SHADOW PRICING AND CHOICE OF TECHNIQUE:
AN APPLICATION TO INDONESIAN RICE MILLING

by

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1. Introduction 

This paper attempts to explore the implications of shadow pricing for the evaluation of four investment alternatives recently faced by the government of Indonesia. The shadow pricing procedure adopted involves a welfare accounting exercise which attempts to estimate the social benefits and costs of public production or use of commodities in the presence of market distortions. The particular market distortions of interest in this paper are: (a) a divergence between the social rate of return on capital and the social rate of discount; (b) a divergence between the wage paid in the advanced sector and the social opportunity cost of labor; and (c) a divergence between the official exchange rate and the social value of a unit of foreign exchange. Income distributional considerations are ignored. Section 2 sets out the physical and economic characteristics of the investment alternatives concerned and briefly reviews the literature that has recently appeared on their relative merits. The decision criteria that are appropriate for evaluating alternatives of this kind are considered in Section 3, and the shadow prices to be used in the evaluation are derived in Section 4 and estimated in Section 5. The results of the economic evaluation under varying sets of assumptions are presented in Section 6.
2. Rice Milling Techniques to Be Analyzed

The four techniques to be analyzed are alternative rice milling facilities of varying capital/labor intensities. The physical characteristics of these facilities were recently described in some detail in an engineering consultant firm's report to the government of Indonesia. Some physical and economic characteristics of these facilities, together with those of the traditional technique, hand-pounding, are summarized in Table 1. Table 1 expresses the various inputs required and outputs produced per 1000 metric tons of rough rice input per year.

Table 1: Characteristics of Rice Milling Techniques—
(standardized at 1000 metric tons of rough rice input per year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small rice mill (A)</th>
<th>Large rice mill (B)</th>
<th>Small bulk facility (C)</th>
<th>Large bulk facility (D)</th>
<th>Hand-pounding (H)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milled rice produced (metric tons)</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of operative workers employed per year</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction cost (million Rp.)</td>
<td>3.059</td>
<td>11.151</td>
<td>19.390</td>
<td>37.159</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of construction cost requiring foreign exchange</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price received for milled rice (Rp. per kg.)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Timmer (9, pp. 27-8), Weitz-Hettelsater (11, p. 373), and Collier et al. (p. 112).
The consulting firm's report gave little attention to the economic merits of these alternatives, concerning itself mainly with their engineering efficiency in the extraction of milled rice from the rough rice input. This led, particularly in the first draft of the firm's report, to the recommendation of an investment package that concentrated 75 percent of its milling capacity in the two most capital-intensive of the four alternatives (C and D above). The wisdom of this recommendation was challenged in later work by Timmer.\(^4\) Timmer pointed out that the recommendation was based at best on narrow engineering efficiency criteria, and at worst on the simple presumption that the more capital-intensive techniques must be desirable since they are more "modern."

To analyze the economic merits of these four milling techniques relative to the traditional technique, hand-pounding, Timmer constructed a unit isoquant in value added from the data given in Table 1 and the assumption that the rough rice input cost Rp. 18 per kg. This isoquant gave the various combinations of capital cost and workers employed per year required to produce a unit of value added (value of milled rice output minus value of rough rice input) for each of the five techniques. The cost minimizing point on this isoquant was then found graphically by drawing a series of lines the slope of which reflected the present value of the wage bill for employing a worker for a period of 50 years, and obtaining a corner solution. After considering three alternative wage rates and three rates of discount, Timmer concluded that the small rice mill (A) was the optimal technique except under highly unrealistic assumptions.

We can represent the choice of technique criterion employed by Timmer as
\[
\min_k \left( \sum_{t=1}^{50} \frac{w_k x_{kt}}{(1+i)^t} \right) \prod_{t=1}^{50} \frac{x_{e} x_{kt}^G}{x_{kt}^G},
\]

where: \( x_k^K \) is the capital cost of the total investment in the kth technique, assumed to be fully incurred in year zero, \( w_k \) is the wage paid in technique \( k \), \( x_{e}^e \) is the total number of workers employed by the kth technique in year \( t \), \( x_{kt}^k \) and \( x_{kt}^G \) are the quantities of milled rice of type \( k \) produced and rough rice (gabah) used by technique \( k \) in year \( t \) (assumed constant over time), while \( p_k \) and \( p_G \) are the market prices of these two kinds of rice, respectively. Obviously, Timmer's criterion is equivalent to maximizing the inverse of the above expression.

In this study the four alternative milling facilities are considered explicitly as alternative government investments. Since public sector investment in milling facilities is unlikely to increase the total amount of rough rice produced it is assumed that any rice milled in the public sector is diverted in full from some other milling activity. Recent experience suggests that this activity would be hand-pounding with hired female labor, since that activity is rapidly vanishing as privately and publicly owned mechanical milling facilities expand. To analyze the welfare effects of diverting rice from hand-pounding to a publicly owned rice mill, it is necessary to value:

1. the milled rice produced,
2. the hand-pounded rice foregone,
3. the resources used by the mill, and
4. the resources released from hand-pounding.
No free trade in rice occurs across Indonesia's boundaries, all trade being arranged by inter-governmental agreements. It is assumed in this study that marginal changes in the quantity of milled rice produced in the public sector would not affect these agreements and hence that, for the purposes of shadow pricing, rice is a non-traded good—even though its domestic price is often affected by changes in the international price. The only traded goods involved in the evaluation of these rice-milling projects, then, are the imported capital goods required in the initial construction. The shadow price of foreign exchange is relevant only to the valuation of these commodities. All construction costs are assumed to be incurred in year zero, and the streams of labor input, rough rice input, and milled rice output shown in Table 1 are assumed to be constant over a 20-year project life, after which project capital has zero scrap value. It is assumed that the only useable resource released from hand-pounding is hired female labor.

3. Decision Criterion for Choice of Technique

Suppose, for simplicity, that the government's welfare function is given by

\[ W(C_0, C_1, \ldots, C_T), \]

where \( C_\tau \) is aggregate consumption in year \( \tau \), \( \tau = 0 \) is the present, and \( \tau = T \) is a finite but distant horizon. A small change in welfare is given by

\[ dW = \sum_{\tau=0}^{T} \frac{\partial W}{\partial C_\tau} dC_\tau. \]
Writing $WT$ for $\delta W/\delta C_t$, the social rate of discount may now be defined as

$$i = \frac{WT_{t-1}}{WT_t} - 1,$$

which we will assume to be constant over time. By rearranging we have

$$\frac{WT_t}{WT_{t-1}} = \frac{1}{1+i}.$$

Normalizing by setting $W_0 = 1$ and noting that

$$W_t = \frac{WT_t}{W_{t-1}} \cdot \frac{WT_{t-1}}{W_{t-2}} \cdots \frac{WT_2}{W_1} \cdot \frac{WT_1}{W_0} \cdot W_0,$$

it is easily verified that

$$dW = \frac{\sum_{\tau=0}^{T} \frac{dC_{t}}{(1+i)^\tau}}{\sum_{\tau=t}^{T} \frac{dC_{t}}{(1+i)^\tau}}.$$

Applying the welfare accounting approach to shadow pricing, we now define the shadow price of commodity $m$ at time $t$, $S_x^m$, to be the effect of a change in its public production at time $t$, $x_t^m$, on social welfare, discounted to the present. Thus

$$S_x^m = \frac{\partial W}{\partial x_t^m} = \sum_{\tau=t}^{T} \frac{\partial W}{\partial C_{\tau}} \frac{\partial C_{\tau}}{\partial x_t^m} = \sum_{\tau=t}^{T} \frac{1}{(1+i)^\tau} \frac{\partial C_{\tau}}{\partial x_t^m}.$$

It is now clear that, given the above assumptions, the effect on social welfare of public production using technique $k$ is expressed by the net
present value of the stream of aggregate consumption that it generates.

Denoting this by $N_k$,

$$N_k = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \sum_{m} s_{m}^{t} x_{m}^{t}.$$

If the public sector was not constrained in its investment behavior, it clearly should continue to invest in every available rice milling technique for which $N_k > 0$. Suppose that it faces two kinds of constraints, one on the total supply of rough rice that may be diverted from hand-pounding in year $t$, $\bar{G}_{t}$,

$$\bar{G}_{t} - \sum_{k} x_{k}^{t} \geq 0, \quad t = 1, \ldots, 20,$$

and another on the total volume of investment that may be financed, $\bar{K}$,

$$\bar{K} - \sum_{k} x_{k}^{t} \geq 0.$$

To obtain the necessary conditions for optimal public production in rice milling we maximize $N_k$ subject to the above two constraints. We thus formulate the Lagrangian

$$L = \sum_{k}^{20} \left\{ s_{k}^{t} x_{k}^{t} - s_{e}^{t} x_{e}^{t} - s_{G}^{t} x_{G}^{t} \right\}$$

$$= \sum_{k} s_{k}^{t} x_{k}^{t} + 20 \sum_{t} \lambda_{t} \left( G_{t} - \sum_{k} x_{k}^{t} \right) + \lambda_{K} \left( K - \sum_{k} x_{k}^{t} \right),$$

where $s_{k}^{t}$, $s_{e}^{t}$, $s_{G}^{t}$ and $s_{K}$ are the shadow prices of milled rice of
type k, labor employed, rough rice and capital respectively.

From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a stationary point we have:

\[
G'_{kt} \left( \frac{\partial x^k_{kt}}{\partial x^t_{kt}} \right) = 0, \quad \text{all } k; \ t = 1, \ldots, 20;
\]

\[
G'_{kt} \left( \frac{\partial x^k_{kt}}{\partial x^t_{kt}} - \frac{G}{t} - \frac{C}{t} \right) = 0, \quad \text{all } k; \ t = 1, \ldots, 20;
\]

\[
G'_{kt} \left( \frac{20}{t} \sum_{t=1}^{20} \frac{\partial x^k_{kt}}{\partial x^t_{kt}} - \frac{K}{t} - \frac{S^k}{t} \right) = 0, \quad \text{all } k.
\]

For each of these expressions, either the term inside the parentheses must be zero or the input level outside the parentheses must be zero. In the latter case the technique is not used at all since we assume that a zero level of any input ensures zero output. When only one of the two constraints considered is binding (as we would normally expect), only one technique will be used. Equating the term in parentheses in each of the above equations to zero we find that at the optimum

\[
\frac{\partial x^k_{kt}}{\partial x^t_{kt}} = \frac{s^e_t}{s^t_t}, \quad t = 1, \ldots, 20;
\]

\[
\frac{\partial x^e_{kt}}{\partial x^t_{kt}} = \frac{s^G_t + \gamma^G_t}{s^k_t}, \quad t = 1, \ldots, 20;
\]
\[
\sum_{t=1}^{20} S_t^k \frac{\partial x^k_{kt}}{\partial x^k_{kt}} = S^K + \lambda^K.
\]

Thus the relative shadow prices of the various commodities should reflect their direct welfare costs or benefits plus, in the case of inputs subject to supply constraints, a premium which reflects the welfare costs of those supply constraints. It is easily verified that

\[
\lambda^K = \frac{\partial W}{\partial K} \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda^G_t = \frac{\partial W}{\partial G_t}.
\]

The appropriate decision criterion is thus

\[
\max_k \sum_{t=1}^{20} \left( S_t^k x^k_{kt} - S_t^e x^e_{kt} - (S_t^G + \lambda_t^G x^G_{kt}) - (S^K + \lambda^K) x^K_{kt} \right)
\]

or

\[
\max_k N_k - \sum_{t=1}^{20} \lambda_t^G x^G_{kt} - \lambda^K x^K_{kt},
\]

where \( N_k \) is defined as before.

If the constraint on the supply of rough rice at time \( t \) is binding, then \( \lambda_t^G > 0 \), and \( x^G_{kt} \) will be the same no matter which technique is chosen. Likewise if the investment constraint is binding, \( \lambda^K > 0 \) and \( x^K_{kt} \) will be the same no matter which technique is chosen. Suppose the investment constraint is binding, but the rough rice constraint is not. Since \( x^K_{kt} \) must then be the same no matter which technique is chosen, the ranking of techniques according to the above criterion cannot be changed by dividing through by \( x^K_{kt} \). This leaves us with the criterion
\[
\max_{k} \frac{N_k}{x_k^K},
\]

since \( \lambda^K \) is the same for all techniques and can be ignored. If the constraint on rough rice input is binding and \( x_{kt}^G \) is constant over time at \( x_k^G \) for each technique (which is so for the facilities considered here, given the initial investment), but the investment constraint is not binding, we are left with the criterion

\[
\max_{k} \frac{N_k}{x_k^G}.
\]

It is now clear that if the investment behavior of the government is constrained by the supply of a single input, alternative investments may be ranked by considering their returns to that input—namely by comparing the amount of net present value they generate per unit of that input—where the dual variable corresponding to that constraint has not been considered in the calculation of net present value. This can produce only a ranking, however. To determine which of the investments should be undertaken, if any, it is necessary to compute the value of the dual variable concerned. Furthermore, when more than one constraint is binding, not even a ranking can be achieved without knowledge of the relative values of the dual variables corresponding to the various constraints.

This provides some insight on the implications of the way a "project" is normally defined in benefit-cost analysis. When there is some unique natural resource such as a dam site on a river it seems natural to compare
alternative dams by choosing the one which returns the highest net present value to that dam site. This is correct provided that the only binding constraint on the supply of inputs for dam construction is the uniqueness of the dam site. Otherwise, in order to rank the alternatives it is necessary to know the value of the dual variable corresponding to the dam site relative to those corresponding to the other constraints, or the absolute values of each of the dual variables but one.

4. Derivation of Shadow Prices

This section derives the shadow prices to be used in the choice of technique exercise. The inputs used by the four milling techniques are capital, labor, foreign exchange and rough rice. Rough rice is valued at the value of the hand-pounded rice foregone when it is diverted from hand-pounding to mechanical milling minus the value of the hired labor released. The final consumption goods to be valued are milled and hand-pounded rice. Except in the cases of capital and foreign exchange, we derive below the various shadow prices in terms of aggregate consumption in year \( t \), \( S^m(t) \).

This can be expressed in terms of the numeraire, aggregate consumption in the initial period (year zero), by writing

\[
S^m_t = (1+i)^{-t} S^m(0).
\]

4.1. Shadow price of capital

Recalling from the previous section that the shadow price of a commodity is, given the assumptions listed, the present value of the stream of aggregate consumption it generates, the shadow price of capital used in a public investment is the present value of the stream of aggregate
consumption foregone by its use. Thus

\[ S^K = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \frac{1}{(1+i)^t} \frac{\partial C_t}{\partial x^K} . \]

Consider first the shadow price of a unit of investment, \( S^I \), made in that part of the economy where the funds used for public investment are obtained. We will suppose, for simplicity, that this alternative investment yields an annuity of value \( q \). That is, Rp. 1 invested in year zero yields Rp. \( q \) each year indefinitely. \( q \) is sometimes referred to as the marginal productivity of capital. Suppose that a proportion \( c^2 \) of these annual returns is consumed, and the remainder is reinvested. These reinvested funds are themselves valued at \( S^I \) and hence

\[ \frac{\partial C_t}{\partial x^K} = c^2 q + (1-c^2)qS^I , \quad 0 < c^2 < 1 \]

and

\[ S^I = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \frac{c^2 q + (1-c^2)qS^I}{(1+i)^t} . \]

We now use the fact that

\[ \lim_{T \to \infty} S^I = \frac{c^2 q + (1-c^2)qS^I}{i} , \]

and solve for \( S^I \), giving

\[ S^I = \frac{c^2 q}{i - (1-c^2)q} . \]
If capital employed in the investment considered comes entirely out of investment elsewhere, then $S^K = S^I$; but if a proportion $c^3$ of this capital comes out of alternative consumption with $1-c^3$ coming out of investment, then

$$S^K = c^3 + (1-c^3)S^I, \quad 0 \leq c^3 \leq 1.$$  

The parameters $c^2$, $c^3$ and $q$ can potentially be estimated empirically. But, as the analysis of Section 3 implies, the social rate of discount, $i$, involves a value judgment. In this study we treat the social rate of discount as an unknown exogenous parameter and attempt to show the implications of different discount rates for choice of technique.

It is possible to argue, however, that in economies where the rate of investment is determined primarily by private decision makers acting independently, $i \leq q$. Suppose that the capital market functions efficiently and that the private rate of discount, $i^P$, as expressed in market behavior, and the private rate of return, $q^P$, are equated. We can then argue that $i \leq i^P$, since $i$ reflects society's concern for the welfare of future generations, whereas $i^P$ does not. Furthermore, we can argue that normally $q > q^P$ in a dual economy, since market wages in the advanced sector exceed the social opportunity cost of labor, and hence the social rate of return to investment exceeds the private rate of return. It follows that

$$i \leq q.$$  

Clearly, $i < q$ implies $S^I > 1$.  

4.2. Shadow price of labor employed

From the analysis of Section 3, the shadow price of a worker employed in a public investment project in year \( t \), in terms of aggregate consumption in year \( t \), is given by

\[
S^e_t = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{1}{(1+i)^t} \frac{\partial C_T}{\partial x^e_{kt}}
\]

Writing \( w_k \) for the wage paid in technique \( k \), \( w_h \) for the wage paid in hand-pounding, which we assume to be equal to the worker's marginal product there, and \( c^1 \) for workers' propensity to consume, we then obtain, using aggregate consumption in year \( t \) as numeraire,

\[
S^e_{(t)} = w_k \{c^2 + (1-c^2)S^1\} - c^1(w_k - w_h) - (1-c^1)(w_k - w_h)S^1.
\]

The first term in this expression is the cost in terms of aggregate consumption in year \( t \) of paying the worker a wage of \( w_k \) out of government revenue. The second term is the social valuation in terms of aggregate present consumption of that part of the worker's increased income that he consumes, and the third term is the social valuation of his additional savings. Rearranging, we have

\[
S^e_{(t)} = w_k(c^1 - c^2)(S^1 - 1) + w_h(c^1 + (1-c^1)S^1).
\]

4.3. Shadow price of labor displaced

Given the framework adopted here, the shadow price of a worker displaced from hand-pounding in year \( t \), in terms of aggregate consumption in year \( t \), \( S^d_{(t)} \), is the value of his contribution to production in his
alternative employment. Writing \( w_a \) for the wage paid in the alternative employment, which we will assume to be equal to his marginal product there, we have

\[
S^d(t) = w_a \{ c + (1 - c) S^l \}.
\]

4.4. Shadow price of foreign exchange

Suppose a rupiah's worth of foreign exchange is spent on importing the traded commodity \( z \). The number of units of commodity \( z \) this will purchase is given by \( 1/p_c^z \), where \( p_c^z \) is the c.i.f. price of commodity \( z \) at the official exchange rate. The contribution each unit makes to our numeraire, aggregate consumption, is given by its domestic price, \( p^z \), as faced by consumers. Thus this rupiah's worth of foreign exchange spent on commodity \( z \) contributes \( p^z/p_c^z \) to aggregate consumption. If, instead, a rupiah's worth of foreign exchange is spread over \( Z \) commodities, where \( \alpha^z \) is the proportion spent on good \( z \), then the shadow price of foreign exchange is given by

\[
S^F = \sum_{z=1}^{Z} \alpha^z p^z/p_c^z.
\]

4.5. Shadow prices of milled and hand-pounded rice

Since the market price of a non-traded final consumption good measures its contribution to aggregate consumption, the shadow prices of the consumption goods milled and hand-pounded rice used in this study are their market prices.
5. **Estimation of Shadow Prices**

The main parametric assumptions to be made in this chapter are summarized in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>$q$</th>
<th>$i$</th>
<th>$c^1$</th>
<th>$c^2$</th>
<th>$c^3$</th>
<th>$w_k$</th>
<th>$w_h$</th>
<th>$w_a$</th>
<th>$S^F$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.07-0.25</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Rp./yr</td>
<td>Rp./yr</td>
<td>Rp./yr</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capital used in construction of rice milling projects is assumed to be derived from aid funds from a foreign government. This assumption seems appropriate since the engineering study referred to in Section 1 was financed by the United States Agency for International Development, even though it was directed to the Government of Indonesia. These aid funds could be made available in three different ways: (a) they could be given for use by the Indonesia government for whatever purpose it desired, (b) they could be restricted to use for general investment, and (c) they could be tied to specific investment projects. In case (a) these funds are indistinguishable from general government revenue. We assume that 75% of these funds come out of government consumption and 25% out of government investment (i.e., $c^3 = 0.75$) which yields an annual return of 25%. Of these returns 75% are consumed and 25% reinvested, etc. Thus $S^K = 0.75 + 0.25 S^I$. In case (b) funds used for investment in rice milling come entirely out of alternative government investment (i.e., $c^3 = 0$), and then $S^K = S^I$. In case (c) the terms under which the aid funds are given
become relevant and this case is explored in Section 6.

The range of discount rates considered here is 0.07 to 0.25. For \( i \leq 0.0625 \) the shadow price of investment is no longer defined, and so 0.07 seems a natural lower bound. The upper bound of 0.25 seems appropriate in view of our earlier argument that \( i \leq q \). The values of the shadow price of capital in both cases (a) and (b) above are tabulated (though not in that order) in the first two columns of Table 3, and plotted in Figure 1. Table 2 also shows that wages paid in rice milling are substantially above the wages paid in hand-pounding and in the alternative employment, rice harvesting. Table 3 shows, in the third and fourth columns, the shadow prices of labor employed in and displaced by rice milling respectively. These are plotted in Figure 2. The final two columns of Table 3 show the relative shadow prices of labor employed and capital for various rates of discount. When \( S^K = S^I \) the shadow price of labor relative to capital falls as the rate of discount falls; but when \( S^K = 0.75 + 0.25S^I \), the opposite occurs.

It has not been possible to obtain the price information necessary to apply the expression for the shadow price of foreign exchange developed in Section 4.4. Indonesia does not seem to have a seriously distorted exchange rate, however, and the only reason for suspecting \( S^F > 1 \) is the existence of tariffs. Nominal tariff rates are quite high, many being at least 100%, but smuggling abounds and domestic prices seldom rise more than 20-30% above c.i.f. prices at the official exchange rate. We assume, therefore, that \( S^F = 1.2 \).
Table 3: Values of main shadow prices for different rates of discount

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social rate of discount (i)</th>
<th>$s^I$</th>
<th>$0.75 + 0.25s^I$</th>
<th>$s^e(\tau)$</th>
<th>$s^d(\tau)$</th>
<th>$s^e(\tau)/s^I$</th>
<th>$s^e(\tau)/(0.75 + 0.25s^I)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1.056</td>
<td>1.014</td>
<td>17.69</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>16.75</td>
<td>17.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.119</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>18.46</td>
<td>9.56</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>17.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>1.190</td>
<td>1.048</td>
<td>19.33</td>
<td>9.59</td>
<td>16.24</td>
<td>18.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.271</td>
<td>1.068</td>
<td>20.32</td>
<td>9.63</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>19.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.364</td>
<td>1.091</td>
<td>21.46</td>
<td>9.67</td>
<td>15.73</td>
<td>19.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.471</td>
<td>1.118</td>
<td>22.77</td>
<td>9.72</td>
<td>15.48</td>
<td>20.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.596</td>
<td>1.149</td>
<td>24.30</td>
<td>9.78</td>
<td>15.23</td>
<td>21.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1.744</td>
<td>1.186</td>
<td>26.11</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>14.97</td>
<td>22.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.923</td>
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<td>10.18</td>
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<td>311.00</td>
<td>20.90</td>
<td>12.44</td>
<td>44.43</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Figure 1: Shadow price of capital and the rate of discount

\[ S^K = S^I \]
\[ S^K = 0.75 + 0.25 S^I \]

Social rate of discount

Figure 2: Shadow price of labor and the rate of discount

Shadow price of labor

(thousand Rp.)

Social rate of discount
6. Choice of Technique Results

In Figures 3, 4, and 5 we plot the relationship between net present value and the social rate of discount for each technique. The data in Table 9 and the shadow prices in Table 3 have been used, but with six different sets of assumptions. In Figure 3, panel (a), it is assumed that the supply of rough rice input is constraining the government's investment behavior, so the results are expressed in net present value (in Rp. millions) per 1000 tons of rough rice input. It is further assumed that $S^K = S^I$ and that all facilities operate at full capacity. Panel (b) is based on the same assumptions, except that all facilities operate at only 75% of capacity. In Figure 4 it is assumed that $S^K = 0.75 + 0.25 S^I$, but otherwise the same assumptions are made as in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3, respectively. In Figure 5 we assume that current investment cost constrains the government's investment behavior, so net present value is divided by investment cost (in Rp. millions). Otherwise, the same assumptions are made as in panels (a) and (b) of Figures 3 and 4.

The rice prices presented in Table 1 are suspect on two grounds. Firstly, they are based on 1971 rice prices, which are well below current (1975) prices, and may well prove to be far below the long-term mean price in real terms. Secondly, the prices in Table 1 assume substantial price differentials between the rice produced by the four facilities. Although Weitz-Hettelsater (1972) made similar assumptions, there is little evidence to support these differentials, and it is of some interest to see the implications of relaxing this assumption, as well as the one above.

Table 4 summarizes the relationship between net present value per unit of rough rice input, for each technique, and the social rate of discount,
for various increases in rice prices. For each rate of discount and each assumed increase in rice prices (zero, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%) we present the ranking of techniques according to net present value per unit of rough rice input. The position of the slash (/) in each ranking indicates the change from positive to negative values. Panel (a) of Table 4 assumes that price differentials between techniques are as in Table 1, while Panel (b) assumes that the price of the rice produced by all facilities is the same as that for technique (A). These results are summarized further in the two acceptance diagrams presented in Figure 6. These diagrams show the optimal technique for each combination of social rate of discount and percent increase in the price of rice. Panels (a) and (b) relate to Panels (a) and (b) of Table 4, respectively. The shaded areas indicate regions in which \( N_k \) is negative for all techniques. When this exercise is repeated for net present value per unit of investment cost, technique (A) proves to be optimal for all discount rates (for which N.P.V. using technique (A) is positive in Figure 3(a)), and for all increases in the price of rice within the above range.

Table 5 presents summarized rankings of techniques according to net present value per unit of rough rice input when the shadow price of capital used in Figure 3(a) is reduced by degrees until capital becomes a free good. This is intended to show the implications of concessionary loans of capital from external sources tied to specific forms of investment. It is assumed, however, that there are no differences in the terms on which loans are made for specific techniques. These results are summarized in the acceptance diagram in Figure 7. This exercise is not repeated for net present value per unit of investment cost since the availability of capital
Figure 3: Net present value per thousand tons of rough rice with $S^k = S^l$ (million Rp.)

a. Operating at full capacity

b. Operating at 75% capacity
Figure 4: Net present value per thousand tons of rough rice with $SK = 0.75 + 0.25 SI$ (million Rp.)

a. Operating at full capacity

b. Operating at 75% capacity
Figure 5: Net present value per million Rp. of investment cost (million Rp.)

a. Operating at full capacity

N.P.V.

0.07 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
social rate of discount

b. Operating at 75% capacity

N.P.V.
Table 4: Ranking of Milling Facilities by Net Present Value Per Unit of Rough Rice Input for Various Increases in the Price of Rice

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<th>Social rate of discount (i)</th>
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<th>50%</th>
<th>75%</th>
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<th>25%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>75%</th>
<th>100%</th>
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<td>BACD/</td>
<td>BCAD/</td>
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<td>CBDA/</td>
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<td>ABC/D</td>
<td>ABC/D</td>
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<td>BACD/</td>
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<td>ABC/D</td>
<td>ABC/D</td>
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<td>CBDA/</td>
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at concessionary rates is inconsistent with investment cost being the binding constraint on government investment behavior.

Figure 6: Acceptance regions for rice milling facilities when price of rice is varied--normalizing by rough rice input

7. Conclusions

The most critical issue affecting the choice of technique in public sector rice milling in Indonesia appears to be the assumption we make about the constraints facing public investment. (i) If a "project" is defined to be a unit of capital expenditure on rice milling facilities--implying that investment cost is the binding constraint--the optimal technique is
Figure 7: Acceptance regions for rice milling facilities when cost of capital is varied -- normalizing by rough rice input

Table 5: Rankings of Milling Facilities by Net Present Value Per Unit of Rough Rice Input for Various Reductions in Social Costs of Capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social rate of discount (i)</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>40%</th>
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</table>
the Small Rice Mill (A). (ii) If a "project" is defined to be a unit of rough rice transferred from hand-pounding to mechanical milling--implying that the supply of rough rice is the binding constraint--the optimal choice could be any of the four techniques, depending on the other assumptions (e.g. rice prices and sources of capital) and on value judgments (e.g. the social rate of discount) that are made.

Considering case (ii), the optimal choice will be the Large Bulk Facility (D) only if capital tied to investment in rice milling is available from external sources on terms so concessionary as to make capital virtually a free good. The Small Bulk Facility (C) is most likely to be optimal if the social rate of discount is high, and the price of milled rice is expected to be higher than indicated in Table 1. The Large Rice Mill (B) will be favored by low rice prices and social rates of discount exceeding twelve percent, while the Small Rice Mill is favored by low rice prices and low social rates of discount.

We refrain from recommending any specific technique, since our general conclusion is that "it all depends on...". This is an important conclusion because there is a tendency among engineers and economists alike to apply simplistic rules of thumb to questions of choice of technique. The results of this study suggest that formal economic analysis of the issues involved is not simply "helpful"; it is indispensable.
This paper has benefited greatly from the counsel and assistance of C. Peter Timmer, extending far beyond the normal duties of a thesis advisor. The author is solely responsible for all views and any errors it contains.

Of the various studies propounding this approach, the analysis of this paper is most compatible with that found in Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (2). There are some notable differences, however.

Weitz-Hettelsater (11).

In the Weitz-Hettelsater report and Timmer (9) these facilities are identified by the symbols C, G, H-1, K-1 and Z, respectively, rather than A, B, C, D and H, as above. See these sources for further details on the characteristics of these facilities. The two different unit labor requirements for hand-pounding are derived from Timmer (9, p. 27) and Collier et al. (p. 112), respectively. No data is available on maintenance costs for the various facilities, so these costs are ignored here.

Timmer (7, 8, 9 and 10).

There is disagreement, however, on the amount of hand-pounding with hired labor that remains. See Timmer (8 and 10) and Collier et al.

For a fuller elaboration of this argument, see Sen (4).

See Sen (6, pp. 493-4) and the references cited therein.

It is important to recall that income distributional judgments are being ignored here. Only aggregate consumption is being considered.

We assume that 107 workers are released from hand-pounding per 1000 tons of rough rice diverted from that activity.

There is evidence, however, in support of a price differential between hand-pounded and milled rice. See Timmer (1972).
CITATIONS


