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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://purl.umn.edu/90435

Title: The Demand for Specialty-Crop Insurance: Adverse Selection and Inefficiency
Authors: Richards, Timothy J.
Mischen, Pamela
Authors (Email): Adverse selection
Keywords: Contingent valuation
Crop insurance
Fruits and vegetables
Moral hazard
Risk
Uncertainty
Issue Date: 1998
Abstract: The twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are often blamed for the lack of insurance for many fruits and vegetables. This paper develops an alternative method of testing for adverse selection that uses a two-stage approach to determine the effects of technical inefficiency on the demand for insurance. With this approach, technical inefficiency is interpreted as an indicator of adverse selection. Because there is no active insurance market for many specialty crops, and thin markets for those that are insurable, a contingent valuation approach is used to obtain the data necessary to estimate the demand for three different types of insurance. The results suggest adverse selection may be a deterrent to the viability of extending the breadth of specialty crop insurance products.
URI: http://purl.umn.edu/90435
Identifiers: 0738-8950
Institution/Association: Journal of Agribusiness>Volume 16, Number 1, Spring 1998
Total Pages: 25
From Page: 53
To Page: 77
Collections:Volume 16, Number 1, Spring 1998

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