ETHNICITY AND DEVELOPMENT

by

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INTRODUCTION

I am a 6,000 year old Pushtun, a thousand-year-old Muslim, and a 27-year-old Pakistani.

Khan Abdul Wali Khan

The above quote was a response by Khan Abdul Wali Khan, leader of Pakistan's strongest opposition party, to a question which was meant to test his loyalty and patriotism to Pakistan. He added:

Why do we lose sight of the historical facts? After all, we were the people of Baluchistan, Sindh, North West Frontier Province, and Punjab the four surviving provinces of Pakistan before the emergence of Pakistan on the map (quoted in Dupree, 1976, p. 5).

Ethnic regionalism may be the most powerful force in Asia today (Connor, 1972). Yet ethnic boundaries are not plotted on maps and neither are they taken into consideration in most economic analysis. The problem is a serious one and wide:

The principle of self-determination of nations, which is today broadly accepted as a self-evident truth, makes ethnicity the ultimate standard of political legitimacy, thereby challenging the validity of the multiethnic state, as well as borders that bifurcate ethnic groups (Connor, 1972, p. 45).

What makes ethnicity such a strong force? If it is such a strong force, it must effect national goals such as
integration and "development". How are these goals affected by ethnicity? This was one line of questioning out of which this paper has emerged. There was another aimed at a different direction but ending at the same place. What is development? How do countries develop? What factors help and what factors hinder development?

This paper attempts to answer all the above questions and, hence, the topic of this paper is the relationship between ethnicity and development.

There are six sections to this paper. Section I attempts answers to the following questions: What is ethnicity and why is it important? Section II is a brief look at modernization theory and how it relates to "national integration" and "ethnicity". These ideas are criticized and rejected. Section III is a look at the concepts of a "cultural division of labor" and "internal colonialism". These concepts we applied to the case of Pakistan in Section IV. External forces affecting ethnicity with reference to Pakistan are examined in Section V. Section VI explores the debate of whether a country should pursue policies which aim to integrate its economy with the world economy or whether inward-looking policies aimed at self-reliance should be followed. The conclusion attempts to redefine development with reference to ethnicity.
1. **Ethnicity**

What is meant when term "ethnicity" is used? When we use "ethnicity", we refer to the phenomenon of ethnic identification. Sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists have been studying ethnic identity long before its current resurgence and popularity. It is from these disciplines that theoretical frameworks that have been used to conceptualize and operationalize the nature of being ethnic have emerged.

The various definitions of ethnicity reflect not only the disciplines from which they originate but also the schools within these disciplines.

Structural-functionalists consider ethnic identification to be a primordial sentiment grounded in the structures of the Gemeinschaft. What is meant by primordial?

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens" of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of language, and following particular social practices. (C. Geertz, 1963, p. 109).

Ethnicity here is seen as grounded in objective reality; it is a "given" characteristic of an individual much like culture, language and religion may be given at birth. Hence also ethnic groups are seen to exist out there as a real phenomenon.
As a reaction to objective and static types of definitions, subjective and dynamic definitions have been postulated. Anthropologist Frederick Barth points out that though ethnic categories usually have correlation to cultural differences, it is wrong to assume a simple one-to-one relationship between cultural similarities and differences:

The features that are taken into account are not the sum of the 'objective' differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant. (Barth, 1969, p. 14).

This view defines the ethnic boundary of the group and not the cultural elements it encloses as critical. Barth's definition is especially useful in examining ethnic groups in the process of change. This is because Barth asserts that:

The cultural features that signal the boundary may change, and the cultural characteristics of the members may likewise be transformed, indeed even the organizational form of the group may change. Yet the fact of continuing dichotomization between members and outsiders allows us to specify the nature of the continuity and investigate the changing cultural form and content. (Barth, 1969, p. 14).

Generally, the subjective approach defines ethnicity as a process by which individuals either identify themselves as different from other groups or are identified as different by others, or both. The subjective definition is taken to its extreme by Shibutani and Kwan, who say that "an ethnic group consists of people who conceive of themselves as being of a kind. They are united by emotional bonds and concerned with the preservation of their type." (Shibutani and Kwan, 1965, p. 40). This definition, of course, goes too far in that women, the aged, homosexuals, etc. can be ethnic groups.

Yet the subjective approach has an advantage over the objective approach. Because the subjective approach deals with the psychological aspects of identity, it makes it "much easier for the definition to embrace the second or the third
ethnic generation than would a definition emphasizing the observed sharing of culture or other attributes." (Isajiw, 1974). This is important to keep in mind if we are to come up with a definition which is cross-cultural enough to encompass the ethnic phenomenon in North America. There are societies in North America in which persons of the second or third immigrant generation who, having been socialized in the larger society instead of an ethnic sub-society, nevertheless have retained or even developed to a higher degree a subjective identity within their ethnic group. This largely symbolic relation to the culture of their ancestors is the resurgence of ethnicity that was mentioned at the outset of this section. The key point in the discussion of this symbolic ethnic identification is that, "The subjective ethnic identification should not be seen as something arbitrary but as a phenomenon based on real ancestral link between a person and a group which has a shared culture." (Isajiw, 1974, p. 121).

It is now possible to link the objective and subjective approach. This link is important to establish because though an ethnic group may be more than simply a group of people who share a common culture, religion, etc., an ethnic group also does not simply exist when some group thinks of its members as a kind. It seems reasonable that ethnicity, like class, is the interplay of objective and subjective elements. That is, it is recognized that subjective definition of a situation affects objective reality, sometimes radically, yet these subjective definitions must in some way be grounded in a pre-existing ethnic reality; "Ethnicity then, is both primordial and highly changeable." (Van Den Berghe, 1976, p. 243).

We turn again to Isajiw for a specific definition of ethnicity:

Ethnicity refers to an involuntary group of people who share the same culture or to descendants of such people who identify themselves and/or are identified by others as belonging to the same involuntary group. * (Isajiw, 1974, p. 122).

* The word "involuntary" simply makes reference to the objective aspect of the definition.
The usefulness of this definition will become apparent later on. Let us now turn to a brief discussion of the importance of ethnicity: Why is ethnicity so important?

Human beings are gregarious animals, they tend to affiliate for many reasons. These reasons could be instinctual, learned, fear or anxiety provoked, need generated or for social comparison. (Freedman, et al., 1974, p. 25). Whatever the reasons for this affiliation, we need to know with whom people affiliate. It seems reasonably safe to say that people affiliate with those of common origin, or what DeVos calls a "common cause."

A sense of common origin, common beliefs and values, a common sense of survival - in brief, a "common cause" - has been of great importance in uniting men into self-defining in-groups. Growing up together in a social unit, sharing a common verbal and gestural language allows men to develop mutually understood accommodations, which radically diminish situations of possible confrontation and conflict. (DeVos, 1975, p. 5).

This process of self-definition and group separation can be based on ethnic grounds. An understanding of this process must in part be based on a psycho-cultural approach. Hence for the time being the individual is our unit of analysis.

A person's search for ethnic identity may be seen as an attempt to define himself/herself in social terms, and this process can be seen as an attempted answer to a human being's need to belong and survive:

Ethnicity in its deepest psychological level is a sense of survival. If one's group survives, one is assured of survival, even if not in a personal sense. (DeVos, 1975, p. 17).

R.A. Schermerhorn writes of this sense of survival in terms of being submerged:

In the face of those real forces that do appear to flatten us out into leveled-out masses, the old individualism can no longer save us. We do need group identity to prevent our being submerged. This pluralism, whose most creative form is ethnicity, is the first step to sanity. (Schermerhorn, 1974, p. 11).
The idea of submergence is the same type of idea that DeVos speaks of in using belonging and survival. This then is a brief look at the psycho-cultural reasons for individual ethnic identification.

But it would be a mistake to look at the psycho-cultural components of ethnicity alone. Understanding ethnicity also means understanding the social structures of entire societies. We must ask: What are the social conditions under which individuals band together as a group? What is it that the people in these groups want beyond a feeling of belonging for its members?

Their aim is practical: it is a demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, more effective political order, greater social justice. . . (Geertz, 1963, p. 108).

Implicit in Geertz' phrasing is a sense of comparison. Ethnic groups acquire meaning and find goals only in their relationship to other ethnic groups. When we place ethnicity in the broad context of the social structure of larger society, we in essence are mapping out the asymmetriccs that develop from power and production. Indeed, ethnic consciousness according to Immanuel Wallerstein is "an assertion in the political arena to defend cultural and economic interest." (Wallerstein, 1979, p. 184). It is the politico-economic inequalities, real or imagined, which are in contention and the source of most conflicts between ethnic groups. In this way, we can see that the needs, demands and boundaries of ethnic groups change in reference to changes in the broader social structure and its interaction with the ethnic group. Hence at different times in its history, an ethnic group may stress different aspects of its heritage (that is, it may shift its boundaries); it may seek different goals according to goals already achieved or the nature of the barriers which limit its movement. The power of ethnic consciousness is latent. But the potential is only realized when the group either feels threatened with loss of privilege or feels that the time is ripe for overcoming a long standing denial of privilege. The situation can be very complex, "... ethnic cleavages interact complexly with other lines of cleavage, notable social class, but also with 'race,' caste and other criteria of
group differentiation."
(Brass and VanDen Berge, 1976, p. 200).*

The concept of ethnic group as we have been discussing above has the type of political and revolutionary characteristic that Marx attributed to class. Marx predicted that the dynamics of capitalism would dissolve the bonds of status groups. (Ethnicity is a status group in this context in that both ethnicity and status are considered to stem from "primordial" sentiment). This dissolving of the bonds in status groups would pave the way for class relationships. This is in essence a functionalist view of ethnic change in which Marx saw the working class as becoming a homogeneous group. This has not happened; as mentioned before, the relationship between class and ethnicity is much more complex than what was postulated by the functionalist theories (of which Marx\(^1\) is one, we will turn to the other-modernization theory—later). What is the relationship between class and ethnicity? It is to this question that we now turn.

Max Weber was perhaps the last person to have made an important contribution towards the theory of social stratification in industrial societies. He proposed that status was a basis for group formation and stratification which was analytically independent of the relations of production. That is, whereas the class principle bonds people into groups due to common position within the existing relations of production, a status group is bonded together on some type of cultural commonality. Class and status provide separate bases for group formation in complex society. The question is: What determines the strength of these principles of group formation in industrial societies? (We limit ourselves to industrial societies for the time being).

Hechter tried to clarify this question by looking at the labor market:

* In that ethnic groups have a political function, which changes in its interaction with the larger social and politico-economic structure and hence changes the nature of the ethnic group, it should be apparent why a dynamic definition of ethnicity was needed.
Analysis of the labor market in industrial societies reveals the existence of two distinct sectors: a primary sector composed of relatively high-paying jobs with good working conditions and employment stability and a secondary sector composed of low paying jobs with poorer working conditions and chronic instability of employment. (Hechter, 1978, p. 245).

The argument is that certain groups such as blacks and Hispanics in the United States are predominantly found in secondary employment sectors. Indeed, they may receive lower wages than a white worker for doing the same job; this "provides a ready explanation for political divisions between black and white workers: the groups taken as a whole have different economic interests." (Hechter, 1978, p. 295). We note that blacks and Hispanics, though disproportionately represented in the secondary labor market, nevertheless are not willing to give up their separate identities. Why?

To answer this question, Hechter goes into an involved discussion on the determinants of group formation in industrial society with respect to ethnic groups. His first major point is that the solidarity of an ethnic group is increased to the extent that both intergroup stratification and intra group interaction are maximized. That is, in terms of stratification, the lower the position of the group in the stratification system, the greater the group solidarity. This is because when one's life chances are seen to be dependent upon membership in a particular group, the psychic significance of membership will be increased. Likewise, when one's life chances are seen to be independent of membership, "the psychic significance of membership in that group will tend to recede or disappear all together." In terms of interaction, Hechter states that studies with small groups have shown that among equally privileged (or equally underprivileged) group interaction promotes identification. But so far we have not mentioned the element of class.

In industrial societies, group formation is complicated in that individuals must choose between various identities which may be more or less congruent. Hence in our discussion, what is important is that each member of an ethnic group is also a
member of a particular class.

Classes are comprehensive groups made up of individuals having a common relationship to the means of production. They are quite limited in number and are hierarchically ordered. By definition classes have antagonistic material interests and presumably, a sharp social boundary separates them. (Hechter, 1978, p. 307).

As any other group, a class may be more or less self-conscious. The social structural conditions leading to the development of class consciousness should be similar to those promoting any other type of group consciousness. This is why The Communist Manifesto argues that the greater the material and social distance between proletariat and bourgeoisie, the greater the probability that the proletariat as a whole will be class conscious (This is a parallel to the level of stratification argument we used before in discussing ethnic consciousness). We can add also that the greater the intensity of interaction within the proletariat, the greater the solidarity.

We have discussed consciousness in ethnic groups and class, and we ask now: Which of these potential bases of association is stronger?

One obvious way to look at this would be to say that if interaction occurs within classes and between ethnic groups, then class consciousness will predominate. Similarly, if interaction occurs within ethnic groups and between classes, ethnic consciousness will predominate. At the individual level, we can look at perceived life chances: if an individual perceives that his class origin is more important for the determination of his life chances than his ethnicity, then he/she is more likely to be class than ethnically conscious. In the same way, if the individual perceives his ethnic origin to be more important for the determination of his life chances than his class origin, then ethnic identity will seem more important.
We can make the casual observation that status group solidarity and hence ethnic solidarity appears to be stronger in peripheral* societies. Why is this? Hechter notes:

The persistence of objective cultural distinctiveness in the periphery must itself be the function of the maintenance of an unequal distribution of resources between core and peripheral groups. (Hechter, 1975, p. 37).

People in peripheral groups are not allowed to become acculturated to the core, and this is initially accomplished through economic means. This persistence of ethnic groups for Barth implies two things. First, that there are certain prescriptions governing situations of contact between ethnic groups and allowing for articulation in some sectors or domains of activity, and secondly, that there are a set of proscriptions on social situations preventing inter-ethnic interaction in other sectors and hence insulating parts of the culture from confrontation and modification. (Barth, 1969, p. 16). These boundaries, that is, the prescriptions and the proscriptions, are maintained by the differential allocation of social roles:

Common to all these systems is the principle that ethnic identity implies a series of constraints on the kinds of roles an individual is allowed to play, and the partners he may choose for different kinds of transaction... The persistence of stratified polyethnic systems thus entails the presence of factors that generate and maintain a categorically different distribution of assets: state controls, as in some modern plural and racist systems; marked differences in evaluation that canalize the efforts of actors in different roles.

* We use the terms "core" and "periphery" for the first time in this paper. The core-periphery parallel may refer to nations in the global picture; for example, the United States is a core nation while Pakistan is peripheral. Further, the parallel may also be used within a nation to describe relations within societies. For example, in the USA, white society is the core, black society is peripheral. Similarly, in Pakistan Punjabi society is core and Pushtuns are peripheral. This parallel need not stop at this level, it can and will be used at finer levels later in this paper.
directions, as in systems with polluting occupations; or differences in culture that generate marked differences in political organization, economic organization or individual skills.
(Barth, 1969, p. 17, 28).

This is in essence a system of stratification, and one which Hechter labels a cultural division of labor.

Summary

Let us review what has been attempted in this section. We started by attempting to come to grips with the concept ethnicity. We looked at objective and subjective definitions of ethnicity and resolved that neither type alone was useful enough. Instead, we linked the objective and subjective approaches and noted above all that self-perception of ethnicity changes relative to exogenous changes and hence arrived at a dynamic definition of ethnicity.

Next, we asked why ethnicity was important. We looked at psychological individual needs for affiliation, belonging and survival. Yet we needed to go beyond the psycho-cultural definitions and we asked what are the social conditions under which individuals band together. In the broader context, we noted that ethnic consciousness is a political consciousness; one which attempts to assert itself politically in order to defend and advance cultural and economic goals.

At this point, we noted, in passing, Marx's view on the eventual predominance of class consciousness over status consciousness. Marx's predictions, it appears, do not stand up to the present day reality. Why was Marx's analysis of the evolutionary and functional dynamics which involve class and status erroneous? Though we did not attempt to answer this question in a rigorous manner, we did look at Michael Hechter's analysis of the relationship between class and status. Hechter asserted that boundaries are established for the interaction of core and peripheral groups. These boundaries are maintained by differential allocation of social roles, and are initially
accomplished by economic means. The dynamics of this process of stratification will be discussed later in the paper. Nevertheless, this system of stratification was labelled as a cultural division of labor. This concept is important to keep in mind in that it becomes the pivotal link of the different parts of this paper.

In essence, the concept of cultural division of labor comes out of an analysis which is a reaction not only to the Marxist-functionalist view on ethnic change, but even more so as a reaction to the structural-functionalist view of ethnic change, in particular, modernization theory. The next section of this paper is a critical look at modernization theory.
Part II

Modernization Theory

Modernization theory is not a unified body of thought. The literature on modernization is vast and it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into any detail. Rather, we will look at some of the main concepts and writers in order to get a general feeling for what this school of thought has said.*

We look at modernization studies with respect to two different levels of analysis. One approach looks at values as its unit of analysis and may be referred to as the normative approach. The other approach uses institutions and organizational networks of society as units of analysis and may be termed as the structural approach. Let us look first at the structural approach.

The structural school sees societal modernization as in some way linked with evolutionary social change. This social change evolves toward increasing differentiation of structure and increasing specialization of function (Smelser, 1959). It is held that all societies undergo a similar series of changes during industrialization. Naturally, under such a unilinear process, the end result of industrialization is bound to be a very homogeneous product:

We are confronted—whether for good or for bad—with a universal social solvent. The patterns of the relatively modernized societies once developed, have shown a universal tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have come in contact with them... The patterns always penetrate; once the penetration has begun, the previous indigenous patterns always change; they always change in the direction of some of the patterns of the relatively modernized societies (Levy, 1967, p. 190; quoted in Mahdi, 1978, p. 35).

One of the patterns that evolve toward universalization is the variation in societal types, that is, all societies and

cultures will resemble one another:

Thus industrialization is viewed as a process that creates cultural homogeneity in that certain patterns of belief and behaviour are necessarily common to all industrial societies. Moreover, commonality is not limited to the single act or norm but applies as well to the configurations into which they are formed, for example, the interrelations among machine technology, division of labor, and authoritative coordination (Moore et al., 1960, p. 364; quoted in Madhi, 1978, p. 38).

What is this process that creates cultural homogeneity and universalization? For one answer to this question, we can turn to the work of Neil J. Smelser. Smelser sees modernization in terms of the technical, economic and ecological changes that affect the social and cultural makeup. Through this process, changes occur in politics, education, religion, family and stratification. Economic development (Smelser correlates economic development and modernization) proceeds through an increase in scientific technology, a progressive commercialization of agriculture, the changeover to mechanical factory production, and ecological arrangements. It must be noted that these four concepts are pulled out of the air; that is, they are not empirical or historical generalizations, but are "ideal types" in the Parsonian tradition.

These four processes are believed to generate similar types of structural changes. Once again, Smelser, using ideal type constructs, believes that these structural changes are: (1) structural differentiation, (2) integration and (3) social disturbances. Let us look more closely at the most important of these three; structural differentiation. He defines differentiation as a process where:

One social role or organization becomes archaic under changing historical circumstances, it differentiates by a definite and specific sequence of events into two or more roles or organizations which function more effectively in the new historical circumstances. The new social units are structurally distinct from each other, but taken together are functionally equivalent to the original unit (Smelser, 1959, p. 2).
In essence, Smelser is writing about a form of specialization which affects the full range of social life. In reference to stratification, differentiation has the effect of moving from ascribed evaluative standards to achieved standards. Individual mobility increases and we move from a situation of Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. This differentiation and increase of mobility create what Smelser calls "increasingly diversified interests" which must be integrated. Part of the differentiation is geared towards integrating these diversified interests. Development is then seen as an interplay between differentiation and integration. But differentiation and integration do not always keep pace with each other and when they don't, we get the third ideal type change: disturbances. At the individual level, disturbances can give rise to anxiety, hostility and fantasy. At the collective level, they give rise to social movements such as peaceful agitation, nationalism, revolution and underground subversion (Smelser, 1968, pp. 126-127). The source of disturbances may be due to uneven change during modernization, for example, as an imbalance between industrial and agricultural sectors. It may also be due to clash of new activities and norms with traditional activities and norms. When the central government attempts to promote modernization, a third source of disturbances is the resistance of the traditional power sources. This disturbance needs to be overcome by increased central control during modernization.

We turn now to the normative school of modernization theory and look at the social psychological definitions of modernization. This school assumes that social action and change are hardly anything more than the totality of the individuals who make up a society. Naturally, structural features of group dominations, historical blockages, resorc control, and control mechanisms and other such elements are not considered to be essential to the understanding of social change. Rather, the unit of analysis is the individual.

Modernization from this perspective is seen as a process of change in the minds of individuals, rather than such impersonal advances as changing institutions. What needs to be changed are traditional values and norms.
At the core of the problem is the incompatibility between modernization and traditional beliefs and values. Development is seen as a problem of communication, training, resocialization; a general problem of what has been termed cultural diffusion. The problem of cultural diffusion is one of transferring the correct attitudes and skills from the developed to the underdeveloped world.

In part, this school is a reaction against the theories we discussed as structuralist. The structuralist theories were socially deterministic, implying regulated mechanisms, planned development and controlled growth. To this the normative school replied by constructing theories which supported the virtues of the capitalist ethic, free enterprise and achievement motivation (Machi, 1979, pp. 59-60).

David C. McClelland is a proponent of this school. McClelland's main point deals with what he calls achievement motivation. Economic development in any time period is seen as a result of the "need for achievement;" a psychological characteristic of the people.

Need for achievement is regarded by McClelland and by those in the tradition he has established . . . as competition with a standard of excellence (McClelland et al., 1953, pp. 70-79, 110-111), where the individual is personally involved with or emotionally orientated to excelling (Machi, 1979, p. 69).

This emotional orientation essentially means having an attitude where there is a desire to do well and excel not for the external rewards, but rather for an intrinsic feeling of accomplishment. This is a theory of entrepreneurship. A spirit of entrepreneurship and hence achievement to motivation leads to modernization of a country. Traditional society, of course, ranks low on the scale of achievement, whereas developed societies rank high. A country must somehow create a spirit of achievement and entrepreneurship in the traditional mind in order for modernization to occur. These values are apparently to be passed on to individuals through a process of
A similar approach is that of Daniel Lerner. The key psychological characteristic which is crucial if development is to occur for Daniel Lerner is empathy. People must have the ability to see themselves in other's shoes. Once again, people of traditional societies are thought to not have this empathy; "in a modern society, more individuals exhibit higher empathy than in any previous society." (1966, p. 51). Lerner insists that a modern society must be a participatory society. Participation requires understanding and assessment of alternative positions, articulate opinions and then make choices. This process, according to Lerner, requires empathy. As such, empathy is the key variable in the functioning of a modern participatory society.

Lerner seems to agree with the view that holds that the passing of traditional society to modernization involves a process of homogenization and universalization (We noted this view when we examined Smelser's ideas). For Lerner, the social aspects of modernization involve "the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed countries," and modernization is a "secular trend, unilateral in direction from tradition to participant lifeways." Again, as with McClelland, this process is to be passed on by cultural diffusion (Lerner, 1966, p. 89).

We have very quickly looked at two schools of modernization theory. What generalizations can we make about the large body of thought?

There are two principle assumptions of this theory.

(1) Modernization is a total social process associated with (or subsuming) economic development in terms of the preconditions, concomitants, and consequences of the latter; ...

(2) This process constitutes a "universal pattern." (Mahdi, 1978, p. 95).
Of course, different writers put emphasis on different elements, usually with respect to their differences in defining "modernization" and "development." Yet there are similarities in the conceptualization of the problem. First, there is among the writers a general trend towards a societal analysis in terms of traditional-modern dichotomy. Secondly, an evolutionary movement is seen to take place from traditional to modern society. Thirdly, there is a search for, or the isolation of, an independent variable or variables that could be considered as crucial for the emergence of modern society." (Mahdi, 1978, p. 96).

The structuralist school can be seen as functionalist and evolutionary. This school was overly concerned with consensus and equilibrium in the society as a whole. For example, Smelser sees disequilibria as a special case in a self-equilibrating model - order is seen as normal and disorder and tension are seen as elements to be overcome. The sources of change are exogenous to the model and are seen in terms of creativity, spontaneity and technological change. There is no mention of social conflict, class divisions and the like as possible sources of change, rather, these types of changes are to be integrated so the society can regain its equilibrium. There is no mention of "actors," that is, there is no question as to who gains and loses from differentiation and who is behind or in front of the process of change. It is Mahdi's opinion that, "In so far as actors are kept out of analysis one can never explain how... incompatibilities are resolved changed or maintained." (Mahdi, 1978, p. 106).

This very problem is also salient in the normative school; the analysis does not concern itself with the actors who try to change or maintain values. This problem is an outcome partly of the belief that modern individuals are equal to a modern nation in a unilinear fashion.
The rate of social change everywhere is a function (probably a linear function) of the number of individuals accruing to the transitional stratum. The more persons who are "going modern" in a single country, the higher its overall performance on the indices of modernity (Lerner, 1966, p. 83).

Society is not simply the additive sum of individual members. One cannot overlook the political and economic systems which prevail and in a sense define the boundaries of people at the societal, national and international levels.

Neither school pays much attention to historical reality. They greatly underestimated or ignored such things as the impact of wars, colonial conquest and domination, economic dependency and penetration of Western forces, especially penetration. They have overlooked the elements of psychological and intellectual imperialism (Fanon, 1963). In short, these methods pay no attention to the "colonial situation" out of which these societies emerge; the after and ongoing effects of which are very much a force. These methods are very ahistorical and hence suffer from ethnocentric value generalizations and abstract ideal types.

Let us take a closer look at what was mentioned as the tradition-modern dichotomy. This has come to be identified with the underdevelopment-development dichotomy which is a parallel we will discuss later on.

To modernize, a society must move from a static traditional form to a dynamic modern form. We note that development is seen as "proceeding from something (tradition) through something (traditional society) to something (modernity)." (Mahdi, 1978, p. 147). It is easy to see from this ahistorical position why societies and their cultures are thought to move towards homogeneity and universalization.

Tradition and modernity need not be seen as exclusive, to think of them as such is "to impose an imperialism of categories and historical possibilities by artificially constructing
"an analytical gap" which denies the possibility of innovation, mutual adaptation, and synthesis." (Mahdi, 1978, p.149). Mahdi adds:

The new patterns of behaviour and attitudes may in some cases be fused; in others, they may comfortably coexist, one alongside the other, despite the apparent incongruity of it all. The old is not necessarily replaced by the new. The acceptance of a new product, a new religion, a new mode of decision-making does not necessarily lead to the disappearance of the old form. New forms may only increase the range of alternatives. Both magic and medicine can exist side by side, used alternatively by the same people. When an encounter takes place between two forces like tradition and modernity, it is very unlikely that either of them will be totally eliminated in the encounter. Such an encounter is more likely to result in a dialectical interaction, as a result of which both will undergo some change (Mahdi, 1978, p. 150).

It is possible to go further and argue that besides the possibility of coexistence, there is also the possibility of modernization strengthening tradition. But first, let's make the connection between the concepts "traditional" and "ethnicity."

A large part of the concept of traditional is rooted in ethnicity and being ethnic. Just as tradition is seen as getting in the way of modernity, ethnicity is seen as an obstacle and a handicap in the modern world:

To be ethnic is to be parochial, limited in one's horizons and contacts. Because affluence in modern societies requires men to maximize their mobility, ethnic communalism is a hindrance. Consequently, assimilation into a cosmopolitan society is urged not only for the sake of political stability, but also because it enhances the opportunities of individuals to advance in competitive societies (Enloe, 1973, p. 33).

We can see how the terms "ethnicity" and "traditional" are related in terms of how they are related to modernity.

To get back to the point, how may modernization strengthen the "traditional" and ethnicity?" (We now use the word "ethnic")
to replace "tradition." It is recognized that the words are not the same although closely related in terms of the static definition of "tradition" as used by modernization theorists).

Cynthia H. Enloe answers the above question for us by saying:

Ethnic conflicts . . . are not just a reflection of traditional elements that stubbornly refuse to die. They stem in part from the success of modernization. Modern developments have equipped ethnic communities as well as national elites with political resources and aspirations (Enloe, 1973, p. 13).

Two of the tools have been increased communications and intensified mobilization:

On the one hand expanded communication and intensified mobilization break down ancient parochialism; on the other hand they can raise ethnic self-consciousness among persons who hold similar values but previously were cut off from one another (Enloe, 1973, p. 16).

Enloe seems to agree with Mahdi about the dialectic nature of the interaction between tradition and modernity, in which both undergo change and adaptation. Enloe gives a few examples of how modernity may sustain ethnic communalism: labor unions may bolster ethnic identity; suburbs may relocate ethnic groups in new residential patterns; radio stations permit intensified intragroup communication; democratic elections may produce incentives for ethnic group solidarity; increased literacy stimulates new interest in communally orientated literature, magazines and newspapers; nationalist ideology provides a means for politicizing what was before only a cultural affiliation; and as modernity depersonalized and complicates social relations the desire for a sense of belonging and direction may be grasped more tenaciously (Enloe, 1973, p. 270).
Summary

It does not seem reasonable to assume that people can afford to divorce themselves from their past; a people's past is in part their self-conception of what they are. Those who deny their past do so by negating a part of themselves and run the risk of feelings of alienation, confusion and dismemberment from feelings of belonging and direction.

In that the process of cultural homogenization and universalization of values has not occurred and does not seem to be gaining ground as modernization theorists predicted, we may safely say that these theorists underestimated the importance of cultural heritage (Hechter, 1976, p. 222). This underestimation took place not only at the level of the individuals' social psychological needs, but also at the societal level.

Ethnic groups have politicized their identity and goals. The politico-economic nature of ethnicity indicates that modernization theorists were blind to the politico-economic variable faced by ethnic groups as the forces of modernization unleashed (Hechter, 1976, p. 222).

Ethnic groups were able also to turn the energy and direction of modernization to enhance their unity and politicize their goals. In that ethnic groups can and do adapt, and develop new methods to maintain and solidify their ethnicity, the possibility of a dialectic relationship between tradition and modernity and the creation of what Mahdi calls "traditions of modernity" were not considered by modernization theorists.

Further, these theorists did not specify the proper unit of analysis. They assumed that sovereign states were composed of homogenous social systems. They did not take into consideration the importance of larger stratification systems based on ethnic origin in poly-ethnic states. They failed to take into consideration the historical conditions during which
countries were created, the dynamics of the political, economic
and cultural relationships between different regions, ethnic
groups and the colonial powers.

As is suggested above, perhaps these theorists' greatest
pitfall was a lack of historical specificity in their analysis.
III. Internal Colonialism and the Cultural Division of Labor

The last section showed why modernization theory has not been able to match up with the dynamics of change in developing societies. In general, we can say that with respect to ethnicity, modernization theory predicted that:

- the transformed conditions of industrial society alter the basis on which individuals form political associations. In consequence of modernization the salience of cultural similarity as a social bond should give way to political alliances between individuals of similar market positions, and thus, more generally social class (Hechter, 1975, p. 16).

We mentioned several times that this does not square with reality. In this section, we will look at Michael Hechter's theory of ethnic change developed in his book *Internal Colonialism*, (1975)

First we reintroduce the concepts "center" and "periphery." The centre and periphery are now to be seen as two objectively distinct groups within a nation. The centre is the dominant cultural group and occupies an area which is the political and economic center of the country. The peripheral culture is subordinate and occupies an area outside of the center. It is assumed that cultural groups are more or less regionally concentrated. It is further assumed that the two collectives possess a group consciousness and a somewhat homogenous solidarity (Of course, it would seem that here we are making the same mistake towards regional ethnic groups that the modernization theorists made about homogeneity in a country. This is an important point and we will return to it in the concluding section).

Hechter avoids the problem of trying to define national development; instead, he suggests that we look at national
development as a black box composed of three problems. The first is one of cultural integration:

Cultural integration includes those processes which lend to the gradual effacement of objective cultural difference between groups in contact... This would encourage the growth of national identity, providing common access to national symbols and values to each collectively* (Hechter, 1975, p. 18).

Economic integration is the second problem of national development. Here, Hechter has in mind the evolution of substantially equal rates of social and economic development among collectives in a society. This can be measured by evaluating the degree to which such variables as per capita income, infant mortality, literacy and the extent of political power are differentiated in terms of cultural group.

Last is the problem of political integration:

Political integration may be said to occur to the extent that the social structural position of a collectivity determines its political behaviour. (Hechter, 1975, p. 19).

For example, if two groups share a common occupation but differ in objective cultural forms and have similar political preferences, the society can be seen as politically integrated. In short, this type of political integration implies "that objective cultural factors, such as language or religion, cease to have salience in the formation of a collectivity's political demands." (Hechter, 1975, p. 19). Hechter points out that how much a collectivity is integrated depends on its definition of the political situation. At a given moment, a collectivity may or may not extend legitimacy to the central government. The collective only grants legitimacy for what it defines as acceptable societal membership. It is of course possible that a collective change

* Hechter uses "collectivity" to mean what we have called "ethnic groups."
its assessment of its position in the society. There are essentially two reasons for a reassessment. First, the collective may become aware of changes in its situation in the society. Second, the collective "may redefine the situation to demand greater rewards from the government in return for continued support of the regime." (Hechter, 1975, p. 20). This reassessment may be due to rising expectations or a change in consciousness of the collective. (In that a collective redefines its situation, its goals and its self-consciousness, which may or may not be related to objective changes, we note again the importance of a dynamic and dialectic definition of ethnicity).

Hechter proceeds to examine critically the suppositions of the structural and cultural diffusionist schools of modernization theory (what he calls the cultural diffusionist school was earlier referred to as the normative school). The point is made that these theorists were writing about exogenous development as opposed to endogenous development. Hechter suggests that endogenous development is what occurred in Western Europe and Japan and is much different than exogenous development.

Exogenous development arose out of what has been termed the "colonial situation." The "colonial situation" typically involved "domination by a 'racially' and culturally different foreign conquering group, imposed in the name of a dogmatically asserted racial, ethnic or cultural superiority, on a materially inferior indigenous people." (Hechter, 1975, p. 30). The metropolitan domination resorts to force and to a set of complex racial and cultural stereotypes in order to maintain political stability and its domination.

The colonial situation produces a type of stratification which essentially superimposes objective cultural distinctions upon class lines, so that class distinctions more or less parallel to cultural differences. This is exactly the term "cultural division of labor" which we discussed in Section I.
(This makes good sense for the colonial power; it is simply
the application of the concept of "divide and rule."
According to our analysis of the dynamics of ethnic group
consciousness and class consciousness, the methods used by
the colonial powers would lead to greater ethnic group consciousness
than class consciousness. It then becomes a matter of manipula-
ting the differences, real and perceived, between the different
groups to keep them occupied with each other and off-balance.
Growth of class consciousness would be dangerous for the
rulers in that they would be singled out as the culturally
exclusive ruling class and hence determinants of life chances
for all groups concerned).

The colony's role is, of course, designed to fit into
the larger plans and system of the imperial country. Because
the colony's role is instrumental, its development tends to be
complementary to that of the metropolis. For example, at
a preliminary stage in the relationship, the colonial economy
role is to specialize in the production of a narrow range
of primary commodities or raw materials for export. In short,
the development of the colony, in that it is dependent on the
direction of the metropolis, is really much different than the
development that took place in the metropolis (Frank, 1969).

Yet this relationship or what Andre Gunder Frank calls
the "development of under-development" need not be limited to
relationships between an imperial power and a colony. Indeed,
this very relationship may exist between different cultures within
a country. When this situation exists within a country, it can
be referred to as "internal colonialism":

(Colonialism) does not, as is commonly believed,
pertain only to relationships between nations.
It also pertains to relationships within a nation
in so far as a nation is ethnically heterogenous
and certain ethnic groups and classes and others
become dominated (Gonzalez, 1970, pp. 70-71).
In terms of our center-periphery distinction, the internal colony is of course the peripheral culture collectively. Its realtionship with the center is one of dependent and exploitative relations. The center collectivity discriminates against the culturally distinct peoples of the periphery. This set of ideas has for its focus the politico-economic conflict between the center and peripheral collectives. Further, the so-called "backwardness" of peripheral collectives as seen as caused by the relations of dependency between center and periphery. Hence increased transactions with the center are seen as increasingly detrimental to the position of the periphery.

What are some of the aspects of internal colonialism? They bear many similarities to descriptions of the overseas colonial situation. Commerce and trade among the periphery tend to be monopolized by the core. Credit is similarly monopolized. When commercial prospects emerge, bankers, managers and entrepreneurs tend to be recruited from the core. The peripheral economy is forced into complementarity to the core and thus becomes dependent on external markets. Generally, this economy rests on a single primary export, either agricultural or mineral. The movement of peripheral labor is determined largely by forces exogenous to the periphery. Typically there is great migration and mobility of peripheral workers in response to price fluctuations and exported primary products. Economic dependence is reinforced through juridical, political and military measures. There is a relative lack of services, lower standard of living and higher level of frustration, measured by such indices as alcoholism, among members of the peripheral group. There is national discrimination on the basis of language, religion and other cultural forces. Thus the aggregate economic differences between core and periphery are casually linked to their cultural differences (Hechter, 1975, pp. 33-34). (Hechter uses "core" for what we have been calling "center, ")

The key process to analyze is not the seemingly automatic structural or economic process that should lead to national
development. National development has more to do with the control of the decisions concerning allocation of resources.

What is needed for national development is to strengthen the political power of the peripheral collective so that it can affect the distribution of resources to its favor. The political power has to be based on political organization. The foundation of such a political organization would be cultural identity or some type of perception of ethnic identity in the peripheral group. The problem for the periphery is not one of integration within the core, but rather a problem of malintegration. This process of unequal development is established on terms which the periphery increasingly regards as unjust and illegitimate.

It is now possible for us to schematize relations between center and periphery in terms of a cultural division of labor.

We note that there has been a tendency towards unbalanced growth in capitalist societies.* Cleavages of interest emerge between groups as whenever industrialization creates or perpetuates relatively advanced and less advanced groups. This leads or perpetuates to an unequal distribution of resources and power between groups.

The goal of the superordinate group, the center, is to stabilize and monopolize its advantage. It does this by carrying out policies which are meant to institutionalize and perpetuate the existing stratification. The center "seeks to regulate the allocation of social roles such that those roles commonly defines as having high status are generally reserved for its members." (Hechter, 1975, p. 39). Of course, members of the peripheral collectives are denied access to these roles. We are describing a system of stratification which we defined earlier as a "cultural division of labor."

* The results of which can be seen in the concern with models of "growth with distribution" and concerns with being able to help the poorest of the poor. See: Redistribution With Growth, Chenery et al., 1974)
This system may be enforced by an active intervention of the state or it may be maintained through institutional means. In the latter method, policies are meant to provide differential access to institutions which confer status in the larger society, such as the educational, military and civil service systems. This cultural division of labor leads to a finer development of ethnic identity for the two cultural groups:

Actors come to categorize themselves and others according to the range of roles each may be expected to play. They are aided in this categorization by the presence of visible signs - distinctive lifestyles, languages or religion practices - which are seen to characterize both groups (Hechter, 1975, p. 40).

In such a situation acculturation does not need to take place:

Regarded as status, ethnic identity is superordinate to most other statuses, and defines the permissible constellations of statuses and social personalities, which an individual with that identity may assume: In this respect ethnicity is similar to sex and rank, in that it constrains the incumbent in all his activities, not only in some defined social situations (Barth, 1969, p. 17).

Acculturation does not need to take place because before interaction takes place individuals can visually perceive the other's status and adjust his/her behaviour. (This is meant as an aggregate statement; it does not refer to any particular interaction by specific individuals).

Given this situation, Hechter asserts that the politics of peripheral groups are bound to be weak, and weaker still is the peripheral group which is also a numerical minority. As a numerical minority, it cannot independently force change through votes.

The members of the peripheral collective have basically three options in the face of such adversity. First, they can, if possible phenotypically, attempt to "pass" and undergo a negation of their past coupled with a subjective reidentification
of their ethnic identity. Secondly, they may attempt to act as "broker" between the two groups in order to maximize their individual power. These people may become ethnic leaders and desire their collective to move towards a gradual policy of change by demanding incremental change to narrow material differences. Thirdly, it may be perceived that what is needed is structural change in the system. They may react to the injustice by asserting the equal or superior value of their culture and demand autonomy or independence.

Hechter certainly sees ethnic groups as having a political orientation:

The existence of ethnic solidarity in a given group should therefore be regarded as a special instance of the general phenomenon of political mobilization (Hechter, 1975, p. 41).

Getting back to the problem of political integration in order to move towards national development, we can see that from this perspective, political integration in the periphery cannot be expected unless there is widespread satisfaction that the cultural division of labor is eliminated.

From the discussion above as well as the discussion on conditions affecting ethnic group and class consciousness in Section 1, Hechter makes three general observations:

(1) The greater the economic inequalities between collectivities, the greater the probability that the less advantaged collectivity will be status solidary, and hence, will resist political integration.

(2) The greater the frequency of intra-collectivity communication, the greater the status solidarity of the peripheral collectivity.

(3) The greater the Intergroup differences of culture, particularly in so far as identifiability is concerned, the greater the probability that the culturally distinct peripheral collectivity will be status solidary. Identifiable cultural differences include: language (accent), distinctive religious practices and lifestyle (Hechter, 1975, p. 43).

Of course, we add that as long as a situation of a cultural division of labor exists, the chances of political integration are minimized.
Summary

This section explored Michael Hechter's general theory of ethnic change. We referred to dominant and subordinate ethnic groups as center and periphery respectively. It was through this dichotomy that we attempted to explore three components of national development.

National development was seen as the combination of the problems of cultural, economic and political integration.

We examined the difference in development as it took place endogenously in metropole countries and exogenously in colonial areas. The "colonial situation" was briefly looked at and was seen as a position of dependence on the metropole by the colony.

There can be a "colonial situation" within a country and this was referred to as "internal colonialism." Some of the important aspects of these was an economic discrimination on the part of the center towards the periphery based on cultural differences. This stratification we discussed in Section I of this paper. We used it again in this section to relate it to the concept of "internal colonialism."

To correct this perceived injustice of the cultural division of labor and internal colonialism, peripheral collectives were said to organize politically on ethnic bases.

In this way Hechter hoped to show that the important aspect to focus on was the conflict in interest based on a discriminatory access to decisions regarding the distribution of resources. In this relationship, the center collective attempts to remain on top by institutionalizing its advantage. The peripheral collective must unite politically along cultural lines if it hopes to confront the situation. It is due to this situation that political integration within the country is weak and will continue to be weak as long as the cultural division of labor and internal colonialism are perceived as apparent.
IV. The Case of Pakistan

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic nation which has been dominated by one ethnic group: The Punjabis (Levak, 1976, p. 289). Each ethnic collective is more or less specific to a geographic region. When Pakistan first emerged as a nation in 1947, its make up was unique in that the two parts of the country, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, were separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. The binding force initially that held the Bengalis, Pushtuns, Sindhis, Baluchs and Punjabis together was the Islamic religion. Islam did not turn out to be enough of a binding force as East Pakistan seceded and became the independent nation Bangladesh.

The domination of the Punjabis over the Bengalis played a crucial role in this disintegration. Indeed, this very same domination plays an important role today in the drive for recognition and self-determination by the peripheral collectives.

Punjabi control is mainly achieved through a strong grip over the military, bureaucratic, and economic institutions and by the role played by forces external to the nation in keeping the Punjabi elite entrenched. This favored position has a historical basis.

The Muslims ruled India for centuries before the great Mughal dynasty was dislodged by the British colonialists in 1857. The Mughal rulers governed through autocratic regulation, rather than democratic integration. This process alienated the Hindus and Muslims from each other and as a result, these groups developed along communal lines with sensitive religious boundaries.

The Muslims, of course, identified with the Mughals and Delhi the political center of India. They saw themselves as first-class citizens and Hindus as second-class.
The British conquest of the Mughal empire and colonialization of India left the Muslims in a rather disoriented position. Their status of a ruler class had eroded and there was little hope of regaining that status. There was no longer a political and cultural center with which to identify. They could not identify with their former Hindu subjects, "people they despised as idolators, held in contempt as poor fighters, and loathed as darker-skinned" (Klass, 1972, p. 26). Nor could they identify with their Christian rulers. In fact, by the end of the 19th Century, the Hindus and British together in distrust of Muslims subjugated them to political and economic isolation (Zakaria, 1970). This isolation was partly due to the insecurity in which the Muslims found themselves. The British made radical changes in politics, economics, and social organization. These changes opened up chances for Hindu urban classes, "which previously were ensconed in their communal and ethnic social structures and interacted only peripherally they found themselves in competition over distribution of new opportunities" (Inayataallah, 1976, p. 90). Muslims were not able to compete for these opportunities as they were slow in adapting to new ways and found themselves at a disadvantage against Hindus who were quick to adapt to westernization.

This insecurity and the awareness of an unequal competition reinforced the separation of identity originated by the Mughal autocratic rule. The result of this situation was a re-awakening of Muslim consciousness which aimed to "realign and readjust the social status of Muslims to Colonialism" (Hussain, 1976, p. 920). Out of this consciousness the Muslim Upper and Middle class evolved three responses:

First, there was a new and vigorous intellectual fermentation focused on the superiority of Islamic cultural tradition as reflected in the writings,
In particular, of Shibli, Hali and Iqbal. Second, there developed a greater sense of identity with the Muslim World outside India, as demonstrated by the Khilafat movement in the early 1920's. Finally came the demand for a separate state or states for the Muslims of India (Inayatullah, 1976, p. 90).

The last demand became the prime purpose of the All India Muslim league which was founded in 1906. The eventual leaders of the Muslim league like M. A. Jinnah were secular in their outlook. Indeed, they were products of a colonial education and saw the possibility of a separate state for the Muslims as an answer to the problem of a minority, threatened by a majority, rather than a need for a homeland to safeguard Islam. There was also a more religious faction which was pro-Islamic and saw religious needs as more important than individual needs. It became the prime task of Jinnah to bring together these factions and politicize the Muslim community. This, then, is how the Muslims were reacting to the process of change. It is relevant now to ask how the British administrators were operating in what is now Pakistan.

The British found this part of their empire rather troublesome and were actively pursuing policies of "rule and divide in order to maintain order." This was done by creating diverse administrative forms:

  varying from governor and chief commissioner provinces to tribal territories and princely states, they divided and ruled this troublesome part of their Empire (Hussain, 1976, p. 921).

Furthermore, this area was predominantly Muslim and in light of what was seen as Muslim revivalism, the British encouraged the growth of ethnic identities. These policies had the effect of creating inter-cultural alienation and inter-ethnic animosities. Blocked by this process was any movement towards integration, unity, or cohesion." (Hussain, 1976, p. 921). How were these
animosities stirred?

Those ethnic groups that had a positive attitude toward the colonial center and were in any way useful for the colonial consolidation and pacification of the empire were rewarded. The reward was exposure to modernization - those that were deemed detrimental to the British goals were not rewarded and were left at peripheral levels of development.

The Pushtuns of the Northwest Frontier Province had always been a military thorn for the British. They had cost the British not only money and lives and were relentless in their fight against British attempts at administering the area. The Pushtuns were to remain outside the affects of British modernization and were to maintain their keen sense of identity (Barth, 1969, p. 119). The Baluch gave the British similar problems. Outside the urbanization of Karachi, the Sindhis, too, remained peripheral. Bengal had also been a trouble for the British. It was in Bengal that the British first encountered armed rebellion in the so-called Indian Mutiny of 1857. It was also in Bengal that terrorist movements against the British first developed in the early years of the Twentieth Century:

Historically, therefore, Bengal has acted as an advance post of developing class consciousness. ... It was because of this role that Bengalis were especially victimized by British imperialism. The British prevented the recruitment of Bengalis into the Indian army and civil service precisely because they were not to be trusted politically. (Tariq Ali, 1973, p. 451). (Also, Wilcox, 1964, p. 15 and Feroze, 1973, p. 451).

Bengalis, then, also remained peripheral to British rewards. On the whole the Bengalis, Sindhis, Baluchis and Pushtuns, discriminated against along ethnic lines, remained very conscious of their ethnic identity (Hussain, 1976, p. 922).

The Muslim Punjabis, on the other hand, were patronized by the British from the very beginning as they had directly or indirectly supported colonial rule (ibid).
Using land as gifts for subservience, the British set about creating an elite:

As the administrative and economic needs of their empire dictated, the British superimposed on the indigenous stratification systems of the Indian subcontinent small groups of functionaries and privileged classes whose orientations and interests were deflected from the common concerns of their own people to serve the interests of the empire.

From the beginning, these groups constituted several levels of titleholders to landed estates, who often maintained custodial armed detachments on behalf of the colonial authorities. Permanent land settlement programs were also used by the British viceroys to reward "loyal" subjects in the form of huge land grants. Large tracts of land were in some instances awarded to persons who were ruthless enough to endenture masses of laborers to dig a canal or build a strategic road. These landowning gentry came to be known as Zamindars, talukdars, jagirdars, mansabdars, nawabs and so forth (Gardezi, 1973, p. 132).

Another important reason the British patronized the Punjabis was because the Punjab was one of the main areas from which the British recruited soldiers. Punjabis were considered one of the "martial races." The British Indian Army came to be considered as "Punjabized" as more than 50 percent of the Muslims who served were Punjabis (Hussain, 1976, p. 23; Cohen, 1969, p. 69; Wilcox, 1964, p. 15).

The British policy of boundary maintenance of ethnic identities worked well enough to affect the self-perception of some of these groups. Indeed, ethnic communities came to see themselves as superiors to the others.*

* It is interesting to note that whereas the Punjabis probably considered themselves superior because of contact with and adoption of the colonialist ways, such groups as the Pashtuns probably felt superior due to lack of such contact.
Meanwhile the Muslim leaders were trying to stir Islamic consciousness and develop a national identity. These goals were thought to have been accomplished in 1947 when Pakistan was created.

Indeed, at this time there was a sense of Muslim identity and feeling of security in the new environment. But the antecedents for divisiveness had already been set and,

Under this Muslim identity lay explosive regional, linguistic, and parochial identities that limited or subverted the broader consciousness. Within the Muslims of Pakistan there existed at least five distinct subcultures: Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pathan, and Baluchi (Inayatullah, 1976, p. 91).

Once the euphoria of independence had faded, it became difficult to transfer the primary sense of identity from the ethnic to the national level. Was not the integrative role of Islam strong enough to help in the above task?

Though at first it was integrative Islam later became a divisive force. There was a confusion as to the role Islam would play in politics of Pakistan. The western educated elite, including Jinnah, felt that religion should have no part in the functioning of the state. This did not agree with the orthodox factions who asserted that in order for Pakistan to be an Islamic state, it should be governed through Muslim law. This type of question was debated for many years and left the country polarized between secular and orthodox factions and led to what Asaf Hussain calls an "internal dualism" — the ethno-Islamic and the ethno-national:

Within the ethno-Islamic framework, the national identity of a citizen of Pakistan ranged between the religion and his state: If a citizen was a Muslim first and Pakistani second, he transcended national boundaries and was sympathetic to pan-Islamism; if he was a Pakistani first and a Muslim second, the basis of his identity was ethnicized. As a Pakistani
he could be a Punjabi, a Baluchi, a Sindhi, a Pathan, or a Muslim. Within the ethno-national framework the internal dualism oscillated between his ethnicity and nationality: was he a Punjabi, Baluchi, Pathan or Sindhi first, or a Pakistani?

Though Islam was first an integrative force, it became divisive and finally in the hands of the Punjabis military-bureaucratic elite it became an oppressive force. The integrative force of Islam was not as strong as the divisive force of ethnic nationalism. This can be seen in the creation of Bangladesh as well as in the regional ethnic based demands for self-determination in what is left of Pakistan (Hussein, 1976, p. 925 and Levak, 1971, p. 203–221).

The divisiveness must not be seen as inevitable. It can be seen in part as the result of continuation of the patterns and policies developed by previous imperialists — the Mughals and the British. It can also be seen as a reaction to the methods used by Punjabi elites to foster a "national identity" based on "Islamic solidarity."

The Punjabis inherited the role of imperialists when the British left. Yet, the vacuum created by the British was not filled in a simple manner. To get a feeling for what happened when the Colonialists departed, we now turn to Hamza Alavi's *The State in Postcolonial Society: Pakistan and Bangladesh* (1973).

Alavi's focus is on the special role of the military bureaucratic oligarchy in post-colonial societies. This role is examined in terms of the interests of three elite classes. These elites Alavi calls the indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan neocolonialist bourgeoisie and the landed classes. He argues that at independence the indigenous bourgeoisie was too weak and underdeveloped to subordinate the military-bureaucratic state apparatus which the British had used to control the area. However, there is a "convergence of interests
of the three competing propertied classes, under metropolitan patronage, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy mediates their competing but no longer contradictory interests and demands (Alavi, 1973, pp. 145-6). The military-bureaucratic oligarchy has this powerful position for it was through it that the imperial country exercised domination of all the indigenous social classes in the colony. At independence the military-bureaucratic apparatus is able to maintain and extend its dominant position. For Alavi the essential problem of the state in post-colonial society is that it was not established by a native bourgeoisie, but rather it was established by and has strong connections with a foreign imperialist bourgeoisie. Though the direct command of the foreign elite is gone, it retains a tremendous influence over decisions made by the post-colonial society and constitutes a powerful element in the class structure of that society:

In view of the power and influence of the neo-colonial bourgeoisie, it is not entirely subordinate to the indigenous bourgeoisie. Nor is it simply and instrument of any of the latter, which would have the implication that independence is a mere sham. Neither bourgeoisie excludes the influence of the other, and their interests compete. The central proposition which I wish to emphasize that the state in the postcolonial society is not the instrument of a single class. It is relatively autonomous and mediates the competing interests of three propertied classes. . . . While at the same time acting on behalf of all of them in order to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, mainly the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production (Ibid., 1973, p. 148).

The state apparatus acquires a relatively autonomous economic role. This is because the state appropriates a large portion of the economic surplus and uses it in bureaucratically directed economic activity, "in the name of promoting economic development."
What part do politicians and political parties play in this perspective? The Bureaucratic-Military oligarchy is not the whole of the state apparatus. Politicians, and political parties also play a role. Their role is rather ambivalent. Ideally, they are expected to articulate the demands of those that support them, yet, they also play the important role of Public Relations. "They play a key role in manipulating public relations on behalf of those who make public policy, to make it acceptable to the community at large" (ibid, p. 149). The ambivalent relationship between the bureaucratic-military apparatus is greater when politicians in high positions are able to influence the careers of individual members of the bureaucracy or military.

Even if the role of the political party is an important one, this does not diminish the relative autonomy of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy:

The essential issue is that of the relative autonomy of the state apparatus as a whole and its mediatory role as between the competing interests of the three propertied classes. ... Insofar as the political leadership participates in the performance of the mediatory role and in the preservation of the relative autonomy of the state apparatus, it is valuable for the purpose of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy; it becomes their partner, a third component of the oligarchy (ibid., p. 150).

However, it is when the political party challenges the mediatory role and the relative autonomy of the bureaucrat-military oligarchy that conflicts arise. As long as the military-bureaucratic oligarchy has a virtual monopoly on the means of violence, they will prevail.

Alavi points to two trends that are salient in Pakistan's history. One is the dominant position of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in the state. He asserts that is has been in
command of state power, "not, as is commonly believed, after
the coup d'etat of October, 1958, but in fact at the inception
of the new state" (ibid., p. 152).

The second trend in Pakistan's history is that the
challenge to the power of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy
has come from the peripheral areas. This challenge stemmed
from those people who felt themselves underprivileged; they
voiced demands for regional autonomy and asked for participa-
tion in the decision making process which allocated material
resources—in short, they demanded participation in state power:

It was not only from East Bengal, but also from Sind,
and Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province,
that such challenges were mounted (ibid., p. 153).

Regional autonomy became a common denominator and an
article of faith for radical political groups—most of which
were part of regionalist movements:

It appeared on the surface that the radical politics
of Pakistan were conditioned primarily by ethnic
or linguistic solidarities stretching across regional
boundaries (ibid.,)

These two trends in Pakistani history and politics—
the dominance of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy and the
regional ethnic basis of challenge directed against the oligarchy—are, Alavi feels, two aspects of a single reality. This single
reality is the political situation in Pakistan which centers
around the role of the oligarchy.

It is with this prespective and these tools that Alavi
analyses Pakistani history. In his mind, the bureaucratic-
military oligarchy has "made and unmade governments with a
succession of prime ministers."

We mentioned earlier that opposition movements ask
for participation in power—more specifically, they ask for
appointments of people from their own relatively underprivileged
ethnic groups, to the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and
military. Obviously, this demand is made in recognition of the powerful role played by the bureaucracy and military. Alavi generalizes his thoughts on post colonial societies and writes:

Because of the powerful role of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in post-colonial societies, positions in the oligarchy are of crucial importance, especially for aspiring educated middle class groups; and their political demands are focused on shares of positions in the oligarchy. Where the oligarchy is recruited from a narrow social or regional base, as for example in the case of Pakistan, the unprivileged educated middle class groups who are denied access to positions of influence and power in the oligarchy organize political opposition. "Moral" principles and ideologies are invoked by both the ruling oligarchy and the opposition to justify their respective interests and to rally public support in their behalf (Ibid., p. 166).

(Emphasis added)

This point is important in light of our analysis because it is for this reason that:

- differences of caste, ethnic origin, religion, or language dominate the politics of postcolonial society (Ibid.).

As we saw before, under these conditions, group will politicize themselves on a cultural basis. At the same time, the group which has a dominant position in the oligarchy appeals to ideologies of "national solidarity" or "national integration" and denounces the opposition as "backward," "narrowminded," and divisive particularism—all in defense of its own privileges. Indeed, the campaign in behalf of the dominant group is carried out by the bureaucratic-military oligarchy itself. As such, there is a merger of political issues arising out of ethnic and/or regional characteristics and the "broader issues of public policy as concern different classes of people."

To illustrate the above points, Alavi writes:

In Pakistan the ruling, predominantly by Punjabi, bureaucrat-military oligarchy has taken over and put to its own particular use the slogans of
Muslim nationalism, the slogans of the movement on whose strength Pakistan was brought into being...

... The ideology of Islamic unity was now employed to deny the validity of the claims and demands of the less privileged groups—the Bengalis, Pathans, and Baluchis—for the recognition for their distinct identity and needs (ibid., p. 166).

Used in this way, the Punjabi oligarchy gave the concept of "Islamic solidarity" and oppressive nature.

This oppression finds its deepest roots in the skewed allocation of material resources, that is, in economic disparities. Indeed, if we make the obvious comparison between East and West Pakistan, we find that East Pakistan was reduced to a colony (F. Ahmed, 1973, p. 140; Levak, 1971, p. 217; Ali, 1973; Alavi, 1973; K. U. Ahmad, 1972). The evidence and the literature to support the idea of the West Pakistani colonization is vast and it is not the aim of this paper to explore this avenue. Instead, we note that East Pakistan remained largely a producer of raw materials (mainly jute) for the world market and for West Pakistan's factories, and as a market for the consumers goods made in West Pakistan. To refresh ourselves we can review the tables on the following pages.

The economic disparities (Table 1) and East Pakistan's subservient position was reinforced by the West Pakistani control of enforcing and implementing institutions. (Table 2)
### TABLE I.---Economic Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>54,501</td>
<td>310,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (1970 estimate)</td>
<td>70 mil.</td>
<td>60 mil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five-Year Plan Allocations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th (unlikely to be implemented)</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid Allocation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export earnings</td>
<td>20-30%</td>
<td>70-80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import expenditures</td>
<td>50-70%</td>
<td>30-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial assets owned by Bengalis</td>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service jobs</td>
<td>16-20%</td>
<td>80-84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military jobs</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources transferred from East to West Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rs. 31,120 million*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-49 and 1968-69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income, official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>RS. 285.5</td>
<td>RS. 419.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>RS. 291.5</td>
<td>RS. 473.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional difference in per capita income, official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real difference in per capita income, 1968-69</td>
<td></td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real difference in average standard of living 1968-69</td>
<td></td>
<td>126%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portion of income spent on food by industrial workers (1955-56 survey)</td>
<td>69.75%</td>
<td>60-63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*At the official rate then, U.S. $1 = 4.76 rupees (Rs.)*

TABLE 2. -- Civil Servants and Military in East Pakistan, 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Servants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Secretary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretary</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Military Officers</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. General</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Personnel</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Officers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The problem is not to show that East Pakistan was dominated by West Pakistan, rather the task at hand is to show that the Bengalis were dominated by the Punjabis. Indeed, evidence on the Punjabi domination of any of the ethnic groups would be a most welcome sight. Albert E. Levak writes, "While no research on ethnic stratification has been carried out in Pakistan, conventional wisdom clearly points to the Punjab as being the dominant province" (1976, p. 296).* To supplement this conventional wisdom, we first looked at the historical basis for the inheritance of power by the Punjab elites. Next, to get a better idea of the components and dynamics of Punjabi domination, we examined the crucial role played by the Punjabi controlled bureaucratic-military oligarchy as seen by Hamza Alavi.

The attempts at "Islamic integration" by the Punjabi oligarchy were not successful. After all, the people of the peripheral provinces were already Muslim:

The Punjabis could not "islamize," ... they could only try to "Pakistanize" them—and this in reality meant to Punjabiize. For the other ethnic groups, this meant a loss of their ethnic identity (Hussain, 1976, p. 927).

Equally important to the potential loss of identity is the economic exploitation which is the manifestation of such chauvinism. It is apparent in Pakistan that a person's ethnicity is important in determining his/her life chances. This must be seen at least partly as a reflection of the objective reality. Indeed, the attempt has been to show that life chances for collectives as a whole depend very much on ethnic factors.

The Bengalis were able to successfully challenge Punjabi imperialism. There is a lesson to be learned from

*Consultation with Dr. Levak revealed that another reason that this type of data is not available is that Pakistan does not compile statistics in terms of ethnic identities.
Bengali liberation—ethnic differences, feelings of subservience, and exploitation are real and are manifest. This was true of the Bengalis and is today true of peripheral ethnic groups in Pakistan:

The division of West Pakistan into four provinces has been followed by a sharp rise in parochial and provincial bitterness. . . . West Pakistan might have to face claims by the Pathans, Baluchis, and the Sindhis who have often indicated their resentfulness of Punjabi domination (Levak, 1974, p. 215).

How were the claims of these minorities handled by the state? No sooner had state government repatriated its 90,000 prisoners of war from India after the defeat in Bengal than these troops were employed in Baluchistan after the government had provoked an armed insurrection. Further, the elected provincial governments of Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province were forced out, and the main opposition party—the National Awami Party was banned (Eqbal Ahmad, 1979). This was under Bhutto's reign. But things do not look much better for the minorities now that the military-bureaucratic oligarchy is back in direct command. General Zia-Ul-Haq, a Punjabi, took over from Bhutto in a coup d'etat in July, 1977. He and the other Generals' preference for a strong centralized government causes deep anxiety in the minority provinces" (Ibid.,) Indeed, it is clear that, no lesson was learned from the secession of East Pakistan" (Levak, 1976, p. 303).

What we can expect are continued efforts by the Punjabi oligarchy to Punjabiize the minority ethnic groups in the guise of "national integration." The loss of East Pakistan has probably increased Punjabis insecurities, to the point that opposition attempts at autonomy or secession are likely to be countered in an aggressive and violent manner. But it is unrealistic to assume that one ethnic group will submit to political and economic exploitation much less violence. Indeed, the more overt and sophisticated the oppression becomes, the more creative, courageous, united, and determined the opposition becomes in its resistance. Pakistan does
not have to remember far back to discover the truth of the above statement. But history is often forgotten or rationalized away.
Part V
External Forces

Up to this point we have not considered international relationships between groups. The international setting is important in our discussion of inter-ethnic relations. We need a framework with which we can see the global inter-relations. There are, of course, competing frameworks or paradigms. Modernization Theory as we examined it earlier is one such framework. International relations were seen in terms of developed nations and underdeveloped nations. The focus was to determine the cause of underdevelopment and the solutions for its elimination. According to this framework, underdevelopment was the result of a nation's deficient value system and economic structure. What was needed in these societies was a strong Puritan Ethnic, that is, a desire to save and invest rather than consume. This is how the developed countries had progressed; they had developed a modern, rational business system and concomitant ethic. This resulted in the ability to accumulate capital, invest it and achieve rapid growth. In order for underdeveloped countries to develop, they too would have to go through these processes. The predicted consequences of this framework in terms of ethnicity, ethnic groups, and national integration were examined in section two of this paper.

In reaction to this apparently "Western" or Center perspective, theories in the Marxist-Leninist tradition were revived and built upon. Basic to these theories is the idea that underdevelopment was caused by colonialism and imperialist exploitation, and that its continuation is a result of the effects of neo-colonialism as felt through the global capitalist economy:

The solution (to be rid of underdevelopment)... was revolution from the dominant imperial power, the United States. Similarly, poverty in the United States was not the product of ignorance and disorganization among the poor, but rather the willful exploitation by the capitalist system. It was no accident said the neo-Marxists, that the
Vietnam War and race riots were occurring simultaneously—they were both aspects of the same Capitalist World System. In many ways, this theoretical framework certainly seemed to explain the world of the late sixties much better than the benign theories of the liberals that had dominated academies ten years earlier. (Chirot 1977, p. 5)

The framework of analysis we build in this section comes out of "Dependency Theory." Initially, the ideas associated with dependency grew out of and were defined by the experience of Latin American radical and revolutionary movements. It is, in essence, a peripheral perspective.

Dependency Theory today stretches farther than its Latin American origins. Reference can be made to the works of people like Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Theotonio Dos Santos, Paul Baran, Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, George Beckford, Hamza Alavi, and Immanuel Wallerstein to name a few scholars associated with Dependency Theory. It is not a single unified body of thought, indeed there are competing theoretical paradigms, although there is a somewhat general consensus.

As we mentioned earlier, the focus of the dependency perspective is on relations of imperialism;

The main concern in this approach is with imperialism between developed and underdeveloped societies, and the role of various local groups—predominantly middle and bourgeois groups—in this system of social relations. (Mahdi, 1978, p. 222)

The unit of analysis is "global" rather than "national" as was the case with Modernization Theory:

"World System: becomes the unit of study and not "State" or the "nation" or the "people." Most specifically, there is a shift from a concern with attributive characteristics of states... to concern with relational characteristics of states (ibid)

This global perspective views the world as divided into center and periphery areas. This can be seen in terms of
relations between countries or relations within a country. In
essence, the terms describe relationships of power. Center
implies "decisions made here" and periphery implies "decisions
made elsewhere." In general, center applies to industrially
advanced capitalist countries whereas the periphery refers
to less industrially advanced countries.

This perspective holds that historical perspective is
absolutely essential to any analysis:

In historical perspective...the development of
the Center/Periphery was integral to the process
of European industrialization. Rather than viewing
industrialization as a process which began in
Britain and gradually spread through the world...industrial advance in some areas required the
development of others into peripheral areas for
the supply of food-stuffs, raw materials, and
labor. As Western Europe developed industrially
Eastern Europe and the overseas colonies
developed along non-industrial lines to complement
the new center (Ibid).

This perspective lays bare the bankruptcy of the
modern-traditional dichotomy:

even in 1900 (all the more in 1950) there were very
few "traditional" societies left in the world.
Virtually all people, aside from a few isolated
groups in the most remote parts of the Amazon,
in a few parts of Africa, and in certain inaccessible
parts of Asia, had already experienced prolonged
and extremely unsettling contact with highly
modernized, industrialized, and politically dominant
Western world. (Chirot, 1977, p. 7)

This political and economic domination (later spreading to
cultural domination) was a general pattern since around 1500.
Since then ever larger parts of the world have come into
contact with the dominant Western world and have changed
accordingly. At first the Western influence was restricted
largely to coastal areas but from there spread inland:
By 1900, the process was virtually complete, and most of the world was directly or indirectly controlled by Europeans (or Europeans transplanted in the Americas). By 1900, this prolonged conquest and penetration had produced a veritable world division of labor. Certain societies acted as the international upper class, the rich, economically diversified and industrialized powers who dominated the world scene (even though they fought quite bitterly among themselves); and the other societies acted as an international lower class who provided cheap labor, certain raw materials, certain agricultural products while they remained poor, weak and economically overspecialized in the production of one, or at best a very few export products. (Chirot, 1977, p. 8) (emphasis added)

(On the whole, we can see this world division of labor as a world cultural division of labor, in as much as the center is generally white and of European descent. This is an effort to bring in the 'cultural division of labor' into the global analysis and the interethnic analysis discussed earlier.)

Although we are discussing general historical trends there is a strong emphasis on historical specificity. This is why Samir Amin, among others, takes great pains and goes into historical detail to point out that peripheral formations (societies or collectives) differ in their relationships with world capitalism and imperialism. (Amin, 1976)

The idea of 'dependence' is central to this set of ideas. The form of dependence of peripheral societies on center social formations differs in accordance to the difference in relationships from society to society. In short, 'dependence' is a product of historical forces, "especially those released by European expansion and world ascendency." (Griffen, 1968:38: as quoted in Mahdi, 1978, p. 224)

More specifically 'dependence' defines the interchange between developed and underdeveloped societies in reference to changing structures of institutions, classes, and power arrangements. Dos Santos writes more concretely:
By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjugated. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion. Which can have either a positive or negative effect on their development. (Dos Santos, 1970, p. 231.)

Dos Santos sees dependence mainly in terms of an economic dependence, in which the economy of one country is conditioned by the economy of another country to which it is subjugated. His economic analysis of dependence is seen as a consequence of the world expansion of capitalism; this, of course, is in line with the theory of imperialism in the Marxist-Leninist tradition.

Johan Galtung in *A Structural Theory of Imperialism* (1971), is not in the Marxist-Leninist tradition; dominance and imperialism are not seen specifically as part of the tendency of the capitalist market to expand. Hence dominance and dependence will not disappear with the end of imperialism or private capitalism. Galtung gives a much broader meaning to dependence and imperialism by distinguishing five different types of "imperialism"—economic, cultural, military, political and communicational—none of which predominates. He sees imperialism as a general structural relationship between two collectives. This system splits up collectives and relates some parts to each other in harmony of interest, and other parts in relations of disharmony of interests. This disharmony of interest is based on what Galtung calls the living conditions; if the living conditions gap is increasing, there is disharmony of interest; if it is increasing there is harmony of interest.

Living conditions can be measured by the typical neo-classical economic measurements (GNP, per capita income), by notions of quality of life, and also by notions of autonomy. Imperialism is
then defined in terms of 'actors'; the center in the center nation, the periphery in the center nation, the center in the peripheral nation, and the periphery in the peripheral nations. The main point is that the center in the center nation and the center in the peripheral nation have a harmony of interests and the center of the central nation uses the center of the peripheral nation as a bridgehead which serves as a transmission belt for value forwarded to the center nation.

Samir Amin in, *Unequal Development*, comes to similar conclusions yet he tends to see the various types of imperialism as an outgrowth or a spillover from the control of the means of production; that is the economic aspects are seen as salient.

In spite of the differences and emphasis by different theorists there is a certain amount of consistency. Dependence is manifested in the current relations of underdeveloped countries and can be seen in many forms; cultural, communicational, military, political, and especially economic. But the external relations are not the prime concern of this paper. Most important for our purposes is the effect of the external factors on internal factors:

Besides being itself the most visible level of dependence, external relations are constantly reproducing a social structure in underdeveloped countries that fits into the dynamics of the international division of labor. (Mahdi, 1978, p. 226.)

Frank writes that dependence has consolidated itself in the social structure of underdeveloped countries, particularly in the position of the ruling class. He feels that the interest of the ruling class coincides in nearly all important aspects with the interests of metropolitan capitalists. These interests coincide in order "to appropriate a part of the surplus produced in peripheral societies, and who, through the pursuit of their own political and economic interests, guarantee the
integration of their society into the existing global division of labor." (Ibid.) But Frank has been criticized for not being historically rigorous in his analysis. Indeed, we have seen in the writings of Hamza Alavi that there is no single ruling class in post colonial societies such as Pakistan. Further, Alavi asserts that the dominant oligarchy which plays a mediating role among the various propertied classes has a relatively autonomous role even with respect to the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, Frank and Alavi agree that the interests of the local elite and the foreign bourgeoisie have much in common. Let us take a closer look at the relationship between the national elite—in particular the military—bureaucratic oligarchy of Pakistan and the international bourgeoisie and its agents—economic advisors.

Hassan N. Gardezi in, Neo-Colonial Alliances and the Crisis of Pakistan, states that despite prophecies to the contrary, within a few years after independence Pakistan emerged as an economically solvent nation. He mentions that outside the years 1952-1953 when there was a crop failure, the country was meeting its staple food needs. Further, Pakistan had a growth rate of 29.6% (originating in manufacturing) in 1953-1954 even though Pakistan was spending almost five times less on imports of machinery than in 1959-1960. During this period—pre 1959-1960—Pakistan "received only nominal economic aid from the United States, and had a much smaller contingent of foreign advisors, experts, and consultants." (Gardezi, 1973, p. 139.) But the post 1959-1960 years were a different story:

Approximately after 1958, and with the advent of Ayub Khan's regime, dependence on foreign aid increased to enormous proportions, with the process of economic planning becoming completely dominated by foreigners—particularly a large contingent of Americans from Harvard University—and Pakistan moved rapidly into the position of a type of economic colony... the role of foreign advisors and planners...
was only the beginning; Pakistan became one of the biggest employers of foreign technicians...at the same time that this invasion of highly paid foreign technicians was taking place large numbers of Pakistani technicians and scientists were being forced to leave the country because of a combination of factors—unemployment, misemployment, low salaries, delays in the processing of, arrogant behaviour of Pakistani officials...(Ibid. p. 139.)

Where did Pakistan get the money necessary to pay for all of this? These costs were met by borrowing foreign capital. This can be seen in the rise of aid flow from 455.8 million from 1950 to 1955 to approximately 3.4 billion from 1960 to 1968. Why was this done? To answer this question let us attempt to answer two questions; who benefitted from these external relations? And who was hurt?

Part of the American plan was to keep the Pakistani's strong as a military ally. Hence a direct recipient of modern weapons and techniques was the Pakistani military and bureaucracy:

Military assistance and economic support helped to enlarge the size of the civil and military bureaucracy as well as to modernize it, and this increased the bureaucracy's hold on politics, and eventually gave it a political monopoly after a 1959 military coup. (Inayatullah, 1976, pp. 102-103)

This enabled the Pakistani elite to expand the military apparatus creating a multiplier effect on the economy of those areas where the expansion took place—West Pakistan and especially Punjab. This of course contributed to the widening of regional disparities.

Another beneficiary of this process is the foreign bourgeoisie and neo-colonialists. In making the military-bureaucratic oligarchy more powerful, the neo-colonialists—in this case the United States—"renders the government of the post-colonial society sufficiently open to admit the successful intrusion of neo-colonial interest in the formulation of public policy." (Alavi, 1973, p. 158.)
Further, there are the effects of taking loans. While the burden of the loans are shared by the people of the country, the benefits are taken by Pakistani elite and by interest groups of the donor country:

Most of the aid has gone, and continues to go, to pay for 'establishment' changes, that is to pay for transportation, salaries, offices, and residences, commisaries, and servants of aid personnel. Another large sum is spent on arranging training and 'orientation' trips to America for the government elite. Almost 95% of the amount spent to buy machinery and other capital goods must be spent in the donor country, which is usually the United States. This condition forecloses those sources of supply where the same goods could be bought and transported at much lower costs. Having installed expensive American machinery Pakistan becomes forever dependent on that country for the supply of spare Parts (Gardezi, 1973, p. 141.)

Furthermore, the machinery that was purchased was capital-intensive whereas Pakistan needs machinery which is labor-intensive. Though capital-intensive machinery may help the laborer after "trickle-down" process it certainly does nothing to decrease the disparity in society—indeed those that benefit most are the capitalists.

Who was hurt by the opening up of Pakistan to the United States? Hurt most of all were the peripheral regions of Pakistan—especially Bengal. Why? Alliance with the United States has brought in a preference for capitalist orientated policies for economic development. (Inayatullah, 1976, p. 103,) Pakistan's economic planning, effected greatly by Harvard economists, was "intentionally designed to skew distribution of the increased income in favor of the already wealthy."

(Levak, 1974, p. 200.) This is the workings of the concept of 'functional inequality.' This view requires that inequality be created to promoted savings and create entrepreneurial dynamism. Not only did Bengal not benefit from the multiplier effect of the
expansion of the military and the bureaucracy but it became the worst victim of the economic policies based on functional inequality:

The West Pakistan based industrial elite, and their co-planners in the civil service and foreign advisor groups were able to reduce east Bengal to a client colony. (Gardezi, 1973, p. 140.)

Asif Hussain looks at the same problem as it effected West Pakistan:

Since the Punjabis ... occupied strategic positions in the country's bureaucratic and military sub-systems, their ruling ideas determined rational policy making at the highest levels. To legitimize their ideas, Western ideologies of economic development and transfer of technology were effected through neo-colonial alliances, military, and economic pacts. As a consequence of the latter, an influential policy advisory group, The Harvard Advisory Group, became entrenched in the planning commission from 1954 to 1970 and exerted enormous indirect influence on the policy making bureaucrats. In some instances they wrote out the complete drafts for the five year plans. As a result of these policies, most of the development was concentrated in Punjab Province...Such ethnic influences on resource allocations strengthen the position of the Punjabi elites on the one hand, while on the other hand, massive doses of foreign aid led to the recolonization and encouraged the 'development of underdevelopment.' (Hussain, 1976, p. 926.)

It is obvious that the bureaucratic-military oligarchy and the indigenous bourgeoisie prospered materially and were able to get a tighter grip on the reigns of power in the country. The metropolitan bourgeoisie was able to open up another area for its markets for cheap raw materials and more importantly for the export of its technicians, capital, and military goods. The metropolitan bourgeoisie was able to integrate another peripheral economy into the world capitalist system and was able to acquire bases for military influence in the area of the subcontinent as well as an ally to "contain communism" and keep
the "free world" open to its economic expansionism. [Obviously the influences of India, U.S.S.R., Afghanistan on the decision made to make an alliance between the United States and Pakistan were not taken into account. (see Inayatullah 1976)]

At the outset of this section we asked why Pakistan formed an alliance with the United States. Perhaps they had some basic common interests. For the Pakistani elites, the interest is to preserve the existing order at the national level. Likewise the preservation of the existing order is also in the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, but at the global level. How has the external influence affected inter-ethnic relations?

In no way has the external influence helped ethnic interaction or national integration. U.S. aid only strengthened the Punjabi domination and did not reach the peripheral regions. Economic policies aimed at building the most viable region of the economy—the Punjab. Regional disparities created by unequal development, "further stimulated and strengthened the feelings of relative deprivation and the demands for greater political and cultural autonomy." (Inayatullah, 1976, p. 103.)

Finally, Galtung's idea of 'actors' can be seen as connecting our previous national analysis with the global analysis in this section. Just as there is a periphery in the peripheral nations which can be seen to fall into a relationship of dependence in terms of a 'cultural division of labor' with respect to the center of the nation; the peripheral country itself can be seen as having relations of dependence in terms of a "world division of labor" with respect to the center of the center nation. Indeed, if we look at the two systems as one system we get a better idea of what Mahdi meant when we quoted him earlier:

Besides being itself the most visible level of dependence, external relations are constantly reproducing a social structure in underdeveloped countries that fit into the dynamics of the international division of labor. (Mahdi, 1978, p. 226.)
This certainly seems to have been true for the set of 'actors' which we call Pakistan.

Summary

Having looked at the national picture we needed to see how the national picture fits into the larger global setting. We needed to know how the external forces—that is the global setting—affected inter-ethnic relations. To find these effects we needed a framework with which to examine the global setting—we used a peripheral perspective which has a Marxist-Leninist tradition and has come to be known as "Dependency Theory."

Using this perspective we divided the world into center nations and peripheral nations and looked at ideas of this theory in general and more specifically the ideas of John Galtung and Samir Amin. We noted that there is an international—and external—aspect to 'dependence' and also an internal aspect. The bulk of the section was an attempt to use these ideas in order to understand the effects of dependence on Pakistan. We concluded that, in the case of Pakistan, external forces unleashed by Pakistan's alliance with the United States and its integration into the world capitalist system was a negative influence on inter-ethnic relations. The net effect was to make both the Punjabi domination of the country and the opposition demands of self-determination greater.
VI. **Trade Versus Self-Reliance**

The previous section concluded that Pakistan's integration into the world capitalist system had a disintegrative effect on inter-ethnic relations. Such effects were caused mainly by problems of disproportionate distribution; integration with the world economy, by rewarding certain collective more than others increases negative effects of relative deprivation unleashing forces of disintegration within the nation-state.

Theorists of the Dependency School as well as those of other schools suggest that developing countries project themselves from the effects of international capitalism by following policies aimed at self-reliance. Dudley Seers contends that that some of the economic aspects of self-reliance include:

- Reducing dependence on imported necessities, especially basic foods, petroleum and its products, capital equipment and expertise. This would involve changing consumption patterns as well as increasing the relevant production capacity. Redistribution of income would help, but policies would also be needed to change living styles at given income levels – using taxes, price policies, advertising and perhaps rationing. In many countries, self-reliance would also involve increased national ownership and control, especially of sub-soil assets and improving capacity for negotiating with transnational corporations. (Seers, 1977, p. 5)

Seers as well as other writers suggest that a key aspect of self-reliance is withdrawal from international trade.
Whether or not self-reliance through withdrawal from international trade is an essential element of development remains a controversial issue. It is argued that there are great costs in attempts at development through self-reliance and that such costs maybe so great as to undermine development efforts. This section briefly surveys the 'trade versus self-reliance' debate.

We look first at why trade is considered to be important to development. Possible costs of a policy of self-reliance include forgoing the gains from trade. These gains can be divided into static and dynamic gains. First, we look at the static gains of trade.

Classical economic theory shows the advantages of trade by pointing to the doctrine of comparative advantage. The differences between countries result in both absolute and relative differences in their productive efficiency. What is central is that even if a country has an absolute advantage or disadvantage in productive efficiency over a range of goods it is still to that country's advantage to specialize in the production of those products in which it has a relative advantage, and acquire its other needs through trade. For example, Germany may be able to produce cameras and cars as well as fruits and vegetables all at a lower unit cost than Kenya. This gives Germany an absolute cost advantage and Kenya an absolute cost disadvantage in the production of these products. But suppose Germany's relative cost advantage is greater in the production of cameras and cars than in the production of fruits and vegetables. That is, Germany's unit cost for the production
of fruits and vegetables may be half of Kenya's unit cost for the same products and Germany's unit cost for the production of cars and cameras may be a tenth of Kenya's unit cost for those manufactured goods. Hence Germany has a relative cost advantage in the production of cars and cameras and Kenya has a relative cost advantage in the production of fruits and vegetables. If these countries specialize in the production of products in which they have a comparative advantage they can engage in profitable trade. This means that if Germany specializes in the production of cars and cameras for export it can import more fruits and vegetables than it could have produced itself. Similarly, specialization in the production of fruits and vegetables for export will enable Kenya to obtain more cameras and cars than it would have produced domestically.

Free trade based on the principles of comparative advantage, has two major theoretical benefits. First, trade enables all countries to escape from the confines of their resource endowments and consume commodities in combinations that lie outside their production possibilities frontier. Specialization permits a country to enjoy a higher level of income and consumption than would be possible without trade. The second major advantage of free trade is that it maximizes global output by permitting every country to specialize in what it does best.

We turn now to the dynamic gains from trade. The major dynamic gain is that the export market widens the total market for a country's products. This can give a poor country the chance to overcome the diseconomies of the small size of its domestic market.
Trade offers the possibility of accompanying capital flows, increased specialization and a rise in the skills of workers. In general the dynamics of trade may lead to a stimulus to competition and encouragement of technological innovation.

Trade can trigger off the "demonstration effect"; by increasing the range of goods that can be purchased trade can stimulate new wants and so create new areas of production or higher productivity. Indeed, there is likely to be a change in attitudes and institutions as well.

It has also been noted that trade has a positive effect on capital accumulation. The capacity to save increase as income rises through the more efficient resource allocation associated with international trade. Further, the stimulus to investment increases as investors realize that the wider markets created by trade will lead to increasing returns. (Meier 1968, chapter 8)

Trade also brings knowledge that comes from contact with other societies; the importation of technical know-how and skills can be an indispensable source of technological progress. The importation of ideas in general can be a potent stimulus to development;

Not only is this vital economic change in itself, but also for political and socio-cultural advances which may be the necessary pre-conditions of economic progress. By providing the opportunity to learn from the achievements and failures of the more advanced countries and by facilitating selective borrowing and adaptation, foreign trade can help considerably in speeding up a poor country's development. (Meier 1968, p. 220)
It is for these reasons that the dynamic gains from trade are thought to serve as 'an engine of growth and development'. In reality, participation in international trade has led to an increase in the exports of developing countries but trade has not, except in a few cases, served as an engine of growth and development. (Meier 1968, p. 225) Why has this been the case?

Critics of the classical and neo-classical theories of trade as an engine of growth and development attack the theory at a theoretical level and at a historical level. At the theoretical level critics charge that the comparative advantage/free trade argument is a static one based on restrictive and unrealistic assumptions. (Thirwal 1978, p. 241)

The reply to this charge is that it is a simple task to make the classical theory of comparative advantage more dynamic. In the words of Gerald M. Meier;

By no means must the conclusions derived from the theory of comparative advantage be limited to a "cross-section" view and given once-for-all set conditions; the comparative cost doctrine still has validity among countries undergoing differential rates of development. (Meier 1968, p. 225)

At the historical level critics believe that due to the free play of international forces, trade tends to widen the income gap between rich and poor countries;

A quite normal result of unhampered trade between two countries of which one is industrial and the other underdeveloped is the initiation of a cumulative process towards the improvishment and stagnation of the latter. (Myrdal 1956, p. 95)
According to Gunnar Myrdal international factor movements have created a highly unbalanced structure of production in the domestic economy and this has led to many adverse effects in developing countries. The inflow of capital develops only those resources which lead to exports, this bias neglects production in the domestic sector. It is claimed that though foreign capital has developed the export sector into the most advanced part of the economy, this has led to the neglect of investment in the traditional sector of the dual-economy.
(Meier 1968, p. 228-229)

The rebuttle to this criticism is that there is no reason to believe that investment in the traditional sector would have been greater had there been no foreign investment;

Much of the criticism is thus misplaced once it is recognized that the relevant comparison is not between the pattern of resource utilization that actually occurred with international factor movements and some other ideal pattern, but between the actual pattern and the pattern that would have occurred in the absence of the capital and labor inflow.
(Meier 1968, p. 223)

This line of reasoning seems to imply that unbalanced growth is better than no growth at all. Such an implication may be misleading when we consider that unbalanced growth may lead to regional tensions resulting in civil war. In such a case we could say that unbalanced growth may lead to regression.

Myrdal attacks trade theory by asserting that the "demonstration effect" has been a handicap for poor countries; contact with advanced consumption standards has raised the propensity to consume, thus inhibiting savings. But John Pincus
counters that, "It maybe seriously doubted that trade is the major source of demonstration effects today, considering the wide availability of western publications, moves and radio, to say nothing of tourists". (Pincus 1967, p. 127). It is further countered that it has not been shown that the negative effects of international emulation outweigh the positive effects.

The third major attack on the view of trade as an engine of growth rests on the contention that the terms of trade for developing countries have been deteriorating. This school of thought has been most forcefully represented by Raul Prebisch who maintains that the terms of trade of the periphery tend to decline relative to the center for three reasons: (1) competitive markets in the periphery and monopolistic markets in the center mean that the periphery fails to benefit from technological progress; (2) developing countries terms of trade improve on the upswing of business cycles and decline on the downward swing, but they decline by more each time, hence the long-term effect is downward; (3) the periphery has a higher income elasticity of demand for imports, developing countries must reduce domestic wages and prices and accept a deterioration in their terms of trade. (Morton 1977, p. 25-27) It has been pointed out that market structure and cyclical effects are not necessary to Prebisch's argument for protection, "as long as world demand for industrial imports is rising faster than world demand for primary imports, the terms of trade for primary exporters will tend to deteriorate, other things being equal". (Pincus 1967, p. 130)

The terms of trade thesis has been considered received doctrine by many developing countries, but has been criticized; the statistical claims are thought to be weak and the analytic reasoning is unconvincing. (see Meier 1968, ch. 3, 7, 8)
Advocates of trade as an engine for development point of view, while rejecting the attack at the theoretical and historical level, still must answer the question of why the dynamic gains from trade have not been widespread in developing countries.

The question is answered by pointing out that the market imperfections in the domestic economies of developing countries have not allowed the dynamic gains to take place. It is argued that for international trade to be beneficial the necessary preconditions must exist, it is then possible for international trade to release latent indigenous sources which can, in turn, exploit the stimulus from the export sector and in this way transform the economy;

Unlike this favorable situation, however, the domestic economy of the poor country has remained fragmented and compartmentalized the transference of resources from less productive to more productive employment has been restrictive, and the linkage of markets and their subsequent extension have been handicapped. (Meier 1968, p. 248)

It is these types of imperfections that have cut short the second round of activities induced by exports, and hence the dynamic gains from trade have not been realized. The conclusion is that domestically based obstacles to development have been of much greater significance than any external obstacles, "and that if the internal handicaps had been less formidable, the stimuli from foreign trade would have been more effective..." (Meier 1968, p. 248) What is stressed here is that the basic problem a developing country should face is not so much to control its trade but rather how to achieve more of a carry-over from its export sector to its domestic economy.
Critics of this view do not deny that trade can be an important stimulus to rapid economic growth. We need only to look at the progress of such countries as Brazil, Taiwan and South Korea in the 1960's and the OPEC countries in the 1970's for evidence. But this does not mean, it is contended, that trade is a desirable strategy for economic and social development. Whether a trade strategy is appropriate depends on the nature of the export sector, the distribution of its benefits and its linkages to the rest of the economy. (Todaro 1977, ch. 12)

In evaluating trade as a strategy for development the disproportional distributional effects of trade must be taken into account;

As for the distributional effects of trade we can state almost without reservation that the principal benefits of world trade have accrued disproportionately to rich nations and within poor nations disproportionately to both foreign residents and wealthy nationals. (Todaro 1977, p. 291-292)

And, we should add that the benefits of trade are also likely to accrue to the dominant ethnic groups.

This tendency towards disproportional distribution of course does not reflect the inherent nature of trade but rather it reflects the structural bias of international and national institutions. Paul Streeten commenting on a conference on strategies for trade and development writes;

A curious paradox came out in the discussion. It seemed that both inward-looking, import-substituting, protectionist, interventionist policies and outward-looking, market orientated non-interventionist policies tend to increase inequalities; the former because they strengthen domestic market imperfections and monopolies and reduce the demand for labor intensive
processes, the latter because the market rewards most those factors which are relatively scarce (capital, management, professional skills) and penalizes those in abundant supply and because the market strengthens the ability to accumulate of those who have against those who have not. (Streiten 1973, p. 4)

(This is not really paradoxical in that in an egalitarian power structure both methods lead to equality; in an inequalitarian power structure both lead to inequality).

To avoid the adverse effects of what is thought to be an inequalitarian international system some writers suggest closing borders and not trading at all. For most countries the option of autarky is not thought to be feasible;

Not only do they (developing countries) lack the resources and the market-size to be self-sufficient but their very existence, especially in the area of food production, often depends on their ability to secure foreign resources. Further, for many countries the international economic system offers the only source of scarce capital and needed technological change. (Todaro 1977, p. 292)

It seems clear that a policy of self-reliance based on a withdrawal from the international economic system has great costs. But it seems clear also that integration into the international economic system also has great costs especially when it comes to unequal distributional effects of growth within a developing country. As we have seen in the case of Pakistan these unequal distributional effects, in the face of rising ethnic nationalism may have severe disintegrative effects on the economy and the country as a whole.
Some writers have suggested that one possible solution to the self-reliance versus trade debate might be greater trade between developing countries. They have called for a "collective self-reliance", meaning a move towards regional economic integration by forming customs unions. Economic integration arises whenever a group of nations in the same region, preferably of relative equal size and equal stages of development, join together forming economic union by raising a common tariff against the products of non-member countries while freeing internal trade among themselves. The main contention of this line of reasoning is that by pooling their resources, small countries can overcome the limits of their small individual markets while still retaining an important degree of autonomy in pursuing their individual development aspirations. There is of course a debate on the advantages and disadvantages of this course of action, a debate that we do not intend to explore here. (See Meier 1973, ch. 6, Vaitsos 1978 and Streeten 1973, ch. 5 and 6) Nevertheless groups of developing countries are moving in the direction of regional economic integration. One significant hurdle is that such a strategy requires a degree of statesmanship and a regional rather than nationalistic orientation that is lacking in many countries. However some writers such as Michael P. Todaro feel, that this tendency maybe overcome;

As time goes on and developing nations begin to see their individual destinies more closely tied to those of their neighbors, and as the pursuit of greater collective self-reliance and self-sufficiency gathers momentum in the late 1970's and 1980's, one might speculate that the pressure for some form of economic integration will gradually overcome forces of separation. (Todaro 1977, p. 320)
There is little reason to believe that the forces of separation will be overcome. Todaro's speculation on the future of economic integration suffers from unsubstantiated optimism. Todaro makes a fundamental mistake by using an unrealistic unit of analysis; the nation-state. We have already found that nationalism is a force that emerges from ethnic collectives rather than from nations as a whole. Had Todaro used ethnic collectives as a unit of analysis instead of the nation-state he may not have had cause for his optimism towards regional economic integration. Indeed we may speculate that should the gains from growth continue to be distributed unequally, as they well may, then the forces of separation in the form of ethnic nationalism may have a disintegrative effect on the economy of the nation-state. This of course would make shambles of any efforts towards regional economic integration. Further, ethnic boundaries cut across national boundaries often causing political tensions between neighboring countries. This tension will be another hurdle in the path towards regional economic integration.

No clear cut answers emerge from the debate of whether countries should pursue inward-looking policies leading to self-reliance, outward-looking policies leading to economic integration with the international economy or an inward-outward looking policies leading to some type of regional economic cooperation. There are costs and benefits to any of these policies and to any combination of these policies. The costs and benefits need to be balanced with reference to development goals. What policy a nation pursues will depend on the viability of its exports in the international market, the nature of the export sector, (whether or not it has linkages with the rest of the economy), the
distributional effects of the policy, what effect that policy has on the nationalistic feelings of the ethnic collectives, and of course on the political orientation of the decision makers.

What is clear is that much of the rigor of the analysis in the debate has been vitiated by using the nation-state instead of the ethnic collective as the unit of analysis. Had the ethnic collective been used as a unit of analysis one point that may have emerged is the increased importance of trade between ethnic groups according to the doctrine of comparative advantage. At the ethnic and regional level markets are even smaller than at the national level, resources are less abundant and capital even more scarce. If the central government was to recognize the sanctity of ethnic identity to ethnic collectives, this recognition alone would go a long way towards establishing a feeling of psychological autonomy for ethnic groups. It would then be possible to move towards a specialization based on comparative advantage. This advantage might lay in the resources claimed by the ethnic group or the advantage may lay in the skills and attitudes on which the ethnic identity is based.

There is of course the ever present problem of an equitable distribution gains. The national setting offers a solution which the international setting does not; the existence of a central authority which can distribute the gains. It is possible for the central government to make sure that ethnic groups and regions are not hurt by the natural play of market forces while still using free market principles through mechanisms of compensation, such as transferring resources from those collectives or areas that benefit most from an integration of the economy to those which benefit the least. (It seems clear that there is a wide scope for using the theory of economic integration at the international regional level for economic integration within the nation-state).
Whether or not the central government will play such a benign role is of course at the heart of the matter. Myrdal is not optimistic:

In many of the poorer countries the natural drift towards inequalities has been supported and been magnified by built-in feudal and other inequitarian institutions and power structures which aid the rich in exploiting the poor. (Myrdal 1963, p. 40)

Whatever role the central government plays and whatever development policies are pursued, the nationalism of ethnic collectives will figure as a key variable in the developments. To overlook this powerful force is tantamount to committing a country to political and economic chaos.

Summary

In this section we set out to review the trade versus self-reliance debate. We noted that a policy of self-reliance resulting in withdrawal from international trade meant forgoing the static and dynamic gains of trade. We examined the various ways in which trade may serve as an engine of growth. Yet, except in few cases the dynamic gains from trade have not been widespread. Advocates of trade theory suggest that this failure has its roots in the market imperfections of the domestic economy. Critics of trade theory have pointed to the severe distributional effects of trade on the domestic economy and assert that problems of distribution are not an inherent reflection of trade but rather reflect the structural bias of international institutions. Trade advocates propose that developing countries formulate policies to regulate market imperfections so that the domestic economy may grow from the dynamic effects of trade. Critics of trade theory point towards making changes in the institutional structure of the international economic system and/or withdrawal from
international trade.

We concluded that for most countries autarky is out of the question; most countries lack the resources to be self-sufficient even in such a basic item as food. We noted that some writers have proposed a "collective self-reliance" through regional economic integration as an alternative solution to the questions raised by the trade versus self-reliance debate. But, there are tremendous obstacles in the way of regional economic integration; these are the forces of separation that exist within an international region and within a nation-state. Any analysis which suggests that these forces of separation will be overcome probably has not used the ethnic collective as a unit of analysis. Once we acknowledge that nationalism, which must be overcome for regional economic integration to succeed, is a nationalism which emerges from ethnic collectives and not from the nation-state as a whole, we recognize that ethnic nationalism plays a pivotal role not only in national integration but also in international regional integration.

A country may follow a trade policy linking it to the international economic system, it may pursue a policy of self-reliance withdrawing from international trade in an attempt to make it on its own, or it may attempt a collective self-reliance through regional economic integration. Whatever policies are decided upon the nationalism that emerges from ethnic collectives will play a crucial role in the developments.
VII. Conclusion: Ethnicity and Development

Ethnic groups have not disappeared as a consequence of modernization. Indeed, their ethnic boundaries have become further highlighted as they have mobilized politically in attempts to fight cultural discrimination of resources and power by the dominating ethnic groups. At least, this has been the case in Pakistan.

The so-called development that occurred in Pakistan did not occur for Bengalis, Sindhis, Baluchis and Pushtuns. In fact, not much of it reached the Punjabi peasant. Indeed, development as used by modernization theorists and centre academics has lost its meaning. This has resulted in attempts at a redefinition of "development". What has development meant and in light of this paper, what might be added or altered to give development a more significant meaning? The task of this concluding section is to answer this question.

In the 1950's and 60's, economic growth was considered development. Development was measured largely by GNP and per capita income. As we saw in the case of Pakistan, questions of distribution were brushed aside;

Inequality was (regrettably) necessary to generate savings and provide incentives. If growth were fast enough, income could easily be redistributed later - indeed that would happen automatically. (Seers, 1977, p. 2-3)

This notion which we discussed earlier as functional inequality came to ill repute even in the 1960's. It came to be realized that the gap between "developed" and "underdeveloped" countries was getting greater despite large transfers of capital and technology. (Dependency theorists would argue that the gap increased because of the transfers of capital and technology). Dudley Seers writes;
Even those developed countries enjoying fast growth had not, after all, achieved the political status or the social equity that had been expected and hoped for. Pakistan was a conspicuous example. (Seers, 1977, p. 2-3)

As a result, distribution became an important factor in defining development and a country was not considered to be enjoying "development" unless in addition, inequality, unemployment and poverty were declining (Seers 1970, p. 3). This idea was the force behind the IBRD-IDS study *Redistribution With Growth* (Chenery et al., 1974). But this approach came up against a problem; governments did very little to change distribution. Can this be surprising? Why should those in power be willing to give it away? A casual glance at history should easily reveal that those in power are reluctant, indeed defiant, about giving up power without a fight.

A further element was added to the concept of development, "the essential element to add - as is being widely recognized - is self-reliance..." (Seers 1978, p. 5). (We found in Section VI that adding self-reliance to the definition of development is a controversial issue. Having stated this we nevertheless allow Seers to make his claims for the purpose of examining his analytic reasoning.) Seers affirms:

We do not understand much about what self-reliance implies for development strategies, but some of the economic aspects are obvious enough. They include reducing dependence on imported necessities, especially basic foods, petroleum and its products, capital equipment and expertise. This would involve changing consumption patterns as well as increasing the relevant production
capacity. Redistribution of income would help, but policies would also be needed to change living styles at given income levels - using taxes, price policies, advertising and perhaps rationing. In many countries, self-reliance would also involve increased national ownership and control, especially of sub-soil assets and improving capacity for negotiating with transnational corporations.

(Seers 1977, p. 5)

There are also cultural implications which are seen to be more country-specific, "but as a general rule let us say that 'development' now implies inter alia, reducing cultural dependence on one or more of the superpowers..." (Seers 1977, p. 5). This is an important point, yet it falls to the same criticism as the "redistribution with growth" policies; why should national elites follow such policies? Such policies would deprive them of goods and services which are considered to be essential for modernization. And again, why should the elite be willing to give up power? The answer; "Such a program may appeal to what seems in many countries to be a stronger force than social conscience - nationalism." (Seers 1977, p. 6)

It is here that Dudley Seers makes a mistake that has been made by others before. The implication of such a statement is that nationalism is a force that stems from the country as a whole. Indeed, this statement typifies the lack of sensitivity and awareness to the history and dynamics of regional, religious, and ethnic divisions within so-called nations. In our example of Pakistan, what is the "nationalism" of which Seers speaks? Is it the revolutionary nationalism of the Bengalis? Is it the rebellious nationalism of the Baluchis, Sindhis and Pushtuns? Or is it the oppressive internal imperialist "nationalism" of the
Punjabis? Nationalism is a powerful force as Seers asserts, but nationalism must be seen in light of the profound divisions within a country. Indeed, as we have seen in the case of Pakistan, nationalism is a force that emerges from ethnic collectives rather than from the nation as a whole. (It is important to note that up to now we have conceived of ethnic groups as Seers and modernization theorists have conceived of nations - that is, as homogeneous collectives. Obviously, ethnic groups are not homogeneous collectives. The same type of dependence relations that exist between ethnic groups at the national level and between countries at the global level may exist within an ethnic group. For example, the Pashtuns can be differentiated into two groups, the hill Pashtuns and the plains Pashtuns;

When we examine origins, it will be found that a clear distinction can be drawn between those who inhabit plains and open plateaux on the one hand and the highlanders on the other hand (Caroe 1958, p. xii)

The reasons for these differences are ecologic and economic. In each sub-group social organizations and behaviour are different. Neither society has a favourable opinion of the other, nevertheless, both recognize each other as cousins and came together in the face of a common enemy. (Akbar Ahmed, 1976, p. 73) The point is that a definition of development which is truly significant must go beyond the national level and also beyond the ethnic level). In light of the analysis in this paper what can be added to give development a more refined and more realistic meaning?
Most important for the purposes of this paper is the right to be culturally diverse. Let us examine What Denis Goulet in *Global Development: The End of Cultural Diversity?* (1977) has written. His point is simple, "Unless cultural diversity is vigorously promoted there can neither be genuine development nor a humane world order." (Goulet, 1977, p. 1) Goulet is concerned that under the impact of various standardization forces, there is a danger of "reducing all cultures to a single type patterned after that found in industrialized societies." (Goulet, 1977, p. 2) He adds:

Therefore, clarification of the relationship between sound global development and cultural diversity is urgently needed before cultural destruction proceeds beyond the point of no return (Goulet, p. 2)

Goulet perhaps underestimates the adaptive and resilient characteristics of ethnic solidarity. Nevertheless, the concern for cultural diversity is crucial for redefining development. We may ask the question, "What are the advantages of cultural diversity?" Goulet answers by saying:

First, each culture is the unique bearer of precious human values. Just as diversity in the natural world is essential to beauty, fullness, and perfection, so too in the human race. The human potential for creativity and goodness is too great to be expressed adequately or completely in a single cultural form. (Goulet, p. 2)
Goulet's second point is more utilitarian; he sees the need for cultural diversity as crucial for the adaptation and survival of the human race in the face of changing ecosystems. His third point is more immediate and was a topic of this paper:

Cultural diversity must be weighed, finally, in the context of what it does for people and how well it meets their deepest needs. Hence cultural diversity cannot be discussed in romantic terms or as an abstract value, but must be seen in present historical and political contexts. (Goulet, p. 4)

Goulet does not lose sight of problems such as food supply, population pressure and social justice, yet he feels that these problems are "explicitly linked with the defense of cultural diversity as an essential ingredient of global and local development." (Goulet, p. 8) Let us reiterate Goulet's and this paper's conclusion: Cultural diversity, of which ethnicity is an key element, must be accepted as an important component of any genuine development.
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