International environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment

We modify a canonical participation game used to study International Environmental Agreements (IEA), considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage, and including a prior cost-reducing investment stage. The use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and also reverses the policy implication of that result: with mixed strategies, equilibrium participation and welfare is higher in equilibria that involve higher investment.


Issue Date:
May 08 2012
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/123719
Total Pages:
35
JEL Codes:
C72; H4; Q54
Series Statement:
CUDARE Working Papers
1129




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-26

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