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Marine Resource Economics >
Volume 10, Number 3, 1995 >
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| Title: | Irreversible Capital Investment in a Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model |
| Authors: | Sumaila, Ussif Rashid |
| Keywords: | noncooperative
game
fisheries
irreversible
capital
trawl
coastal |
| Issue Date: | 1995 |
| Series/Report no.: | Marine Resource Economics
Vol. 10 No. 3 |
| Abstract: | A two-stage, two-player noncooperative game model is developed(under an irreversible capital investment assumption) with the main aim of predicting the number of vessels that each player in such a game will find in his
best interest to employ in the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock, given a noncooperative environment and the fact that all players are jointly constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. The predictions so obtained are then compared with (i) the sole owner's optimal capacity investments for the two players; (ii) the results in Sumaila (1994), where perfect
malleability of capacity is assumed implicitly: and (iii) available data on the
Acrto-Norwegian cod fishery. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/49035 |
| Identifiers: | 0738-1360 |
| Institution/Association: | Marine Resource Economics>Volume 10, Number 3, 1995 |
| Total Pages: | 21 |
| From Page: | 263 |
| To Page: | 283 |
| Collections: | Volume 10, Number 3, 1995
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| 18823391.pdf | | 5228Kb | PDF | View/Open |
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