000012170 001__ 12170
000012170 005__ 20181005200209.0
000012170 037__ $$a826-2016-55133
000012170 041__ $$aen
000012170 245__ $$aCooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion
000012170 260__ $$c2006
000012170 269__ $$a2006
000012170 270__ $$mecsparka@nus.edu.sg$$pChander,   Parkash
000012170 270__ $$mtulkens@core.ucl.ac.be$$pTulkens,   Henry
000012170 300__ $$a29
000012170 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000012170 446__ $$aEnglish
000012170 490__ $$aCTN Nota di Lavoro 34.2006
000012170 520__ $$aIn essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as of the Chander-Tulkens solution within the gamma core. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked whether with the often mentioned virtue of self enforcement' any conceptual gain is achieved, different from what is meant by efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barrett's (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific content.
000012170 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000012170 700__ $$aChander, Parkash
000012170 700__ $$aTulkens, Henry
000012170 8564_ $$s628311$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12170/files/wp060034.pdf
000012170 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/12170
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  Previous issue date: 2006
000012170 982__ $$gFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Coalition Theory Network Working Papers
000012170 980__ $$a826