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Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics >
Volume 35, Number 1, April 2010 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/61059
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| Title: | A Dynamic Model of Mesh Size Regulatory Compliance |
| Authors: | Akpalu, Wisdom |
| Keywords: | crime
dynamic model
fishery
regulation |
| Issue Date: | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | JARE
35(1) |
| Abstract: | This paper employs a dynamic model for crimes that involve time and punishment to
analyze the use of a net with illegal mesh size in a management regime where each
community claims territorial use right over a fishery but has a discount rate that may
differ from the social discount rate. The equilibrium stock and harvest levels are found to
be much lower if the regulation is violated. Moreover, the optimal penalty for violation
must be decreasing in the shadow cost of taking the risk to fish illegally, and increasing
the risk of punishment increases the equilibrium stock level. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/61059 |
| Institution/Association: | Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics>Volume 35, Number 1, April 2010 |
| Total Pages: | 17 |
| From Page: | 34 |
| To Page: | 50 |
| Collections: | Volume 35, Number 1, April 2010
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| JARE,Apr2010,#03,pp34-50.pdf | | 330Kb | PDF | View/Open |
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