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Marine Resource Economics >
Volume 06, Number 3, 1989 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/48540
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| Title: | Crop Sharing in the Fishery and Industry Equilibrium |
| Authors: | Plourde, Charles
Smith, J. Barry |
| Keywords: | wage contracts
crop-sharing contracts
equilibrium
fisheries |
| Issue Date: | 1989 |
| Series/Report no.: | Marine Resource Economics
Vol. 6 No. 3 |
| Abstract: | This article presents a model of commercial fishing in a stochastic environment that focuses on the labor-employment contract. In a partial equilibrium context, the authors show that when boat owners and crew members are risk-averse, crop sharing is the optimal contract, and the resultant labor employment level will be greater than with a (suboptimal) wage contract. Industry effects and steady-state resource growth limitations are introduced into a market equilibrium model. In this extended model, market equilibria will also involve sharing contracts. These will result in greater employment, which comes at the expense of reduced resource stocks and higher-than-necessary harvesting costs. The article also examines how industry regulation such as licensing, quotas, and subsidies will differ if the prevailing contract is cropsharing as compared with a wage. Despite the fact that cropsharing contracts are privately optimal in a regulated setting, they may not be socially optimal. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/48540 |
| Identifiers: | 0738-1360 |
| Institution/Association: | Marine Resource Economics>Volume 06, Number 3, 1989 |
| Total Pages: | 15 |
| From Page: | 179 |
| To Page: | 193 |
| Collections: | Volume 06, Number 3, 1989
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| 8175827.pdf | | 902Kb | PDF | View/Open |
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