A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games

We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games.


Issue Date:
2006
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
Record Identifier:
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12168
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/12168
Total Pages:
20
Series Statement:
CTN Nota di Lavoro 10.2006




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

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