AgEcon Search

AgEcon Search >
       Yale University >
          Economic Growth Center >
             Center Discussion Papers >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://purl.umn.edu/54536

Title: Commitment Contracts
Authors: Bryan, Gharad
Karlan, Dean S.
Nelson, Scott
Authors (Email): Bryan, Gharad (gharad.bryan@yale.edu)
Karlan, Dean (dean.karlan@yale.edu)
Nelson, Scott (scott.nelson@yale.edu)
Keywords: Consumer/Household Economics
Institutional and Behavioral Economics
JEL Codes: D03
D14
Issue Date: 2009-10
Series/Report no.: Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper
980
Abstract: We review the theoretical and empirical literature on commitment devices. A commitment device is any arrangement, entered into by an individual, with the aim of making it easier to fulfill his or her own future plans. We argue that there is growing empirical evidence supporting the proposition that people demand commitment devices and that these devices can change behavior. We highlight the importance of further research exploring soft commitment – those involving only psychological costs – and the welfare consequences of hard commitments – those involving actual costs – especially in the presence of bounded rationality.
URI: http://purl.umn.edu/54536
Institution/Association: Yale University>Economic Growth Center>Center Discussion Papers
Total Pages: 37
Collections:Center Discussion Papers

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
cdp980.pdf246KbPDFView/Open
Recommend this item

All items in AgEcon Search are protected by copyright.

 

 

Brought to you by the University of Minnesota Department of Applied Economics and the University of Minnesota Libraries with cooperation from the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

All papers are in Acrobat (.pdf) format. Get Adobe Reader

Contact Us

Powered by: