Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis

Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated hat could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect producer contributions to generic advertising. The results suggests that producer referendum play a critical role in increasing contributions and that producer surplus is maximized by a Provision Point Mechanism instituted by producer referendum with thresholds ranging from 68% to 90%, and expected funding from 47% to 77% of the time, depending on the level of advertising effectiveness.


Subject(s):
Issue Date:
2004-12
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/122106
Total Pages:
45
Series Statement:
NICPRE Research Bulletin
04-05




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-26

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