000010360 001__ 10360
000010360 005__ 20180910183827.0
000010360 037__ $$a418-2016-26466
000010360 041__ $$aen
000010360 245__ $$aExperimental test of the effect of imposing a penalty on buyers in a specific market structure
000010360 260__ $$c2007
000010360 269__ $$a2007
000010360 300__ $$a24
000010360 336__ $$aConference Paper/ Presentation
000010360 446__ $$aEnglish
000010360 490__ $$aConference Paper
000010360 520__ $$aUsing experimental economics tools this paper is testing one of the potential pitfalls in the renewable energy certificates (RECs) market in Australia. Stylised experiment highlighted that sellers' knowledge of the existence of the penalty to buyers for non compliance with mandatory requirements to have a certain number of RECs and the level of penalty in the duopoly market on supply side can push prices for unit of RECs higher than would occur in competitive market without penalty. The level of penalty was used by sellers as a "focal" point for setting the price for the unit.
000010360 650__ $$aMarketing
000010360 700__ $$aIvanova, Galina
000010360 8564_ $$s206498$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10360/files/cp07iv01.pdf
000010360 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/10360
000010360 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:10360$$pGLOBAL_SET
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  Previous issue date: 2007
000010360 982__ $$gAustralian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society - 2007>2007 Conference (51st), February 13-16, 2007, Queenstown, New Zealand
000010360 980__ $$a418