Files
Abstract
This paper examines husband and wife perspectives on the division of authority over agriculture-related
decision-making within households in Tanzania and Mali. We develop a theoretical model of intrahousehold
“accord,” defined as the level of agreement between husbands and wives over who holds
authority for different decisions. We then empirically analyze husband and wife claims to authority over
thirteen household farming decisions, explaining accord as a function of household characteristics and
decision characteristics. We posit that lower transaction costs (in terms of negotiation and enforcement
costs) make property rights over some decisions relatively more secure, resulting in greater accord over
household authority for those decisions. We test our theoretical model using survey data from a stratified
random sample of 3,763 households in Mali (n = 1,766) and Tanzania (n = 1,997). Cluster analysis and
binary logistic regression suggest that variation in intra-household accord can be explained by both
household characteristics (including individual spousal attitudes, relative spousal assets, and overall
household resources) and by decision characteristics (such as whether the benefits of a given decision
accrue to the individual spouse or to the household as a whole). Furthermore patterns of intra-household
accord and predictors of intra-household accord both vary significantly by country (Mali versus
Tanzania), but are consistent with the interpretation that cultural norms might lower decision-related
transaction costs leading to efficient, if not necessarily equitable, household decision-making processes.