duties and liberties, as well as his exposure to the protected liberties of other individuals" (1924:6).


15. Information from Sidi Munani.


17. Field Notes, Melindun, April 1985; Interview with Denny Lang, Deputy Chairman, SALCRA, April 1985.

18. Interview with Awang Zain, General Manager, SLDB, April 1985.


22. Field Notes, April, 1985.

23. A penghulu is a government-appointed official whose area of responsibility (pegai) may include from 10 to 30 longhouse communities.
REFERENCES


