000010272 001__ 10272
000010272 005__ 20180122193949.0
000010272 037__ $$a828-2016-55160
000010272 041__ $$aen
000010272 245__ $$aClimate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements
000010272 260__ $$c2007
000010272 269__ $$a2007
000010272 300__ $$a35
000010272 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000010272 446__ $$aEnglish
000010272 490__ $$aETA Nota di Lavoro 16.2007
000010272 520__ $$aWe analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.
000010272 650__ $$aResource /Energy Economics and Policy
000010272 700__ $$aAnsink, Erik
000010272 700__ $$aRuijs, Arjan
000010272 8564_ $$s318810$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10272/files/wp070016.pdf
000010272 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/10272
000010272 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:10272$$pGLOBAL_SET
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  Previous issue date: 2007
000010272 982__ $$gFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers
000010272 980__ $$a828