AFRICAN CAPACITY BUILDING EXPERIENCE, 1950s-1990s:  
LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

By

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ABSTRACT

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African capacity building was first identified as a major development problem during the transition to independence in the 1950s. After billions of dollars of investment in education over the past three decades, capacity building has been identified as one of Africa's most serious development problem of the 1990s. This paper analyzes African capacity building experiences over the last four decades. It focuses on the treatment of African capacity building by colonial powers, African governments, donors, and international agencies during the transition to independence in the 1950s and the postindependence period since 1960. Nigeria and Kenya are used as case studies to highlight some of the key issues and draw some lessons for South Africa.

Capacity building in this study focuses on the development and strengthening of education and decision-making skills required for sustainable economic development. Attention is focused on both the supply and demand sides of capacity building, namely education expansion and absorptive capacity of the economy (i.e. employment creation).

Key findings include the following: Uncompromising political and economic demands for education at independence in the 1960s
led to a massive expansion of education at all levels, beginning with universal free primary education in the 1960s, followed by the expansion of secondary and university education in the 1970s. Manpower training programs focused on the urgent Africanization of the civil service. However, after a major expansion of education from 1960 to 1980, problems emerged in the 1980s, including an intolerable level of government expenditure on education, declining education quality and relevance, and inability to absorb school leavers and curb the brain drain. Donors and international agencies have increasingly come under fire for paying insufficient attention to African capacity building while overemphasizing the provision of physical infrastructure which they assumed to be the "missing factor". These projects promised quick, visible, and measurable results but required crisis management. Technical assistance has also come under scrutiny. The new African Capacity Building Initiative was established to redress capacity problems in Africa.

Six lessons flow from this analysis for South Africa: (1) The hard trade-offs between elimination of illiteracy (i.e. primary education expansion) and university education expansion, (2) The burden of financing the expansion of education, (3) The high cost of education per student, (4) Absorptive capacity of the economy, (5) Effects of education expansion on quality and relevance of education, and (6) The selective borrowing of skills from the international community in nation building.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF TABLES</th>
<th>iv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1

1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND APPROACHES ................................................. 1
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT ......................................... 6
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...................................... 7
1.4 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY .......................... 8

## CHAPTER 2
AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE .... 9

2.1 THE COLONIAL PERIOD: 1880s-1960s .......................... 10
2.1.1 OVERVIEW ............................................. 10
2.1.2 MAJOR ISSUES ......................................... 11
2.1.3 ASSESSMENT ........................................... 13
2.2 THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE: 1950s ...................... 15
2.2.1 THEORETICAL OVERVIEW ................................ 15
2.2.2 DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND PROGRAMS .................. 17
2.3 INDEPENDENCE PERIOD: 1960s-1990s ....................... 18
2.3.1 THE GROWTH-LED STRATEGIES OF THE 1960s ............... 19
2.3.2 THE GROWTH-WITH-EQUITY ERA OF THE 1970s ............. 20
2.3.3 THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT DECADE: 1980s ............ 21
2.4 SYNTHESIS .................................................. 24

## CHAPTER 3
CAPACITY BUILDING IN POSTINDEPENDENT AFRICA ................... 27

3.1 OVERVIEW .................................................. 27
3.1.1 THE 1960s .............................................. 28
3.1.2 THE 1970s .............................................. 30
3.1.3 THE 1980s .............................................. 32
3.1.4 THE 1990s AND BEYOND ................................ 34
3.2 CAPACITY BUILDING PROBLEMS ............................... 35
3.2.1 FINANCING OF EDUCATION ............................... 36
3.2.2 ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY ................................ 37
3.2.3 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND EXPATRIATE EMPLOYMENT .... 38
3.2.4 BRAIN DRAIN ........................................... 41
3.3 SYNTHESIS .................................................. 42
LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Africa: Expatriate Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment of Trained Manpower

.............22
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND APPROACHES

The dawn of independence in Africa1 in the late 1950s and early 1960s was preceded by a number of country studies to assess alternative development strategies during the transition to independence. In most of these country studies, capacity building was identified as one of the critical bottlenecks which required immediate attention. For example, the World Bank's first mission to Africa arrived in Nigeria in September 1953 and conducted detailed economywide and sectoral studies of Nigeria's development potential. The mission observed that:

"Nigeria is seriously short of trained senior administrators and technicians for government posts and technical personnel for industry. Their skills can be acquired only through higher education and long experience; Nigeria cannot supply them in sufficient quantity for many years to come" (World Bank, 1953, p23).

In Kenya, the Swynnerton2 Plan of 1954 emphasized the importance of expanding the field staff of agricultural and veterinary services as a means of achieving agricultural

---

1All references to Africa in this paper are intended to mean Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa.

2The Swynnerton Plan was initially developed as Kenya's Ten-Year Plan of 1946 to 1955. It was adopted in 1954 as a master plan to accelerate the pace of smallholder agricultural development.
development. The advent of Kenya's independence in 1963 subsequently led to a severe loss of professional personnel, particularly in the veterinary services.

In the mid sixties a major World Bank study of agricultural development in Africa confirmed the urgent need for capacity building throughout the continent (de Wilde et al, 1967). de Wilde et al (1967) documented the extensive use of expatriate expertise in the provision of commodity-based extension and other agricultural services in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast), Burkino Faso (formerly Upper Volta), and other former French colonies.

Capacity building can be defined as consisting of three major elements: (a) Human resource development, with emphasis on the provision of basic health, nutrition, education, and technical skills; (b) The restructuring of public and private organizations and institutions to improve their management and performance; and (c) Supportive political leadership which promotes human capital development as a major source of economic growth. Other sources of growth are institutional, technological, and physical capital development. These four elements are often referred to as the "prime movers" of economic development (World Bank, 1989; King, 1991).

This paper addresses some aspects of the first component, namely education (formal and informal) and skills development, including job-specific skills development. Thus, capacity building in this paper refers to the development and
strengthening of education and decision-making skills required for sustainable economic development (Berg, 1993).

Because Africa is a profoundly agrarian-dominated economy, special attention will be given to African agricultural development and capacity building issues in historical perspective. For example, capacity building was first identified as a major problem by African leaders and donors in the 1950s but it is still prevalent in the 1990s. Since capacity building is affected by social, political, and economic policies, it is important to examine how various countries have addressed capacity building over time.

Africa lags behind other Third World regions on many human capital measure such as the number of skilled workers per million people. The net effect of this deficiency in human capital and technical skills has manifested itself in various ways in Africa. One need only look at the volume of literature on the African development crisis over the last three decades. For example, although agriculture is widely regarded as the "backbone" of Africa, its performance over the past three decades is disappointing. Despite massive expansion of education and manpower training programs and substantial donor assistance during the 1960-80 period, many countries have been unable to develop sustainable capacity building institutions and replace expatriates. In fact, foreign technical assistance is running about $3 billion to Africa each year (Berg, 1993, p73).

Nevertheless, capacity building has to be examined as part
of the overall development process despite the urgency of training African scientists, managers, and physicians. Critical to this analysis is the performance of Africa's economies in three decades of independence. Many African countries have lost their comparative advantage in primary commodity production and export markets. For example, Nigeria has changed from a position of leading net exporter of some primary commodities such as palm oil to that of a leading net importer of that commodity (Staatz & Wohl, 1991; Eicher, 1992). African staple food crops such as maize, sorghum, millet, and cassava have been unable to keep up with the population growth despite earlier calls by researchers to intensify research programs on these cereals (National Academy of Sciences, 1974). Hence, increased imports of food grains such as rice and wheat are adding to the debt crisis in Africa. Poor performance has also been recorded in industry, which has been given priority over agriculture in most countries on the continent. The above supply side effects are also paralleled by demand side effects. Consumption habits in West Africa are gradually shifting away from traditional food staples towards imports of rice and wheat (Reardon, 1992). Thus, Africa's poor economic performance, especially in the 1980s, has in turn, restricted its ability to finance education expansion and restricted its absorptive capacity, i.e., its ability to employ school leavers and retain trained African personnel. In many nations this has contributed to a massive brain drain to other African countries and industrialized nations. Finally, the heavy
reliance on expatriate expertise in technical assistance programs, and the gap in compensation packages between expatriates and trained African nationals, all add to the crisis. These are some of the outcomes arising from the inability to generate sufficient absorptive capacity to recruit, promote, and retain trained scientists, managers, and teachers to replace the over 40,000 expatriates in the 47 countries in Africa (Berg, 1993, 68).

Many authors now charge that African nations have given insufficient attention to long-term capacity building. In addition, many donors have concentrated on financing overseas training programs, and have, for many political reasons avoided long-term investments in developing African universities and research institutes. Many overseas-trained Africans often do not return to their countries after completing their studies. They contribute to the African brain drain. The World Bank regards African capacity building as one of the "missing links" arising from, *inter alia*, the unique treatment of Africa by the donor agencies who have concentrated on crisis management at the expense of building long-term African capacity (Jaycox, 1989; Financial Gazette, Harare, 1993). Likewise, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (1984) declared that:

"IFAD's approach is to build and strengthen national capability in monitoring and evaluation, and thereby in national development management, which is often the weakest link in the development cycle in most developing countries" (IFAD, 1984, p38).
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The thesis of this paper is that African capacity building, especially skills, knowledge and institution development, has received inadequate attention from African governments and donor agencies over the last four decades. Although African governments have attempted to reduce their dependency on expatriate expertise through the expansion of education and skills development, these initiatives have been frustrated by insufficient attention to the creation of absorptive capacity, quality of education, and continuity of financing of education. Thus, government attempts to build African capacity have been frustrated by harsh economic realities and changing national priorities during the postindependence period. The emphasis on the development of the "hardware\(^3\)" and industrialization without sufficient attention to the development of the "software\(^4\)" has undermined well-intended efforts. Physical infrastructure projects have turned into "sand castles" despite their quick, visible, and measurable results. Besides, these "sand castle" also claimed a substantial portion of development budgets. The intellectual vacuum in Africa, be it through brain drain or insufficient capacity generation, has led to increased dependence on the North for expertise\(^5\) (Berg, 1993).

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\(^3\)That is, physical infrastructure development.

\(^4\)That is, capacity building, broadly defined.

\(^5\)There is little consensus on the exact number of expatriates in Africa. For example, Jaycox (1989, p3) believes that there were 100 000 expatriates in 1989 while Berg (1993)
Whatever the correct figure is, the current number of expatriates is much larger than at the time of independence in the 1960s. For example, in 1963, technical assistance personnel from OECD-countries in Africa numbered 31 262. The figure is now estimated at 42 500 in 1993 (Berg, 1993, p68).

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the above historical overview and problem statement, four questions will be addressed in the balance of this paper:

(a) How has African capacity building been treated in the economic development of Africa during the transition to independence?

(b) How did African governments, donors, and international agencies treat African capacity building during the postindependence period?

(c) What are the capacity building experiences of selected African countries since independence?

(d) What lessons can be drawn from these experiences for South Africa?

Although capacity building has been widely documented, there is substantial disagreement between African governments and donor agencies on this subject. None of the parties involved is prepared to embrace their mistakes. On the one hand, donor provides an estimate of 40 000 in the 1980s (Berg, 1993, p72).
agencies blame African governments for mismanagement, iron-handed approaches and corruption. On the other hand, many African governments blame donor agencies for their short-term projects and the "heavy hand" of the cold war. There are continuing attempts to apportion the blame. But there is agreement among various authors that African capacity building should be brought to the top of the development agenda in the 1990s (Jaycox, 1989; World Bank, 1991; Berg, 1993).

1.4 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the African capacity problem. The analysis will be undertaken through a review of literature on the development policies and approaches pursued in Africa over the last four decades with emphasis on African capacity building.

The paper is organized as followings: Chapter 2 presents an overview of economic development policies and approaches in Africa in historical perspective with emphasis on the treatment of African capacity building. An overview of capacity building initiatives by African governments in postindependent Africa is covered in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 examines capacity building experiences in Nigeria and Kenya. Chapter 5 provides a summary and conclusions from African capacity building experiences and draws key lessons for South Africa.
CHAPTER 2

AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter analyzes the nature of development policies and approaches that shaped the development and performance of Africa during the colonial, transition, and postindependence periods. The main objective is to set the stage for an analysis of how African capacity building has been treated by policymakers, donor agencies, and development experts during this period. The analysis focuses on important historical landmarks and policies and approaches during each of the last four decades.

A few qualifications are in order. First, some of the approaches cover more than one period. Thus, a discussion of the transition period in the 1950s does not necessarily mean that colonial rule had completely ended because Namibia did not gain its independence until 1990. Second, the Sudan became the first African country to gain independence in 1956, followed by Ghana 1957, and 17 other countries in 1960. This explains why 1960 is commonly referred to as the beginning of Africa's independence. Third, this chapter focuses on the major development approaches used across the continent. Africa is a diverse continent not only in terms of its countries, people and other physical characteristics, but also in terms of former colonial powers

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6 These include the colonial period (1880-1960), the transition to independence (1950s), and the independence and postindependence periods (1960s- 1990s).
(Vaughan, 1977; Martin and O'Meara, 1977). As such, past
development policies and approaches have had different impacts on
Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone regions of Africa. Country-
specific issues will be addressed in case studies of Nigeria and
Kenya in the chapter 4.

2.1 THE COLONIAL PERIOD: 1880s-1960s.

2.1.1 OVERVIEW

The legacies of colonialism have been widely documented. It
is, however, important to highlight some of the key pillars of
colonialism upon which the development of independent Africa is
rooted. As already indicated, the diversity of strategies
throughout Africa makes it difficult to generalize about their
impact. These strategies varied widely not only among African
regions under different colonial powers but also among different
regions and countries under the same colonial power. For example,
the British colonial policy in Kenya promoted extensive European
settlement on much of the best land reserved for Europeans in the
late 1890s. However, in Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia, and Sierra
Leone, the British colonial policy constrained plantation
development and settlement by European farmers and foreign
private firms. By contrast, the French colonial policy encouraged
Europeans to settle and establish coffee and cocoa plantations in
Cote d'Ivoire (formerly the Ivory Coast). Similarly, the German
colonial and commercial policy in Tanzania (then Tanganyika)
concentrated on the development of plantation agriculture until the end of the German rule in 1912 (Eicher and Baker, 1992).

2.1.2 MAJOR ISSUES.
Binswanger and Deininger (1993) have identified five mechanisms which landlords/plantation owners, in collaboration with the state, have historically used to depress the profits of small-scale farmers and limited the choices of unskilled workers in order to extract their labor services at the lowest cost. Some of these measures have been used by colonial powers in Africa and in South Africa. These five measures include:

(a) Control over Land.
Various colonial governments (e.g. Kenya and Zimbabwe) gained control over prime agricultural land and allocated rights to "unoccupied" land to members of the ruling class. This process of land alienation confined peasant cultivation to infertile or remote areas with poor infrastructure and market access. Farm profits were reduced by the higher labor requirements for producing a unit of output on poor land, by increased transport and marketing margins, and by increased prices for consumer goods imported to the region.

(b) Differential Taxation.
Differential taxation of the peasant population via tribute requirements or hut, head or poll taxes which had to
be paid in cash, kind, or labor services. Some of these taxes were partially waived for workers or tenants in administered estates.

(c) **Restricted Market Access.**

Market access could be further restricted by cooperative or monopoly marketing schemes which purchased commodities only from the large-scale farmers.

(d) **Coercive Measures.**

Once large farms had been established by the rulers, coercive interventions in the labor market were sometimes used, together with the above mechanisms, to assist in the retention of workers or tenants in the administered estate. Examples of such coercive interventions include pass and vagrancy laws and slavery. One of the highlights of colonialism which contributed to the neglect of African capacity building was the systematic coercion of Africans to provide labor services to European plantations and mines.

(e) **Restriction of Public Goods and Services.**

Reduction of profits in the peasant farms was often achieved by confining agricultural public goods and services (roads, extension, credit) to the farms of the rulers or by subsidizing these farms directly.
The Binswanger-Deininger framework will be used as a checklist for an analysis of African capacity building and the performance of African smallholder agriculture.

2.1.3 ASSESSMENT

Eicher and Baker (1992) reviewed the literature on agricultural development in Africa and examined four capacity issues in detail:

(a) The degree to which Africans were excluded from or "forced" to participate in colonial development programs;
(b) The colonial record on the training of Africans;
(c) The colonial position on promoting research on export versus food crops; and
(d) The debate over cash and food crops.

A number of conclusions flow from an analysis of the impact of the colonial period on African human capital and managerial skills. First, Africans were systematically excluded from participation in many colonial development schemes, including the production of certain export crops and improved cattle. For example, coffee growing by Africans in Kenya was prohibited until 1933 when it was introduced on a limited scale on selected districts far removed from European coffee plantations. They were forced into growing other selected crops such as cotton or "contribute" their labor to maintain roads. This explains why there is so much negativism surrounding cash crops and African
development (Heyer and Waweru, 1976).

Second, colonial governments gave little attention to the training of Africans and the development of institutions for training African agricultural and other scientists and managers. In fact, the statistics at the time of independence in the 1960s were disturbing: There was only one Faculty/College of Agriculture in Francophone Africa and only four university graduates were trained in agriculture in this region between 1952 and 1963, compared to 150 in Anglophone Africa during the same period. In addition, there were only three African scientists working in all the agricultural experimental stations in the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania in 1964 (Eicher and Baker, 1992, p20).

Third, there was a systematic bias against research on food production and other initiatives by African farmers and herders. Colonial research and development programs were focused on export crops, plantations, land settlement schemes, and commercial farmers with favorable natural resource endowments. Such efforts help explain some of the regional inequalities and the fragmented road and railroad system (Heyer and Waweru, 1976).

Fourth, Eicher and Baker (1992) conclude that the net effect of colonial policies and programs on Africans lies between Peter Bauer's (1975, p653) assertion that "virtually all components of modern social and economic life in Africa date from the colonial period" and Kwame Nkrumah's(1963, pxiii) assessment that "without exception they (the colonial governments) left us nothing but our
2.2 THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE: 1950s

2.2.1 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES.

The 1950s marked the transition to independence for many African countries. Colonial rule was responsible for planning and steering African nations on the road to independence, including, inter alia, the selection of the type of people to be trained, and the level of training to be offered. Western prejudice about the economic behavior of African farmers and traders and the belief that Africans were not responsive to economic incentives contributed to the neglect of African capacity building. Three controversial issues were debated in the 1950s and 1960s:

(i) The Concept of Economic Man.

In the 1950s and 1960s, many Western economists held the view that Africans were not "economic men" in the Western sense. This view was a carry over from Alfred Marshall, the founder of neoclassical economics, who described Africans as:

"the savages living under domination of impulse; scarcely ever striking out new lines for themselves; never forecasting the distance future; fitful in spite of their servitude to custom, governed by the fancy of the movement, ready at times for the most arduous exertion, but incapable of keeping themselves long to steady work" (Marshall, 1956, quoted by Jones, 1960).

However, in his survey of studies of migration, trade, production, and marketing, Jones (1960) concluded that economic
drive is present in many Africans. Subsequent studies by other authors reached similar conclusions. For example, in a study of Nigerian factory workers, Kilby (1961) found that the workers surpassed their European counterparts in physical exertion by as much as 50 percent when appropriate rewards were held out to them.

(ii) The Target income/Backward-Bending Labor Supply Curve hypothesis.

This hypothesis reflects Western perception of Africans, based on the "Target income/Backward-Bending Labor Supply Curve hypothesis. Eicher and Baker (1992) trace the origin of this hypothesis to the colonial period when plantation and mine owners reported that they could not fill available vacancies at going rates because Africans were "lazy" and mine workers would often return to their villages once they have earned their target income. Without question, the advocates of this hypothesis were ill-informed about African economic behavior and farming systems. The primary source of livelihood for most Africans was subsistence farming, hunting, and other activities. Africans were forced into the cash economy through the introduction of various forms of coercive measures. Empirical studies in the 1960s helped reject the simple-minded proposition that Africans were lazy.

(iii) The Cultural Barrier Hypothesis.

The "Cultural Barrier Hypothesis" was used to argue that
social and cultural factors were overriding barriers to the adoption of innovations and achievement of African development goals. But experience since the 1950s has demonstrated that culture is not an overriding constraint on development (Eicher and Baker, 1992). To be sure, cultural factors need to be taken into consideration in designing development interventions but they are no longer viewed as insurmountable barriers to economic and social change.

2.2.2 DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND PROGRAMS.

Economic development in general, and agricultural development specifically, depends to a great extent on the four critical prime movers of development, namely, improvements in human capital, institutional innovations, technological change and improvements in physical capital (Bonen, 1990; Lele, 1992). A conducive social, political, and economic environment is necessary for the prime movers to be effective. However, many countries have focused on only one prime mover which they assumed to be the "missing factor" in development. The promotion of the missing factor approach varied according to the economic, political and/or intellectual power of its advocates. For example, one of the major objective of the Marshall Plan in the early 1950s was the reconstruction of war-torn Europe through U.S. assistance to rebuild the physical infrastructure. However, the quick recovery of Western Europe in the 1950s was attributed to an array of complementary prime movers such as human capital,
institutions and technology.

The Marshall Plan concept was later expanded to the Third World. The most important objective of the Plan was of a strategic nature, involving both economic and political motives: To secure political stability and support from the Third World during the cold war; to establish vital economic links to serve the "vent-for-surplus" motives; and to secure strategic raw material for industrial development in the North. The second objective was humanitarian, aimed at improving the well-being of the people in the Third World. The Marshall Plan provided experts, advisors and foreign training to Latin America and Asia (Khan, 1978, p16). The U.S promoted community development (CD) programs as a foreign policy strategy to combat the spread of communism during the Cold War (Holdcroft, 1978, p2). U.S agricultural development specialists placed heavy emphasis on the direct transfer of technology to the Third World through what Vernon Ruttan (1990) describes as the "diffusion model".

2.3 POSTINDEPENDENCE PERIOD: 1960s-1990s.

The foundation for the development of independent Africa was laid during the colonial and the transition periods. Whether such

7 This doctrine was developed by the economist Adam Smith. It views trade as providing an outlet for goods that otherwise would not find a market.

8 This model asserts that Third World farmers could increase their productivity by adopting agricultural practices and technologies from industrial countries.
a foundation was "hollow" or "solid" can only be ascertained by observing the performance of African economies since independence. Conventional wisdom suggests that the entire blame for the neglect of African capacity building in the colonial and transition periods should be placed on foreign powers and experts. But during the postindependence period, the blame may have to be shared, albeit unequally between donor agencies and African governments.

2.3.1 THE GROWTH-LED STRATEGIES OF THE 1960S.

The economic growth models that were developed by Western development economists in the 1950s were introduced into African development in the 1960s. Schultz (1964) advanced his well known "efficient-but-poor" hypothesis which argued that traditional agriculture was characterized by allocative efficiency despite low levels of per capita output. Schultz's hypothesis called for a major shift from the agricultural extension and community development approaches of the 1950s towards investment in agricultural research and human capital in the 1960s. The introduction of technological development as a second prime mover of economic and agricultural development was a major breakthrough in the 1960s. It led to the promotion of what Ruttan (1990) describes as the "high pay-off model" and it was given empirical support through increased achievements of the Green Revolution in Asia starting in 1965. An emphasis on technological innovation was an important contribution of the 1960s to a more holistic
view of development.

During the 1960s and 1970s most new African governments were focused on nation building, industrial development, education and diversification of their economies (Eicher and Baker, 1992). Insufficient budgetary allocation for agricultural research, extension, and training was common throughout Africa (Leonard, 1977). Expatriate expertise played a major role. The gradual failure of the CD programs in various parts of the Third World in the 1950s prompted the need to create an economic base as the foundation for rural development (RD) efforts. Thus, growth-led strategies were undertaken in the 1960s. However, the inability of the poor to benefit from the proceeds of the growth-led models led to a shift towards growth-with-equity in the 1970s.

2.3.2 THE GROWTH–WITH–EQUITY ERA OF THE 1970S.

The development goals were broadened in the 1970s to include employment and distribution. This approach became known as "growth-with equity". It was prompted by the inability of the growth-led strategies and the "Progressive Farmer" model of the 1960s to "trickle down" to the poor. During the 1970s, Robert McNamara emerged as the leader of international donor organizations. His poverty-oriented approach was first launched in 1971 and reaffirmed in his landmark speech in Nairobi, in 1973 when he announced the World Bank's new focus on smallholder

9 The "Trickle Down Theory" assumed that recipient governments would use their fiscal instruments to distribute the benefits of economic growth.
farming (Shapley, 1993). McNamara's vision is captured in his
dedication to alleviate poverty and hunger among the "poorest of
the poor" or the "bottom 40% of the population". The World Bank's
new RD program was subsequently published as a Rural Development
half of the expanded agriculture lending to RD to achieve an
ambitious goal of increasing production by 5% per year (World
Bank, 1988).

2.3.4 THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT DECADE: 1980s

In response to the economic crisis of the late 1970s and
The Report identified and focused on Africa's faulty domestic
economic policies and the need for policy reform to accelerate
economic growth in Africa. The Berg Report thus formed the
foundation for the infamous structural adjustment programs (SAPs)
of the 1980s.

The Berg Report argued that African governments had focused
on political consolidation, provision of basic infrastructure,
and development of human resources while paying inadequate
attention to production. It also contends that the scarcity of
trained African personnel has led to a greater reliance on
expatriates for trained manpower and that the situation is more
critical for the supply of "high -level" (university trained)

\(^\text{10}\) Elliot Berg was the coordinator of the World Bank team
responsible for compiling the report (World Bank, 1981).
manpower. Table 2.1 shows the dependency of selected African countries on expatriate manpower during the first decade of independence.

Table 2.1: Africa: Expatriate Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment of Trained Manpower.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PERCENT(%)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>62</td>
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The Berg Report asserted that faster economic growth in Africa required, among other things, accelerated development of human resources through more and better formal schooling and intensification of training. The report also notes that African
government expenditures on schooling were already claiming about 4% of gross domestic product (GDP) and about 16% of total public expenditure in most countries. The size of expenditure on schooling was second only to general administration function. In addition, recurrent expenditures on education were between 25 and 35% of the total recurrent spending (World Bank, 1981, p81).

While the size of education budgets in most countries is relatively large, the allocation priority within the education sector has tended to favor primary education, followed by secondary and lastly, university education. The social rates of return to these categories were reported to be 29%, 17%, and 12% respectively. The Berg Report notes that the cost of education in Africa is relatively high compared to industrial nations:

"African governments spend as much per university student as countries with per capita incomes at least three times and as much as eight times higher. By contrast, primary education is cheap in comparison with industrialized countries" (World Bank, 1981, p82).

The 1980s marked a major shift from projects to macro economic policies, including economic growth, policy reform, market liberalization, and food security. The first structural adjustment program (SAP) in Africa was launched in Ghana in 1983. By 1989, SAPs were implemented in 32 of the 45 countries in Africa.

In 1989, the World Bank published a long-term perspective study (LTPS) which laid out new priorities for the 1990s and beyond, including an ambitious target growth rate of 4 to 5% per year for Africa. The LTPS acknowledges the importance of many
short-and long-term constraints on growth, including poor
governance, pervasive shortage of human and institutional
capacity, and technological stagnation. It also placed a strong
emphasis on equity and sustainability to supplement the earlier
concern with growth and efficiency. The report emphasized African
capacity building through human and institutional development:

"A central theme of the report is that although sound
macroeconomic policies and an efficient infrastructure are
essential to provide an enabling environment for the
productive use of resources, they alone are not sufficient
to transform the structure of African economies. At the same
time major efforts are needed to build African capacities to
produce better trained, more healthy population, and to
greatly strengthen the institutional framework within which
development can take place" (World Bank, 1989, pxii).

2.4 SYNTHESIS.

The colonial period in Africa is characterized by the
systematic exclusion of Africans in development schemes and
training facilities, coercion into the provision of labor to
plantations owners, various official mechanisms to depress the
profits of small-scale African farmers, and the extraction of the
services of unskilled workers at the lowest cost. Also, there has
been a systematic bias against research on food production and
other initiatives by African farmers and herders.

The 1950s marked the transition to independence for many
African countries. Colonial powers took charge of planning and
steering African nations to independence, including limited
preparation of Africans for administrative positions. The
theoretical foundation for the development of independent Africa
was based on neoclassical economics. The main focus was on economic growth and modernization through the structural transformation of the economy. Agricultural development and institution building were given low priority. The thinking and planning were strongly influenced by various theoretical propositions such as Prebisch's 1949 thesis on international terms of trade, Lewis' two sector model of 1954, and Hirschman's economic linkages of 1958. The planning process was also influenced by Western theories and prejudice about the behavior of African farmers who were perceived to be unresponsive to economic incentives. These included the concept of economic man, target income/backward-bending labor supply curve hypothesis, and the cultural barrier hypothesis. Development strategies and programs emphasized the provision of the physical infrastructure as the missing factor. This approach was heavily influenced by the success of the Marshall Plan in the reconstruction of war-torn Europe.

The 1960s marked the shift towards growth-led strategies. In many countries, large-scale plantations, ranches, and irrigation schemes dominated the 1960s. Kenya and Nigeria were exceptions in emphasizing smallholders as a target group to promote the growth-led strategies. Schultz's (1964) "efficient-but-poor" hypothesis has led to the promotion of the "high payoff model" and the Green Revolution in Asia.

The emphasis shifted towards the growth-with-equity approach in the 1970s after the benefits from the smallholder approach
failed to trickle down to the poor. The World Bank led the shift towards a new integrated rural development (IRD) approach to support the bottom 40% of the population in the Third World.

The 1980s are generally known as the decade of structural adjustment. The Berg Report attributed most of the failure of the project approach to poor policies of the 1970s. It blamed poor domestic economic policies as the root cause of Africa's economic stagnation and criticized governments for focusing too much attention on political consolidation, provision of basic infrastructure, and human resource development at the expense of production. The Berg Report recommended that African governments introduce economic policy reform to create a conducive environment to economic growth. In 1989, the World Bank published its LTPS report which documented new priorities and approaches to be pursued in the 1990s and beyond.
CHAPTER 3

CAPACITY BUILDING IN POSTINDEPENDENT AFRICA.

3.1 OVERVIEW

The previous chapter was devoted to an overview of major development policies and approaches and their direct and indirect impact on African capacity building over the last four decades. This chapter focuses on some of the capacity building problems experienced and subsequent corrective actions undertaken by policymakers and donor agencies since independence.

Since independence, African governments have invested billions of dollars in educational programs to increase literacy rates and reduce their dependency on expatriate skills. African governments are aware that investment in human capital development is not just a social service but a powerful source of economic growth which increases the human ability to "identify, define, and deal with problems..." (Bonnen, 1990, p264). However, in many countries, overinvestment in university education relative to other sectors has frustrated capacity building efforts. Also, primary and secondary education have often been oriented towards university education without sufficient provision for career development and training opportunities for students who were unable to proceed to universities (Harbison, 1970; Saint, 1992). Formal education in Africa is also modern sector-oriented, expensive, inaccessible to many people, and a
budgetary strain on governments (World Bank, 1989). We shall now examine Africa's experience in capacity building starting with the 1960s.

3.1.1 THE 1960S.

Capacity building is one of the major postindependence strategies undertaken by African governments to reduce illiteracy levels and long-term reliance on expatriate personnel. For example, the UNESCO-led Conference of African States on the development of education in Africa, held on 15 May 1961, has become one of the most important landmarks in African capacity building initiatives. The Addis Ababa Conference called for massive expansion of education at all levels (primary, secondary, and university) and the preparation of national manpower plans to identify and alleviate critical shortages of African skills and other colonial legacies (King, 1991). While the delegates to the 1961 conference endorsed a goal of universal primary education by 1981, African governments were overwhelmed in the 1960s and 1970s by the cost of financing free primary education. Besides, inadequate growth in employment opportunities in both rural and urban sectors contributed to the school leaver problem, i.e. the inability of primary and secondary school graduates to find jobs upon completion of their schooling.

Many manpower specialists in the 1960s believed that capacity building was an exercise in "getting the numbers right" through quantitative estimates, forecasts, and the computation of
benefit/cost ratios. This explains why insufficient attention was often paid to the quality of those trained, career development, and the school leaver problem. Much attention in university education was focused on preparing officers to Africanize the civil service (King, 1986; 1991).

Without question, in the early 1960s, there was an understandable optimism about the speed with which scientific, managerial, and educational capacity could be installed. However, some of the prominent Western advocates\textsuperscript{11} of educational expansion acknowledged the dilemma of policymakers in balancing short-term and long-term investments in human capital development:

"(African countries) may have to choose between immediate investment in intensive development of strategic manpower on a selective basis and the early elimination of illiteracy on a mass basis. This is a cruel, but compelling mandate for rapid development" (Harbison, 1961, quoted by King, 1991, p75.

The Africanization of government posts and expansion of education should also be commended in their own right, despite their inability to meet all the expectations arising from independence. They were part of broader long-term nation building initiatives to give ordinary people a sense of belonging and patriotism as new nations emerged. A reduction in illiteracy levels was also viewed as a long-term investment in human resource development (Rivkin, 1968).

\textsuperscript{11}Frederick Harbison, Arthur Lewis, H.M. Phillips, Hans Singer, and others (King, 1991).
3.1.2 THE 1970S.

The first wave of enthusiasm about education in the 1960s was followed by an intensive rethinking of education priorities during the 1970s. While the principle of universal primary education was still cherished in the 1970s, there was a marked shift towards expansion of secondary and university education (King, 1986). Secondary education was not viewed as an end of its own but an intermediate input into the expansion of university education to meet the demand for high level skills to replace expatriates. For example, the Kenyan economist Tom Mboya (1967) proposed expansion of secondary schools, university facilities, and related services which would be basic, functional and fully utilized. But he also advocated the creation of absorptive capacity as a way to avoid the overproduction of graduates and creation of graduate unemployment:

"I have often felt that those who assist us in our development efforts have tried to discourage the rapid expansion of our educational facilities. The argument is that we may overproduce and create graduate unemployment. This danger exists but we must first attempt to circumvent it by expanding job opportunities, not by curtailing enrollment. A massive programme in education does require a massive development efforts in other sectors" (Mboya, 1967, p24).

During the 1970s, most donor agencies turned their attention to "basic needs", helping the poorest of the poor, non-formal education, and developing the informal sector. At its 1972 Workshop in Accra, the Association of African Universities (AAU) reviewed the previous decade of African education development and
found it frustrating. Part of the explanation for this frustration was offered by some of the expatriates attending the Accra Workshop:

"African education is intimately linked with the international aid and education industry, and... the donor/client dependency relationship has inhibited the development of African institutions and the capacity of Africans to develop educational policies which are socially relevant and financially feasible, for the last quarter of a century" (Carl Eicher, quoted by King, 1991, p78).

Donors also had mixed views on African education. In 1972, the heads of several international foundations attended a Rockefeller Foundation conference in Italy to review their support to education. In 1974, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations compiled a set of key papers on education which proposed various changes to the African education system. For example, Mark Blau proposed that manpower approach to educational planning be replaced by the previously scorned rate of return approach. Many papers concluded that there was an underinvestment in lower levels while too much was being spent on the higher levels of education. These conclusions may have hastened the

12 The Workshop Report "Creating the African University: Emerging Issues of the 1970s" was subsequently referred to as "an angry document, reflecting the frustrations caused by the fact that Africans themselves had had little choice in the development of their educational systems and that they were now being held to account for the inadequacies of inherited and inflexible systems" (Alison Girdwood, 1988, quoted by King, 1991, p78).

13 They were published under the title "Education and Development Reconsidered" (King, 1991, p79).
withdrawal of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundation programs\textsuperscript{14} in university development programs. Coombe (1991) is of the opinion that these programs have made pioneering contributions to African university education despite their short duration.

3.1.3 THE 1980s.

Theodore Schultz (1980) advocated massive investments in population quality and in knowledge generation in the Third World. But the aspiration of the African people for higher education has encouraged many governments to overinvest in universities relative to primary and secondary education, leading to massive increases in enrollments for higher education and in unsustainable public subsidization of higher education. However, the expansion in enrollments has been biased against science and technology, leading to questionable quality and relevance of university education. Given that the 1980s were a decade of structural adjustment lending, African governments faced hard choices between continued subsidization and rationalization of expenditures on university expansion. Proposals have been

\textsuperscript{14}In West Africa, the Ford Foundation's Francophone West African Education Research Training Program was launched in 1974, but the first trainees did not commence their training till January 1977, and did not finish their fieldwork before the middle of 1979. Similarly, the Ford Foundation's Anglophone West African Regional Educational Research Consortium did not start till 1979. In fact, in 1979 the Ford Foundation drastically cut back its education capacity building initiative and dispersed many of its own education staff. In other words, two of the Ford Foundation's main research training programs had scarcely started when the Foundation begun to withdraw its support for them (King, 1991).
suggested to change priorities and place more emphasis on, among others, education cost sharing, relevance, and generation of supplementary income by universities from private sources such as research contracts (SADCC, 1985; Kenya, 1989; World Bank, 1990).

The World Bank observed that donors had prematurely abandoned tertiary, especially university education support in the 1970s. It also acknowledged that the shift in donors' policies towards primary education was motivated by their desire to achieve immediate results for their efforts and investments (World Bank, 1989). However, Please (1984) contends that:

"Despite its deep involvement in all aspects of economic policy as they relate to the developing countries, the World Bank remains, as it has always been, a project-driven organization" (Please, 1984, p10).

From the 1980s on, the World Bank replaced UNESCO as a leader in the debate on African education and capacity building. The Bank's leadership position may have been strengthened by the experience and advice from the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation advised the World Bank to increase its own in-house education research capacity. The World Bank's rapid response to this call was demonstrated by the proliferation of research publications on education from the 1970s to date. Its education research program has been concerned primarily with the delivery, efficiency, costs, and financing of schooling.

But the heavy hand of the World Bank in educational policy circles in Africa is a matter of major concern to the Association of African universities (AAU). In particular, the AAU charges
that African higher education institutions have had little opportunity to contribute to the discussion of the World Bank's report on African education reform. In addition, the AAU maintains that the report did not capture the perspectives of African concerns and priorities, or approaches that focus on educational rather than financial and economic factors. In response, at its 7th General Conference in 1989, the AAU adopted a proposal to promote studies by African universities and an exchange of policy related information and experiences (AAU, 1991).

3.1.4 THE 1990S AND BEYOND.

Human-oriented development has become a major concern of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in the 1990s. The UNDP has produced an annual "human development index" through which "human progress" can be quantitatively measured and compared among developing countries (UNDP, 1990, piii; The Courier, 1990, p96). The promotion of educational opportunities for women has gathered momentum (Summers, 1992). African leaders are calling for increased training of present and future leaders. In many countries, former African heads of states are making important contributions to African leadership training programs. For example, the former Nigerian head of state, General Olusegun Obasanjo, is chairman of the Nigerian-based Africa Leadership Forum which was established in 1988 to promote African leadership training (Obasanjo, 1990). The UNDP, African Development Bank
(ADB), and the World Bank helped establish the African Capacity Building Fund (ACBF) in 1991. A sum of $100 million has been reserved for the first four-year phase of the African Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI) to redress African capacity problems over 20 years (World Bank, 1991, p2).

Initially, the objective of the ACBI is to improve economic management and policy analysis capacity in Africa. The ACBI appears to be a phased experiment to determine, over time, the most effective techniques for African capacity building. The driving force behind ACBI is partly derived from the failure of structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and the paucity of African macroeconomists, managers, and scientists.

3.2 CAPACITY BUILDING PROBLEMS.

African policymakers took giant steps to expand education in the 1960s (Berg, 1993). However, by 1970, there were clear indications that the initial priorities at independence had to be reassessed to devote greater attention to a balanced emphasis on the quality and relevance of education and training and science and technology. The support for a balanced approach became even more widespread during the 1980s and gained momentum in the early 1990s (SADCC, 1985; World Bank, 1989; Eicher, 1990; Saint, 1992; Berg, 1993).

Many problems have obscured and/or stifled efforts by governments to build African capacity. Four problems will be discussed.
3.2.1 FINANCING OF EDUCATION

African governments were overwhelmed by political and economic demands for primary and secondary education to eliminate illiteracy and improve labor marketability in the modern sector. The expansion consisted of primary education in the 1960s, followed by secondary and university expansion in the 1970s. For example, from 1960 to 1983, total education enrollments in Africa increased from 12.7 to 62.9 million. Primary school enrollments increased from 36% in 1960 to 76% in 1983 while secondary school enrollments rose from 3% to 20% during the same period. At the same time, the need to build sustainable long-term internal capacity to reduce reliance on expatriates was crushing. University enrollments rose from about 21 000 in 1960 to about 437 000 in 1983 with an additional 100 000 students in overseas universities (Rimmer, 1991, p8).

The massive increases in enrollments for secondary and university over the past three decades has raised alarm bells about the magnitude of government expenditure on higher education. For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s, Africa's public expenditures on education ranged between 4 to 5.5% of its combined national incomes. But in 1973, the Cote d'Ivoire spent 33% of its budget on education which was the highest in the world (Rimmer, 1991, p8). In fact, social rate of return on higher education is about 13%. Since the direct private cost of higher education is estimated to be close to zero, the private rate of return of higher education is about 30% (World Bank, 1989, p81).
Also, the World Bank's 1980 figures on the cost of a student-year as a percentage of per capita GNP confirmed that African education is among the most expensive in the world. For example, the cost per student-year as a percentage of per capita GNP for primary, secondary, and university education in West Africa was 24%, 142%, and 1,045% respectively, while the corresponding figures for Europe, Middle East, and North Africa were 15%, 47%, and 306%. The corresponding figures for Asia and Latin America were also lower than those in Africa (World Bank, 1989, p82; UNICEF, 1985, p49). The structural adjustment programs of the 1980s have convinced some countries to reduce their expenditure on education and privatize some of the cost of education. Some countries are considering cost sharing instead of complete privatization which would make education even more inaccessible to the poor.

3.2.2 ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

In many African countries, the expansion of secondary and university education has not been accompanied by an associated expansion in employment opportunities. This has led to massive unemployment, a brain drain, and frustrations by those who had invested time and effort to acquire education. There are various reasons behind this absorptive capacity problem: First, the expansion in enrollments often has not produced a balanced mix of graduates. It was biased against science and technology which led to the decline in quality and relevance of university education
(Saint, 1992). As such, many graduates were underemployed or unemployed because their training was "irrelevant" to the skill requirements of the economy. Second, the relatively small modern sectors did not grow fast enough to absorb the output of the expanded education system. For example, average annual growth of GNP per capita declined from 1.6% during the 1965-73 period to -1.6% in 1990 (World Bank, 1992, p196). Third, agriculture, the backbone of most African economies, has grown at an annual average of 2% since 1960, while population growth rate averaged 3.1% during the same period (Jaycox, 1993, p2). As such, the stagnant agricultural sector was unable to generate sufficient jobs.

3.2.3 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND EXPATRIATE EMPLOYMENT.

The provision of expatriate technical assistance is one of the widely documented criticism of donor involvement in African development over the past 30 years. The distinction between the roles of technical assistance and expatriate personnel has become blurred. At best, the two issues may be viewed as "two sides of the same coin". At worst, they may be treated as one and the same thing. This should not, however, disqualify some genuine attempts to use expatriate personnel as an intermediate step to fill the capacity gap in Africa.

There are several ways in which expatriates have been rightfully or wrongfully accused of "standing in the way" of African capacity building. First, technical assistance now
accounts for about $3 billion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Sub-Saharan Africa each year (Berg, 1993, p73). An increasing number of Africans are raising the question of whether some of these funds could be more productively spent on building African institutions and training Africans. Second, there is a growing concern among Africans about the seemingly skewed distribution of skilled employment opportunities between trained African nationals and expatriates. Based on a survey of African views on the role of technical cooperation, Berg (1993) remarks that:

"A recurrent theme in the national assessments is the concern about the persistent reliance on expatriate technical assistance personnel in spite of major efforts made in training. Either national training programmes and policies have been defective and have not given priority to appropriate areas, or donors have been perceived as requiring expatriate technical assistance personnel even when suitably qualified nationals are available" (Berg, 1993, p5).

Berg (1993) also cites examples where trained national personnel were unemployed while expatriates were provided under technical cooperation schemes. While education may not be perceived as a right to a job, it is most likely to be perceived as such in developing countries where the marginal value of education is probably high due to the scarcity of trained manpower. Thus, the persistence of unemployment of trained Africans in their own countries while expatriates have jobs has several implications. For example, it may send negative signals to some Africans, leading to a reduction in the perceived value of education, followed by a further reduction in future
investment in human capital development. In addition, it may also create further tension between governments and their skilled manpower.

Third, the discrepancies in the salaries and conditions of employment between trained Africa nationals and expatriates promote further disenchantment and the brain drain which, in turn, perpetuates the existence of the capacity gap in Africa. It becomes a "self-feeding destruction" of Africa's long-term prospects.

Fourth, there are concerns about the possible "complicity" of some African governments. On the one hand, some analysts believe that African governments unwillingly accept an expatriate-inclusive technical assistance package as the only way to obtain equipment and financial assistance. On the other hand, others charge that African governments accept the status quo without question because:

"technical assistance personnel, whose services are provided free or nearly free, are used to supplement the state's operating budget" (Berg, 1993, p7).

The contribution of technical assistance personnel to the building of long-term African capacity is under critical review. For example, Berg (1993) observes that:

"...There is a growing sense that technical assistance cooperation does not work well, that as presently practiced it is ineffective, that such benefits as it brings are extremely costly, and that in any case, it has little lasting impact" (Berg, 1993, p3-4).

Likewise, University of Toronto economist, Gerald Helleiner
observes that:

"A succession of expatriates learn more and more about developmental decision-making while Africans below them in the hierarchy become progressively more alienated and discontented. The experience and collective "memory" which is accumulated during the process of development is thus appropriated by foreigners who subsequently leave the country carrying these invaluable assets with them" (Helleiner, 1979, quoted by Eicher, 1986, p20).

3.2.3 BRAIN DRAIN.

The brain drain is one of the major contributors to Africa's capacity gap. In fact, it may be viewed as an involuntary "subsidization" of industrial countries\(^\text{15}\) by poor countries. In 1989, the World Bank reported that:

"One explanation for the shortages in high-level skills is the brain drain. The United States alone had more than 34,000 African students in 1985, many of whom are unlikely to return to Africa; there are reported to be more than 70,000 trained Africans who have opted to remain in Europe (World Bank, 1989, p81).

There is also a migration of skills within Africa which constitutes an African brain drain. However, this intraregional migration appears to attract less criticism. In fact, it is viewed by the World Bank (1989) as a positive sign of a growing intraregional market for skills. The World Bank (1989) reports that a significant number of skilled workers have moved into Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. However, the source countries of such skilled workers are not indicated. In addition,

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\(^{15}\)Developed countries are major beneficiaries of "skills flight" from the Third World regardless of whether migration of skills is motivated by economic, political, or other factors.
South Africa has benefited extensively from skilled white workers from former colonies in Africa as the latter gained independence. The current political development in South Africa could also stimulate further intraregional brain drain. A number of trained Africans are already queuing up for positions in South Africa's traditionally Black universities.

Africa's inability to create sufficient absorptive capacity and incentives to retain its skilled workers contributes heavily to its brain drain. Overseas economic incentives and employment conditions are unmatched by almost all African countries. Such discrepancies create a "disguised migrant labor system" for skilled African workers who supplement their home-based resources with overseas earnings.

3.3 SYNTHESIS

Since independence in the late 1950s, African governments have been investing in educational programs to increase literacy levels and build internal capacity for high level skills requirements. First, the UNESCO-led conference of African governments on education development in 1961 placed major emphasis on the expansion of education at all levels. In the Eighth Session of the Economic Commission for Africa in 1967, the same call was reiterated with an additional requirement for growth in absorptive capacity of African economies. A rapid expansion of education was launched by many countries as they
gained independence in the 1960s. The first wave of expansion consisted of primary education in the 1960s, followed by secondary and university expansion in the 1970s. The 1980s was a decade of structural adjustment lending and retrenchment in many countries on public expenditures on education. It was also a time to review progress from initial capacity building programs and set new priorities. A number of critical problems had emerged: overinvestment in education, increasing financial burden on government, reduction in the quality and relevance of education, insufficient absorptive capacity, unemployment, declining popularity of technical assistance, and the brain drain. Many countries are now undertaking corrective measures to redress the situation. These measures include, inter alia, the adoption of cost sharing and full cost recovery principles, encouragement of universities to generate supplementary income from private sources, and improvement of education quality and relevance.
CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES OF CAPACITY BUILDING: NIGERIA AND KENYA.

This chapter analyzes postindependence capacity building experiences and initiatives in Nigeria and Kenya. These countries were specifically chosen because of their differences in size and geographical location.

NIGERIA:

4.1 EXPECTATIONS AT INDEPENDENCE.

Nigeria gained independence in 1960 and immediately undertook a series of major programs to strengthen its human resources. Johnson and Okigbo (1989) note that:

"Independence for Nigeria was a time of euphoria and of international goodwill toward Nigeria manifested in large assistance grants and concessional loans" (Johnson and Okigbo, 1989, p1211).

Sir Eric Ashby of Cambridge University was invited to lead a Commission on Post-Secondary School Certificate and Higher Education. The Commission consisted of three members from the United Kingdom, three from the United States and three from Nigeria representing the country's then three regions (Harbison, 1970). The Ashby Report immediately won acceptance throughout the country and it stimulated a major program of education and manpower development. The Ashby Commission proclaimed boldly
that:

"...it would be a grave disservice to Nigeria to make modest, cautious proposals, likely to fall within her budget, for such proposals would be totally inadequate to maintain even the present rate of economic growth in the country. Accordingly we reject this approach. Our recommendations are massive, unconventional, and expensive; they will be practicable only if Nigerian education seeks outside aid and if the Nigerian people themselves are prepared to accord education first priority and to make sacrifices for it" (Ashby Report, 1960, p179).

4.1.1 THE ASHBY COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The education expansion program recommended by the Ashby Commission was designed to correct regional imbalances and increase enrollments and centers of learning at all educational levels. All universities would be national in outlook to avoid unnecessary and uneconomic regional duplication of expensive courses. An Institute of African Studies would be created at each university to co-ordinate research from various university departments. They would also offer degrees in commerce, liberal arts, engineering, medicine, agriculture, and veterinary education. Many university degrees would be based on international standards while veterinary education would be closely related to the special needs of Nigeria. Agriculture, being the largest component of the Nigerian economy, would have a much greater part in university education. In order to open up further opportunities for university study, one university would offer evening courses while another would offer correspondence courses, both streams leading to degrees. Four existing universities with limited additions and incorporation of several
smaller colleges into major universities would be used (Ashby Commission, 1960).

An Inter-Regional Manpower Board\textsuperscript{16} was proposed to continuously review the national manpower needs and formulate programs for National manpower development. The main cost of the whole program would be borne by the Regions, with assistance from the Federal Government and international aid. Graduate teachers for all post-primary institutions were in greatest need. Hence, a co-ordinated program was proposed to consist of (a) scholarships for overseas training of Nigerian teachers, and (b) the importation of overseas graduates. In summarizing its recommendations, the Ashby Commission declared that:

"We propose a rate of investment in education which far outstrips the probable growth of Nigeria's economy by 1970.... We propose almost to double the number of primary schools pupils, almost to quadruple the number of students in secondary schools, and to multiple by more than five the present number of university students in Nigerian institutions" (Ashby Commission Report, 1960, Quoted by Harbison, 1970, p393).

The Nigerian government introduced a more ambitious agenda than the Ashby Commission. In a White Paper issued in 1961, the Federal Government accepted the Commission's report in principle but increased many of its targets. For example, secondary school and university enrollments were increased from 30 000 to 45 000 and from 7 500 to 10 000 respectively, while the annual flow of 2 500 technical students was raised to 5 000 technicians (Harbison, 1970, p393).

\textsuperscript{16} Comprised of members from the Federal Ministries, Regional Governments, and representatives of employers, trade Unions, and the general Public.
4.2 ACHIEVEMENT: 1960s-1970s.

Nigeria made rapid and impressive progress in building its educational system. Part of this progress was financed from government revenue and part from foreign exchange earnings from export of primary agricultural products. Within four years after its independence, Nigeria signed four agreements with USAID to assist with its university development program, including the development of the faculty/college of agriculture in various universities. Prominent Nigerian leaders such as Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe\(^{17}\) had aspirations for a "land-grant-like" university to serve the whole of Nigeria (Johnson and Okigbo, 1989, p1212).

Nigeria's progress was unprecedented in Africa:


By 1967, university enrollment was over 8,000 students and growing at about 24% per year. But this growth was cut short by the outbreak of the civil war in July 1967 which ended in January 1970. Starting from one university in 1961, there were six operating universities with one more in progress in 1967 (Johnson and Okigbo, 1989, p1215; Harbison, 1970, p394; World Bank, 1990.

\(^{17}\)Governor general and later President of Nigeria and also a leader of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) party (Johnson and Okigbo, 1989).
The recommendation of the Ashby Report for four universities had been surpassed. Secondary school enrollments increased from 12,000 in 1958 to over 37,000 in 1965 (Harbison, 1970, p394).

But the cost of university education in Nigeria was extremely high. For example, in the early 1960s, Nigeria was spending a little more than 1.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) on education but this increased to over 3% in 1966. In addition, the annual growth rate of recurrent expenditure on education averaged 15% while GDP grew at an annual rate of 4%. In terms of cost-per-student, Nigeria's universities were among the most expensive in the world, with student-faculty ratios averaging six-to-one. This compares with nine to one at some elite private universities in the United States such as Princeton University, and fifteen to one in many U.S. research universities such as Michigan State University. Salaries were very high because of large-scale employment of expatriates. The cost of providing on-campus housing for students and staff was also staggering. The Ashby proposal for a new non-residential city university was rejected. There was even more pressure for post-graduate education development which would make the reduction of the cost-per-student even more difficult (Harbison, 1970).

By 1967, Nigeria was overinvesting in university education and in university-oriented secondary education relative to other sectors of the economy (Harbison, 1970, p395). There were also more serious shortcomings of resource allocation within the university faculties/colleges. At least 60% of Nigeria's manpower
had to receive some basic training in science and technology. But the actual situation was almost the reverse: About 60% of Nigerian students in institutions of higher learning enrolled in the liberal arts, law, or the social studies (Yesufu, 1967, according to Harbison, 1970). As a result:

"...Graduates in these areas were finding it difficult to get senior level positions; many were forced to accept intermediate type jobs for which a university education is by no means necessary; some were already entering the ranks of the unemployed. On the other hand, too few graduates were being produced in agronomy, veterinary medicine, some branches of engineering, and the natural and physical sciences "(Harbison, 1970, p396).

The enrollment in teacher training institutions expanded at an annual rate of only 2% from 1960 to 1965, leading to a reduction of the quality of secondary education in many areas and a heavy dependence on expatriate teachers. There was even more serious shortfalls in intermediate technical training. In 1965 the annual intake into the technical institutes was less than 500 students while the output was less than 450 technicians compared to the target of 2,500. The National Manpower Board repeatedly warned that rapid development of technical institutes was the most critical problem of manpower development in Nigeria. In 1967, one of Nigeria's leading economists, Professor T.M. Yesufu, called for the establishment of at least thirty more technical institutes and ten more colleges of technology, and a proportionate reduction in university expansion. The shortfalls of agricultural assistance, veterinary assistants, nurses, and medical technicians were equally disappointing (Harbison, 1970).

Shortages of mathematics and science teachers in secondary
schools have contributed heavily to the latter's inability to prepare students for entry into universities science and technology faculties, leading to the imbalance in university enrollments. University enrollment reached more than 150,000 by 1986/87 while the number of graduates increased from 425 in 1962/63 to more than 30,000 in 1986/87 (Johnson and Okigbo, 1989, p1215). Total enrollments doubled every four or five years, reaching about 500,000 by 1988/89, of which 160,000 were in universities and 130,000 in technical/vocational institutions, and the remainder in teacher training or other specialized institutions (World Bank, 1990, p4).

4.3 NEW PRIORITIES: 1970s-1990s

The building of secondary and university education institutions was a critical issue in the development of human resources at independence. By the early 1970s, Government officials and educators were considering a shift to multipurpose secondary schools. Universities were also under pressure to link their programs more closely to the needs and available resources of the nation. Stringent financial policies and poor prospects for further overseas aid persuaded universities to curtail their expenditures. Both educators, planners, and politicians alike emphasized the need to correct the previous imbalance in resource allocation.

Having made substantial progress in high-level manpower
development for government and industry, attention shifted in the 1970s to underemployment and urban and rural unemployment. Frustrations arose as many school-leavers were unable to be absorbed into the relatively small modern sector of the economy. The modern sector could only absorb an estimated 5%\(^{10}\) of the total labor force. It could not absorb the combined annual output of Nigeria's formal education establishment of over 600,000 school leavers, drop-outs, and graduates (Harbison, 1970, p399). The problem of absorbing the school leavers proved to be more serious and even more difficult for Nigeria to handle than high-level skill development.

Rural modernization was proposed to increase agricultural production and generate employment. These initiatives required heavy investments in human and financial resources in both agriculture and rural community development. But the requirements and programs for the training of community development workers, small-scale entrepreneurs, village leaders and rural school teachers, were less clear. Available knowledge about the process of rural village development and the generation of incentives for self-improvement was limited. Besides:

"...very few persons with much education and initiatives are willing to commit themselves to service in the bush" (Harbison, 1970, p402).

From 1970 on, petroleum products were the major source of

\(^{10}\)Assuming a population of 50 million with 33 to 38% of population in labor force, between 700,000 and 900,000 persons employed in the modern sector, of which at least 600,000 to 750,000 are employed in the urban areas and the remainder in rural areas, agriculture and related services (Harbison, 1970, p398).
foreign exchange earnings for Nigeria. With the decline in global petroleum prices in early 1980s, the Federal government introduced various ways to reduce its financial support to the states. These new measures included control of school enrollment growth, removal of subsidies\textsuperscript{19}, raising student fees, raising supplementary income from non-governmental sources\textsuperscript{20}, using accumulated bank balances from oil boom years, and strengthening university infrastructures (World Bank, 1990).

4.4 SYNTHESIS

The need for capacity building in Nigeria was first identified by the World Bank mission in 1953 and followed up with the Ashby Commission report at independence in 1960. Nigeria was successful in obtaining a large amount of external aid and technical assistance for the development of its secondary and university education. Hence, initially, the universities were of high quality. As a result of strong political pressure and student demand at independence, the Nigerian government gave highest priority to the development of secondary and university education.

\textsuperscript{19}Up until 1985, Government subsidy to the feeding of university students was 16\% of government expenditure on education.

\textsuperscript{20}In 1985/86 the proportion of universities' recurrent income generated from non-governmental sources did not exceed 4\%. In 1987, universities were officially asked to raise this figure to 5\% per annum so that within ten years, 50\% of recurrent income would come from these sources. Currently, around 40-50\% is raised from the U.K and the U.S. (World Bank, 1990, p12).
education. Thus:

"... as it emerged as an independent nation, Nigeria had an announced strategy for development of education even before it had a plan for national economic development" (Harbison, 1970, p393).

By the 1970s, Nigeria was overinvesting, in relative terms, in university and university-oriented secondary education. The single-purpose orientation of secondary schools overlooked the needs of the majority of students who terminated their formal education at that level. Similarly, underinvestment in technical training resulted in inadequate supply of qualified teachers at all levels. The latter has contributed to imbalanced university faculty/college development biased against science and technology. As already indicated, pressure from the people rather than poor planning by the government, was the cause of this distortion in resource allocation. However, progress with Nigeria's education development was impressive despite these distortions:

"On balance, Nigeria was making solid progress by 1967... No other African country was making more progress in high-level manpower development; no other country was more committed to investment in education" (Harbison, 1970, p397).

At present, Nigeria has the largest and most diversified system of higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa, consisting of 21 Federal, one military, and eight state universities. This rapid growth took place in three major periods: The first was in the 1960s and early 1970s when six universities were established, the second in the mid-1970s when seven more were created, and the third in the 1980s when seven Federal Universities of Technology
and eight state universities were established (World Bank, 1990, p1). The second and third waves of university expansion were financed by the rapid growth of oil revenues during 1973-1980. However, with the sharp decline in oil revenues in the early 1980s, many projects were abandoned at various stages of completion. Some of these projects are now being revived by a $120 million structural adjustment loan from the World Bank over four years beginning in 1990.

KENYA.

4.1 PREINDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES.

An overview of preindependence policies and approaches which laid the foundation for Kenya's postindependence development, is in order. Brown (1968) reported that Kenya expanded food production to help the Allied Forces during World War II. After the war, policies were introduced to reform the African land tenure system, experiment with group farming, and promote soil conservation (Heyer and Waweru, 1976). The government declared an Emergency\textsuperscript{21} in September 1952 to combat the Mau Mau rebellion (Hazlewood, 1979, p9). Although the Emergency focused on land, the underlying issue was the quest for independence which was finally achieved eleven years later in 1963. The Troup Report of 1953 recommended measures to increase the productivity on

\textsuperscript{21} The Emergency was partly used to promote consolidation of the high potential Kikuyu land to facilitate the Kikuyu tribe's "Great Leap Forward" in agriculture (Brown, 1968, p42).
commercial farms while the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 promoted a smallholder road to development (Brown, 1968). The development phase of 1956-60 focused on implementing the Swynnerton Plan. Hence, Kenya is the only African country to have committed itself to a small-scale farming pathway well in advance of independence. Since Africans were prohibited from owning land in the "White Highlands" while Asians were excluded from owning agricultural land, the commercialization of land was a major feature of the Swynnerton Plan (Hazlewood, 1979). Africans were subsequently allowed for the first time to grow the same high value cash crops as European settlers (Brown, 1968, p43).

4.2 EXPECTATIONS AT INDEPENDENCE.

When Kenya gained independence in 1963, it had the largest non-African population in Africa. The 1963 population of 8.1 million people included 7.8 million Kenyans, 61 000 Europeans, and 169 000 Asians. At independence, Kenya inherited a thriving modern economy which had been fashioned largely to fit the needs of the non-African population. Since Asians were excluded from agriculture before independence, they established themselves in manufacturing, trade, and other modern sector activities. Kenyans were involved in manufacturing, construction, and trade, mainly as wage earners. Non-African communities, especially Europeans who had gained experience from colonial administration and other privileges, enriched Kenya's internal capacity at independence.
by Jomo Kenyatta's guarantee to protect private property rights:

"The Government of an independent Kenya will not be a gangster Government. Those who have been panicky... can now rest assured that the future African Government... will not deprive them of their property or rights of ownership. We will encourage investors... to come to Kenya ... to bring prosperity to this country" (Jomo Kenyatta, quoted by Hazlewood, 1979, p13).

Kenya also adopted a principle of self-help as a rural development strategy which formed the basis for the provision of education and training opportunities in the rural areas. The Kenyan government launched equal education opportunities for all by providing free primary education and the production of skilled and high level manpower to meet the changing needs of the economy. The importance of education is reflected by the growing proportion of the government budget allocated to education which rose from 10% in 1964/65 to 20% in 1985/86 (Kenya Government, 1989, p20). Kenya's initial policy on capacity building is also reflected in the speeches of some prominent Kenyans such as Tom Mboya²² (1967) who outlined various strategies for African development including education expansion at all levels and increasing absorptive capacity of African economies.

Kenya expanded education at all levels since the early 1960s. For example, primary school, secondary school, teacher training, vocational, technical, agricultural, and university

²²Tom Mboya, was M.P; Kenya Minister for Economic Planning and Development; and Chairman of the Seventh Session of the Economic Commission for Africa (E.C.A.).
education institutions were expanded to meet the demands of the economy for technical and professional skills. Primary schools more than doubled between 1963 and 1987, while secondary schools increased seven-fold and universities increased from one to four during the same period. Enrollments increased more than five-fold for primary schools, over seven-fold for secondary schools, and more than thirty-fold for universities. For example, enrollments for secondary education rose from 30 000 in 1963 to just over 100 000 in 1968 when 601 schools were operational. University enrollment increased from 571 in 1963 to over 17 000 in 1987.

The expansion in secondary education was partly due to the deliberate policy of Government and partly the massive growth of Harambee\textsuperscript{23} secondary schools which outnumbered Government-supported schools (Heyer et al, 1971, p79).

In addition to formal schooling, Kenya also supported a variety of adult and youth training opportunities outside the school system, including community development training centers, farmer training centers, adult literacy groups, youth clubs, and village polieotechnics (Heyer et al, 1971).

Government policy on manpower development in general, and training in particular, has undergone three major phases since independence: The first phase was in the early 1960s when the main concern was the rapid Kenyanization of the public service. A series of crash training programs were launched. But these

\textsuperscript{23}Harambee schools are community-run schools established as part of community self-help initiatives.
training programs created expectations for automatic promotion into higher job positions. By 1975, the public service was almost completely Kenyanized (Kenya, 1989, p224). The second phase began in the early 1970s with the publication of the Ndegwa\textsuperscript{24} Commission Report of 1971 which called for the transformation of the public service from its focus on public affairs administration to an instrument of development management. The third and current phase arose from the findings and recommendations of two Review Committees in 1980 which analyzed government salary and expenditures and observed (a) a lack of coordination and control among the large number of training institutions and (b) inability of government training policy to make provision for the needs of the private sector (Kenya, 1989).

4.3 ACHIEVEMENTS: 1960s-1970s.

Kenya's education and training system has been reviewed more than ten times in the 20 years since independence. By the early 1970s, school leaver problems co-existed with a demand of parents for more schools and related facilities. As such, there was a

\textsuperscript{24}Subsequently, Ndegwa (1987) emphasized that development creates a growing demand for higher levels of management skills to lead rather than follow the development process. He advanced three proposals: (a) the extension of microeconomics principles of management to the national management of the economy, (b) the recognition of the role of government in the management of the national economy, and (c) the importance of complementarily between the role of political leaders as decisionmakers and that of the public servants as administrators.
need to widen the scope of education to encompass all types of rural needs. The development of primary schools in Kenya has always involved co-operation with local communities and various education authorities. Local communities provided and maintained school buildings while at first missionaries, and more recently, local government authorities have provided recurrent costs with some assistance from the central government. However, increased political demand for free universal primary education following independence has increased the financial burden on the government (Heyer et al, 1971).

Many Harambee schools are unable to compete for staff as they cannot offer a permanent career. They rely heavily on untrained school-leavers. For example, in 1971, 65% of the teachers in private and Harambee schools were unqualified, compared with 24% in the government-supported schools. As such, the two education streams have different emphasis and quality. For example, Harambee schools copy the academic program of official secondary schools but lack the necessary resources such as qualified staff and equipment to implement it. Hence, science teaching, among other subjects, is neglected (Heyer et al, 1971, p79).

There has been a pattern of regional imbalances in the distribution of educational resources and opportunities in Kenya since independence. Court (1984) traces these imbalances to the mode of colonial development, the direction of missionary activity, and the vigor of self-help efforts, reinforced by the
postindependence configuration of political power. The Kenyan government took steps to widen the distribution of education opportunities and reduce the imbalances. These steps include the gradual removal of fees for primary education, the partial allocation of resources on a regional basis, and special additional provision to previously deprived regions. However, these efforts faced serious problems because:

"...In the first place, marginal improvements in the pattern of distribution of government-aided schools have tended to be counteracted by the provision of self-help facilities; the wealthy and politically influential areas have been able to maintain their lead by the establishment of self-help harambee schools" (Court, 1984, p285).

The above observation suggests the existence of both rich and poor Harambee schools and Kenya's inability to introduce a unified school system. The inherited colonial system still retain differential quality in terms of teachers and resources between "high cost" and Harambee schools (Court, 1984, p286).

Expatriate manpower in certain technical and specialized skills has contributed to the modernization of Kenya's economy, especially in the private sector where Kenyanization had limited success. A lack of Kenyan managerial expertise for industrial and commercial enterprises and tight foreign control of the private sector are cited as some of the reasons for this limited success. The Kenyan Government reports that by the early 1980s, it had developed sufficient technical and managerial skills for middle and high level management positions in both public and private sectors. The continued existence of technical assistance
personnel was therefore viewed to be not only costly to the economy but it also limited private sector employment opportunities for trained Kenyans (Kenya, 1989, p224).


Kenya's Sixth Development Plan covering the 1989-93 period contains major education and human capital initiatives. First, attention is focused on the relevance of the education system to the changing needs of the economy. With the introduction of a new 8-4-4 education system in 1985, specialized training will be provided through the introduction of vocational and technical courses at each level of the formal education system.

Second, the problem of financing education from the public budget is addressed. Although this cost is borne by both the public and private sector, the share of the public sector has increased from 15% in 1960 to 30% in 1980 and 35% in 1987. Private spending on education is about 25%, 70% and 50% of the total expenditure on primary, secondary, and higher education respectively. The combined public and private expenditure on education ranges between 10 and 15% of GDP. The government has introduced a cost-sharing system to reduce its overall expenditure on education (Kenya, 1989, p213).

Third, there has been over-enrollment in secondary schools. For example, there were 151 secondary schools in 1963, of which 119 were Government-supported and 32 were private. By 1987, there
were 2,485 schools, of which 635 were Government-supported, 1,497 Harambee and 353 private schools. Several problems arose: (a) over-enrollment, especially in Harambee and private secondary schools has over-stretched available resources, and (b) the quality of education in some private schools has become questionable. The government plans to stop building new secondary schools (Kenya, 1989, p217).

Fourth, several measures are planned to expand university education: (a) Expansion of university education will focus on the generation of a variety of high level skills for both the public and private sectors, and (b) Given the shortage of local university places, about 12,000²⁵ Kenyans are in overseas universities. Private overseas training drains the country's foreign exchange reserves. Thus, the Kenyan government contends that overseas training should only complement local training and serve as a means of transferring technology and knowledge from industrialized countries. The government plans to double enrollments in existing universities during the Plan period (Kenya, 1989, p219).

Fifth, the expansion of teacher training is another priority. In 1987, 30% of primary and 40% of secondary school teachers were untrained while universities experienced serious shortages of trained teaching staff. For example, in July 1987, the University of Nairobi had 154 vacancies out of an

²⁵Of this, nearly 60% are in North America and about 24% in India. Almost 90% are sponsored privately while some 10% receive government scholarships (Kenya, 1989, p219).
establishment of 1,162 while Moi University had 25 vacancies out of an establishment of 48. In the short run, these universities would need assistance from both local and foreign sources. The Kenyan government plans to launch an accelerated training program during the Plan period (Kenya, 1989, p220).

Sixth, the government plans to promote employment of trained Kenyans in the public and private sectors by tightening control on work permits and actively discouraging employment of foreign personnel except in areas where local skills and expertise are non-existent or inadequate (Kenya, 1989, p224).

4.5 SYNTHESIS

Kenya inherited a thriving economy and non-African expertise at its independence in 1963. Loss of skilled manpower was minimized through Jomo Kenyatta's guarantee that private property rights would be protected. The Kenyan government adopted a principle of self-help as a rural development strategy which helped increase education opportunities in the rural areas through the mobilization of community contribution to the cost of education. Programs for rapid expansion of education at all levels and manpower training were launched immediately after independence. The results were mixed. For example, Kenyanization was successful in the public service but it had limited success in the private sector. Overinvestment in secondary education resulted in an increased financial burden for the government,
overstretching of resources, and deterioration of education quality, especially in unaided Harambee schools. The Sixth Development Plan (1989-93) focuses on new priorities and corrective measures such as education relevance, cost sharing, reduction of secondary education, expansion of university education and employment of trained Kenyans in high level public and private sector positions.
CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

5.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper analyzes African capacity building experiences over the last four decades. It focuses on the treatment of African capacity building by colonial powers, African governments, donors, and international agencies during the transition to independence in the 1950s and the postindependence period since 1960. Nigeria and Kenya are used as case studies to highlight some of the key issues and draw some lessons for South Africa.

Capacity building can be defined as consisting of three major elements: (a) Human resource development, with emphasis on the provision of basic health, nutrition, education, and technical skills; (b) The restructuring of public and private organizations and institutions to improve their management and performance; and (c) Supportive political leadership which promotes human capital development as a major source of economic growth. Other sources of growth are institutional, technological, and physical capital development. These four sources are often referred to as the "prime movers" of economic development.

This paper focuses on education and technical skills and their role in sustainable economic development. It starts from the thesis that capacity building has received inadequate
attention in many African nations over the last four decades and that the efforts of African governments to expand education and skills have been frustrated by various problems. These problems include, inter alia, insufficient growth in absorptive capacity of their economies, deteriorating quality and relevance of education, and difficulties in financing education expansion under rapid rates of population growth.

African independence in the 1960s aroused high expectations among the previously disenfranchised public. There was an uncompromising political and economic demands to eliminate mass illiteracy, expand secondary and university education, Africanize civil services and take over the management of trade and industry. There was an equally compelling pressure to provide free primary education. In the first UNESCO-led conference of African governments on education development held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1961, it was agreed that education should be expanded at all levels. The main goal was to achieve universal free education for all Africans by 1981, i.e within twenty years of independence. African governments were also concerned with building their long-term internal capacity to reduce their reliance on technical assistance expertise. When the Economic Commission for Africa met in 1967, it emphasized the need to increase economic growth in order to expand jobs and address the school leaver problem.

Primary education was given priority in the 1960s, followed by secondary and university expansion in the 1970s. For example,
from 1960 to 1983, total education enrollments in Africa increased from 12.7 to 62.9 million. But during the 1980s, African governments, under severe financial stress, attempted to grapple with the following problems: overinvestment in education relative to other sectors; increasing financial burden of education; reduction in the quality and relevance of education; insufficient absorptive capacity of the economies; growing unemployment of school-leavers; increasing skepticism about the quality and cost of technical assistance; and the brain drain. Many countries are now undertaking corrective measures such as raising the contribution of students to the cost of education, encouraging universities to raise part of their income from private sources, improvement of education quality and relevance, and moderation of education expansion.

The two case studies of Nigeria and Kenya illustrate some of the difficulties in financing educational expansion and maintaining educational quality under conditions of rapid population growth and resource limitations. The need for capacity building in Nigeria was first highlighted by the World Bank mission in 1953 and followed up by the Ashby Commission report at independence in 1960. Nigeria was one of the few newly independent African nations to have a strategy for education development before it had a plan for national economic development.

Nigeria was successful in obtaining a large amount of external aid and technical assistance for the development of its
secondary and university education. However, by the 1970s, many observers charged that Nigeria had overinvested in university and university-oriented secondary education relative to other sectors of the economy. In addition, underinvestment in technical training resulted in inadequate supply of qualified teachers at all levels. The latter has contributed to imbalanced university faculty/college development which has been biased against science and technology. Nevertheless, Nigeria's impressive progress with education development from 1960 to 1980 was unparalleled in Africa.

Nigeria now has the largest and most diversified system of university education in Sub-Saharan Africa, consisting of 21 Federal, one military, and eight state universities. The first expansion of universities in the 1960s and early 1970s was financed from the export earnings of primary agricultural products. Starting in the early 1970s educational expansion was financed by the rapid growth of oil revenues. With the sharp decline in oil revenues in the early 1980s, many university projects were abandoned at various stages of completion.

Kenya inherited a thriving economy and expertise from the Asian and European population at its independence in 1963. Skilled manpower was encouraged to remain in Kenya after independence through Jomo Kenyatta's assurance that private property rights would be protected. The Kenyan government adopted a principle of self-help as a development strategy which formed the basis for increasing education opportunities in the rural
areas and mobilizing community support to finance the cost of education.

Programs for rapid expansion of education at all levels and manpower training were launched immediately after independence amidst political pressure for free primary education. Primary schools more than doubled between 1963 and 1987, while secondary schools increased seven-fold and universities increased from one to four during the same period. Enrollments increased more than five-fold for primary schools, over seven-fold for secondary schools, and more than thirty-fold for universities. For example, enrollments for secondary education rose from 30,000 in 1963 to just over 100,000 in 1968 in 601 schools. University enrollment increased from 571 in 1963 to over 17,000 in 1987. The expansion in secondary education was partly due to the deliberate Government policy and partly the massive growth of Harambee secondary schools which outnumbered Government-supported schools. In addition to formal schooling, Kenya also supported a variety of adult and youth training opportunities outside the school system, including community development training centers, farmer training centers, adult literacy groups, youth clubs, and village politechnics.

The results of some of these education and manpower training programs were mixed. For example, Kenyanization was successful in the public service but it achieved limited success in the private sector. The expansion of education, especially secondary education increased the financial burden on the government and
taxed available resources which led to the deterioration of education quality, especially in Harambee schools. Kenya's Sixth Plan (1989-93) focuses on improving education relevance, cost sharing, reduction of secondary education, expansion of university education, expansion of employment opportunities for trained Kenyans in high level public and private sector positions, and limited use of technical assistance personnel.

Returning to the thesis of this paper about inadequate attention to capacity building, the literature surveyed for this paper has revealed that many African nations have surprisingly overinvested in some type of education relative to the capacity of their economies to absorb newcomers to the labor force.

5.2 LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

The following six lessons for South Africa may be drawn from Africa's capacity building experience:

1. The Hard Trade-Offs.

Africa's independence aroused high expectations for accelerated access to educational opportunities by the previously disenfranchised public. Most African governments responded by expanding education at all levels. For example, between 1960 and 1983, total enrollments in all educational institutions increased from 12.7 to 62.9 million. As such, primary school enrollments increased from 36% in 1960 to 76% in
1983 while that of secondary schools rose from 3% to 20% during the same period. At the same time, the need to build sustainable long-term internal capacity to reduce reliance on expatriates was crushing. University enrollments rose from about 21,000 in 1960 to about 437,000 in 1983 with an additional 100,000 students in overseas universities. Implicitly, African governments were faced with what appeared to be a trade-off between short-term and long-term investment in human capital development. The question is whether or not primary and university education should be treated as if they were mutually exclusive. After all, the road to university education is via the primary school. The policy lesson for South Africa is clear: There is likely to be a crushing demand to expand education. Careful consideration should be given to the trade-offs and sequencing of priorities and the need to generate a high rate of economic growth to provide employment opportunities for a more educated population.

2. Financing Educational Expansion

The massive expansion of education in many countries was accompanied by overinvestment in education relative to other sectors, and a need for higher and higher levels of government expenditure on education. For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s, Africa public expenditures on education ranged between 4 to 5.5% of its combined national incomes. But in 1973, the Côte d'Ivoire spent 33% of its budget on education which was the highest in the world. Also, the social rates of return from
public investment in primary, secondary, and university education in Africa are 29%, 17%, and 12% respectively, which suggests, inter alia, overinvestment in university education relative to primary and secondary education.

Many structural adjustment programs of the 1980s included various measures to reduce the cost of government expenditure on education. These measures include education cost sharing with emphasis on increased private contribution and encouraging communities to build and operate schools such as Harambee schools in Kenya where the principle of self-help has been adopted throughout the country. The lessons for South Africa are twofold: First, government-sponsored education expansion invariably leads to increased financial burden on the government. Second, reduction of government expenditure on education through increased private contribution may be effective only if accompanied by drastically improved access to financial markets for student loans. A similar approach was used in the financing of low-cost housing in South Africa.

3. Cost of Education

African education is surprisingly more expensive than in many industrialized countries, both in terms of public sector contribution and average cost per pupil/student, especially at the higher levels. The World Bank's 1980 figures on the cost of a student-year as a percentage of per capita GNP confirmed this point. For example, the cost per student-year as a percentage of
per capita GNP for primary, secondary, and university education in West Africa was 24%, 142%, and 1 045% respectively, while the corresponding figures for Europe, Middle East, and North Africa were 15%, 47%, and 306%. The corresponding figures for Asia and Latin America were also lower than those in Africa. Based on these comparative data, it would appear that African education is among the most expensive in the world. The cost of education in Nigeria supports this observation. For example, in terms of cost-per-student, Nigeria's universities were among the most expensive in the world, with student-faculty ratios averaging six-to-one. This compares with nine to one at some elite private universities in the United States such as Princeton University, and fifteen to one in many U.S. research universities such as Michigan State University. The lesson for South Africa should be clear: On the one hand, a low student-teacher ratio may lead to an acceptable cost per student. On the other hand, a high student-teacher ratio may lead to a low cost per student but it also limits student-teacher interaction which affects the quality of education. It may be necessary, as a first step to reduce the present imbalances in student-teacher ratios across all population groups in South Africa.

4. Absorptive Capacity of the Economy

African governments made impressive progress in the expansion of primary education in the 1960s and secondary and university education in the 1970s. But many economies did not
grow fast enough to absorb the growth in education output. As a result, the school leaver problem became a critical social and political issue which could not be resolved in urban areas. For example, a decade after independence, Zimbabwe found in 1990 that it had to look to rural areas to absorb 75% of the newcomers to the labor force. In particular, the annual growth of African agricultural sectors (i.e. 2%), the "backbone" of many African economies, has lagged behind population growth rate of 3%, especially from 1970 to 1985. Also, average annual growth of GNP per capita declined from 1.6% during the 1965-73 period to -1.6% in 1990. Massive unemployment of school leavers and university graduates arose. Graduate underemployment and/or unemployment has contributed heavily to the African brain drain within the continent but mainly overseas. The policy lesson for South Africa can be summarized as follows: Education expansion is a highly visible product that can easily outstrip the capacity of the economy to absorb the school leavers. Careful consideration should be given to both sides of the education equation, namely, expansion and absorptive capacity.

5. Quality and relevance of education

The preoccupation with the expansion of secondary and university education can overlook the need for technical training and career development of secondary school leavers. Inadequate provision for post secondary technical education has also contributed to poor preparation of science teaching in secondary
schools. The latter has led to imbalanced university faculty/college development which has been biased against science and technology. The university education output mix was imbalanced and graduates had "irrelevant" training relative to the needs of their economies. This has contributed to the perpetuation of the very problem which university education sought to resolve, namely, to reduce reliance on expatriate technical skills by building African capacity. The policy lesson for South Africa is as follows: Careful consideration should be given to the promotion of a balanced development of university faculties/colleges, including science and technology to meet the changing needs of the economy.

6. Borrowing Scientific Knowledge from the Global Community.

Technical assistance from the international community was popular and generously showered upon Africa starting in the 1960s. It was used extensively to make up for the shortfall in high skill requirements in Africa. However, technical assistance has come under increased scrutiny in the 1980s because of its uneven quality, rapid turn over, high cost, and contribution to African graduate unemployment. Also, technical assistance is flawed because expatriates often repatriate knowledge when they leave Africa. The policy lesson for South Africa is clear: A country is better served by building its own intellectual, scientific, and managerial capacity while making provision for selective acquisition of these skills from the international
community as and when it is necessary. However, technical assistance is a narrow form of acquiring skills from the international community. South Africa may benefit from a much broader approach involving the acquisition of international skills, knowledge, and technology through *inter alia*, technical assistance, non-governmental organizations, and consultancy. Creation of sufficient internal capacity will guard against heavy reliance on external sources while keeping the doors open. In this regard, South Africa can learn from Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, India, and others.
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