000010875 001__ 10875
000010875 005__ 20170823162636.0
000010875 037__ $$a1318-2016-103266
000010875 041__ $$aen
000010875 084__ $$aD58
000010875 084__ $$aH21
000010875 084__ $$aL51
000010875 245__ $$aHeterogeneity in Costs and Second-Best Policies for Environmental Protection
000010875 260__ $$c2000
000010875 269__ $$a2000
000010875 300__ $$a34
000010875 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000010875 446__ $$aEnglish
000010875 490__ $$aDiscussion Paper 00-20
000010875 520__ $$aThis paper investigates heterogeneity in pollution abatement costs using a computable general equilibrium framework. Previous literature using aggregated data has found that "grandfathered" tradable permits are dominated by other instruments including emission taxes, performance standards, and technology mandates because of interactions with pre-existing taxes. However, when the underlying costs of abatement are heterogeneous, a disaggregate representation of costs yields qualitatively different findings. In a disaggregate model of NOX abatement in the United States, the relative performance of tradable permits improves significantly and out-performs command and
control approaches over a wide range of emission reductions.
000010875 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000010875 6531_ $$acost-effectiveness analysis
000010875 6531_ $$ageneral equilibrium
000010875 6531_ $$aenvironmental policy
000010875 6531_ $$ainstrument choice
000010875 6531_ $$asecond-best regulation
000010875 700__ $$aBurtraw, Dallas
000010875 700__ $$aCannon, Matthew
000010875 8564_ $$s175804$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10875/files/dp000020.pdf
000010875 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/10875
000010875 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:10875$$qGLOBAL_SET
000010875 912__ $$nMade available in DSpace on 2007-03-08T04:19:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
dp000020.pdf: 175804 bytes, checksum: 5a1c504848e65f2dc14459ab44a53fab (MD5)
  Previous issue date: 2000
000010875 982__ $$gResources for the Future>Discussion Papers
000010875 980__ $$a1318