000108618 001__ 108618
000108618 005__ 20180122215352.0
000108618 037__ $$a1349-2016-106934
000108618 041__ $$apt
000108618 245__ $$aLAND REFORM AND DEFORESTATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZONIA
000108618 260__ $$c2008-07
000108618 269__ $$a2008-07
000108618 270__ $$mc.araujo@u-clermont1.fr``$$pAraujo,   Claudo
000108618 300__ $$a20
000108618 336__ $$aConference Paper/ Presentation
000108618 520__ $$aNo processo de  reforma agrária brasileiro é comum a redistribuição de terra ocorrer por meio de invasões das grandes proprieades pelos sem terra. Esse mecanismo introduz insegurança no direito de propriedade fundiária e, na Regîão Amazônica, tem como consequência o excesso de desflorestamento. Esse trabalho utiliza   um jogo não-cooperativo para mostrar que   as interações estratégicas entre proprietários e posseiros em um contexto instittucional onde as  florestas naturais são consideradas como recursos de livre acesso implicam o excesso de desflorestamento. A principal implicação analítica  do modelo é que a taxa de desflorestamento de determinada área tende a aumentar com o  número de posseiros na área.  Essa implicação é confirmada quando testada em um painel de dados censitários municipais da  Amazônia brasileira no período 1970-96 e esse resultado se mantem mesmo quando se controla o problema da  endogeneidade do número de posseiros na especificação de uma equação de desflorestamento. Da perspectiva ambiental, portanto, o resultado permite questionar os mecanismos utilizados pelas políticas de reforma agrária no Brasil.----------------------------------------In Brazil, the land reform involves redistribution of land plots from large landowners to squatters. It generates property rights insecurity which alters land uses and fosters forest depletion. In this paper, a non cooperative game model is developed where natural forests are considered as an open access resource and the strategic interactions between landowners and squatters lead to an over deforestation. The main theoretical implication is a positive impact of squatters on deforestation. It is successfully tested on a panel data set covering the municipalities of the Legal Amazonia controlling for the endogeneity of squatters in a deforestation equation. The result questions the modalities of the Brazilian state-led land reform
000108618 542__ $$fLicense granted by Natalie Walker (walke759@umn.edu) on 2011-07-07T20:23:34Z (GMT):

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000108618 650__ $$aLand Economics/Use
000108618 6531_ $$areforma agrária
000108618 6531_ $$adesflorestamento
000108618 6531_ $$ainsegurança dos direitos de propriedade
000108618 6531_ $$aeconometria de painel
000108618 6531_ $$aLand reform
000108618 6531_ $$aDeforestation
000108618 6531_ $$aland tenure insecurity
000108618 6531_ $$apanel estimation
000108618 700__ $$aAraujo, Claudio
000108618 700__ $$aBonjean, Catherine Araujo
000108618 700__ $$aCombes, Jean Louis
000108618 700__ $$aMotel, Pascal Combes
000108618 700__ $$aReis, Eustaquio Jose
000108618 8564_ $$s202601$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/108618/files/204.pdf
000108618 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/108618
000108618 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:108618$$pGLOBAL_SET
000108618 912__ $$nSubmitted by Natalie Walker (walke759@umn.edu) on 2011-07-07T20:25:36Z
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  Previous issue date: 2008-07
000108618 982__ $$gSociedade Brasileira de Economia, Administracao e Sociologia Rural (SOBER)>46th Congress, July 20-23, 2008, Rio Branco, Acre, Brasil
000108618 980__ $$a1349