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| Title: | The GATT Negotiations and US/EC Agricultural Policies Solutions to Noncooperative Games |
| Authors: | Johnson, Martin
Roe, Terry
Mahe, Louis |
| Issue Date: | 1989 |
| Series/Report no.: | Bulletin 89-2 |
| Abstract: | Countries cooperate in negotiating treaties. However, treaty compliance is noncooperative; signatories comply with treaties only if compliance leaves them better off than noncompliance. US and EC agricultural policies of 1986 are modeled through a noncooperative game. Bilateral treaties, formalizations of Nash Equilibria, are presented which improve US and EC welfare. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/7491 |
| Institution/Association: | University of Minnesota>Economic Development Center>Bulletins |
| Total Pages: | 16 |
| Language: | English |
| Collections: | Bulletins
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| File |
Size | Format |
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| edc89-02.pdf | 589Kb | PDF | View/Open |
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