Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.


Issue Date:
2006
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/12175
Total Pages:
21
Series Statement:
CTN Nota di Lavoro 72.2006




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-23

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